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Abstract 
 
 
The ‘end of life’ issue in relation to assisted suicide and euthanasia is one of our 
prime concerns and a most widely discussed phenomenon not only in academic 
and official literature, but also in day-to-day life. Some people, who are 
terminally ill or suffer from degenerative diseases, choose to end their life while 
they are competent to do so especially when the hope of recovery fades, suffering 
escalates and the quality of life diminishes. My thesis examines the practice of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia in: (a) England and Wales where the practice has 
been strictly prohibited, but is now in a process of liberalisation. The recent 
guidelines issued by the Director of the public prosecutions pertaining to section 2 
(4) of the Suicide Act 19611, may permit people assisting suicide to disobey the 
law on assisted suicide.2 (b) The Netherlands, the State of Oregon in the U.S. and 
Switzerland where the practice is already liberalised under special circumstances. 
In conclusion, the thesis will discuss liberal regimes to observe which regime 
would best suit England and Wales position. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 S. 2 (4) provide: “[N]o proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section except by 
or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.” See ‘The Suicide Act 1961’. 
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk
2 This view was put forth by Prof. David Schiff and Prof. Richard Nobles in the conference held 
on ‘Purdy and Director of the public prosecutions’ Guidelines’ on 6th November 2009. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Issues surrounding ‘end of life’ are widely discussed at today, not only in the 
academic and official literature, but also in day-to-day newspapers, television 
programmes and general conversation. The most controversial issues concern the 
areas of assisted suicide and euthanasia. These issues arose with the Greeks and 
eventually gained prominence in the medical context. Medical and scientific 
progress has lead to a change in the place and the time of death.3 For example, 
prior to the 20th century people generally died at home.4 It was rare for people to 
have any medical intervention in the last moments of their lives. Today many 
people die in hospitals or in hospices under medical supervision.5  As a result, 
there is now a progressive movement that consists of dying patients, as well as 
their families and physicians. This movement poses the question of whether the 
artificial extension of the lives of people who are dying is really in their best 
interest in all cases.6  For instance, ‘right to die’ societies and other such 
organisations have begun to lobby for change in the law of assisted suicide. These 
‘right to die’ societies and organisations argue that the patient, or the family 
representative, should have control over the dying process. They aim to ensure 
patient autonomy in the last moments of his or her life and further to this, they are 
in favour of allowing the patient to choose the time and the place of his or her 
death. In other words, as argued by Battin,7 death has formed a part of the 
conception of personal autonomy and self-determination. 
                                                 
3 Ziegler S. J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide 
for its Potential to Enhance Oversight and Demedicalize the Dying Process’. Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p. 318. 
4 For example, owing either to old age or due to illness or natural calamity.  
5 Ziegler S. J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide 
for its Potential to Enhance Oversight and Demedicalize the Dying Process’. Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p. 318. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Battin M.P. (2008) ‘Safe, Legal Rare? Physician-Assisted Suicide and Cultural Change in the 
Future’ in Birnbacher Dieter and Dahl Edgar (eds) Giving Death a Helping Hand: Physician-
Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation and Public Policy. An International Perspective. The 
Netherlands: Springer, Vol. 36. 
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This thesis examines the law of England and Wales on assisted suicide and 
euthanasia. As a comparison, the thesis examines the legal and extra-legal 
regimes of three different jurisdictions where assisted suicide or euthanasia, or 
both practices, are legalised or permitted officially. These jurisdictions are the 
Netherlands, the State of Oregon in the U.S. and finally, Switzerland. In the 
Netherlands, both euthanasia and assisted suicide are permitted under special 
provisions. In the State of Oregon, only physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is 
permitted. In Switzerland, assisted suicide is legal as long as the motive of the 
assistant is altruistic.8  
 
The main difference between Switzerland and the other two jurisdictions is that in 
Switzerland anybody either a physician or non-physician may assist in an act of 
suicide. On the other hand, in the Netherlands and the State of Oregon only 
physicians can provide assistance. In Switzerland and the Netherlands in 
particular, these practices have long been recognised and are now deeply 
embedded in the culture of these countries. In fact, Switzerland has started to 
cater for foreigners with this service, resulting in a phenomenon known as 
‘suicide tourism’. People from other countries, especially Germany, France, 
Austria and England, travel to Switzerland in order to die.9 As of now, it is the 
only place in Europe for ‘death refugees’ i.e. travellers who have the aim of 
ending their lives in a humane and dignified manner through the assistance of 
‘right to die’ societies such as Dignitas.10
 
                                                 
8 It is relevant to note that apart from these three jurisdictions, places such as Belgium, Luxemburg 
and the State of Washington and Montana in U.S. also permit one or the other practices. The 
reason why the subject matter of the thesis is restricted to only the Netherlands, the State of 
Oregon and Switzerland is because the current position of the practice of assisted suicide and 
euthanasia in England and Wales has some things in common with the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. The State of Oregon is of interest because its model is observed abuse free since its 
inception. Furthermore, Lord Joffe’s ‘Assisted dying for Terminally Ill Bill’ was modelled on the 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA). See Keown J. (2007) ‘Physician Assisted Suicide: 
Lord Joffe’s Slippery Bill’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 15, pp. 126-135. 
9 ‘Assisted suicide statistics: the numbers Dignitas helps to die, by country’. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/feb/25/assisted-suicide-dignitas-statistics  
10 Dignitas is one of the ‘right to die’ societies based in Switzerland which (apart from Exit 
international) provide assistance in suicide to foreigners apart from Swiss residents, provided that 
the person assisted suffers from a fatal disease or unacceptable disability. 
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The thesis is divided into three chapters, followed by an overall conclusion at the 
end. Chapter 1 sets out the law of England and Wales on assisted suicide. Hence, 
it provides an overview of the statutory law on assisted suicide11. It also analyses 
the limited scope of section 1 in the light of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. It 
further examines the possible reasons as to why a special provision - section 2(4) 
is incorporated in the statute that provides the Director of the Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) with the power to decide whether to bring prosecution or not against the 
person alleged to have assisted in the suicide. The role of the DPP is also analysed 
in this chapter, taking into account the recent landmark decisions in cases of 
assisted suicide.12 This is followed by considerations of possible future 
developments that could potentially follow from the most recent decision in the 
case of Debbie Purdy.13   
 
Chapter 2 examines the law of England and Wales on euthanasia. Hence, it is 
necessary to take into account both acts that kill and omissions that kill. Firstly, 
the chapter analyses the difference in law between the conduct of a doctor and a 
layperson that kills. Of particular importance here is the doctrine of double effect. 
Following this, the chapter will illustrate the discrepancies that are arguably 
involved in the application of the criminal law in cases of double effect. Secondly, 
the chapter sets out the duties that potentially can transform omissions into acts. 
The chapter discusses the ability of doctors to cancel their legal duties under 
special circumstances and the difficulties faced by laypersons who choose to do 
the same. The chapter concludes by examining the implications drawn from the 
relevant acts and omissions that kill.  
 
Chapter 3 sets out the current legal regimes relevant to the Netherlands, the State 
of Oregon and Switzerland. This comparison with the law of England and Wales 
is undertaken in order to have an insight into the regimes adopted by these 
                                                 
11 The Suicide Act 1961. 
12 That is the case of Diane Pretty and Debbie Purdy. The example of Daniel James will also be 
examined in this chapter. 
13 Regina (Purdy) v DPP (Society for the Prosecution of Unborn Children Intervention) [2009] 3. 
W.L.R. 403. Hereafter cited as R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3. W.L.R. 403. 
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jurisdictions in relation to the ‘end of life’ issue.  Apart from an assessment of 
these legal regimes, this chapter also sets out the extra-legal regimes adopted by 
these jurisdictions in order to ensure safe, responsible regulation of the practice of 
assisted suicide and euthanasia. 
 
The conclusion draws attention to what are arguably the two main reasons why 
the legislature in England and Wales is still reluctant to liberalise the current strict 
legal regime. These are the principle of sanctity of life or value of life and the fear 
of abuse. The thesis examines whether the experiences of these foreign 
jurisdictions can provide any information that might inform the debate on the law 
of England and Wales. Furthermore, an attempt is made to ascertain whether the 
fears regarding the potential for abuse of a more liberal regime are justified. In 
addition, attention is drawn to further problems that could potentially arise from 
the liberalisation of the laws on assisted suicide or euthanasia. Similarly, the 
importance of the sanctity of life or value of life is taken into account in this 
concluding part. This analysis is undertaken in order to find out whether there is 
evidence from these countries, as well as the state of Oregon, to show that the 
public in England and Wales generally holds different views on the sanctity or 
value of life, when compared to the view of the public in the other jurisdictions 
noted above.  
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Chapter 1 
The Law of England and Wales on Assisted Suicide 
 
  
Before 1961, it was a crime under common law to commit suicide or even to 
attempt to commit suicide. Such a felony was regarded as self-murder. As a result, 
anyone who assisted or encouraged another person to commit suicide and who 
was also present at the suicide was guilty of murder as a principle in the second 
degree; a person who was an accessory before the fact to the suicide14 was guilty 
of being an accomplice to murder.15  In 1961, the law on suicide was changed and 
liberalised by the Suicide Act, but nevertheless, assisted suicide remained a 
serious crime under section 2 (1) ‘complicity in suicide’.16 This Act creates a 
tension between the lawfulness of suicide and the unlawfulness of assisting 
someone to commit suicide which has become apparent over time. Efforts have 
been made to shed light on this Act and to clarify the law on suicide and assisted 
suicide. This chapter sets out the law on suicide and assisted suicide. It examines 
leading cases focusing on the role of the DPP under section 2 (4) of the Act and 
consider the likely future developments in this area by taking into account the 
most recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of Debbie Purdy.17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Accessory before the fact to the suicide was one who did assists in suicide, but was not present 
at the time of commission of the crime. 
15 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 407.  
16 Williams Glanville. (1973) ‘Euthanasia’. Medico Legal Journal, Vol. 41, pp. 14-34. 
17 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403. 
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1.1 The Statutory Law on Assisted Suicide: The Suicide Act 1961 
 
a) Outline of the Act's Provisions 
In 1961, Parliament enacted the Suicide Act decriminalising suicide under section 
1. At the same time, the Act made provision for criminal liability for complicity in 
the suicide of another under section 2 of the Act.18  
 
Section 2(1) of the Act 
Section 2 (1) proscribes any conduct that would assist in suicide of another person 
or the attempted suicide of another person.19 It provides: “A person who aids, 
abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to 
commit suicide” perpetrates a crime under section 2 (1) of the Act.20 On the other 
hand, a person who attempts to aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of 
another, commits an offence under section 1 (1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 
1981. 
 
As of 1st February 2010, the above position of the law on assisted suicide, which 
comprised of two offences, both the substantive offence and the attempt to 
commit the substantive offence, has been replaced with a single offence through 
section 59 (2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.21 The new Act substitutes 
section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act with the following:  
 
“(1) A person (“D”) commits an offence if-  
(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or 
attempted suicide of another person, and  
(b) D’s act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an 
attempt at suicide. 
                                                 
18 Ibid., at  p. 407.   
19 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 1; R v (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R 32, p. 
460; R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 409. 
20 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32. 
21 See ‘Minister of Justice Circular 2010/03’ at URL: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/circular-02-2010-coroners-justice-act.pdf.  
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(1A) The person referred to in subsection (1) (a) need not be a specific 
person (or class of persons) known to, or identified by, D. 
(1B) D may commit an offence under this section whether or not a suicide, 
or an attempt at suicide, occurs. 
 (1C) An offence under this section is triable on indictment and a person 
convicted of such an offence is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 14 years.”22
 
In addition, section 59 (4) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 inserts two new 
sections under section 2 of the Suicide Act: 
 
Section 2A of the Act 
“2A Act capable of encouraging or assisting 
(1) If D arranges for a person (“D2”) to do an act that is capable of 
encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another 
person and D2 does that act, D is also to be treated for the purposes of 
this Act as having done it. 
(2) Where the facts are such that an act is not capable of encouraging or 
assisting suicide or attempted suicide, for the purposes of this Act it is 
to be treated as so capable if the act would have been so capable had 
the facts been as D believed them to be at the time of the act or had 
subsequent events happened in the manner D believed they would 
happen (or both). 
(3) A reference in this Act to a person (“P”) doing an act that is capable of 
encouraging the suicide or attempted suicide of another person 
includes a reference to P doing so by threatening another person or 
otherwise putting pressure on another person to commit or attempt 
suicide.”23 
 
                                                 
22 See section 59 Encouraging and Assisting Suicide (England and Wales) of Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 c. 25. http://login.westlaw.co.uk  
23 Ibid. 
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Section 2B of the Act 
“2B Course of Conduct 
A reference in this Act to an act includes a reference to a course of 
conduct, and a reference to doing an act is to be read accordingly.”24   
 
Implications of the New Provisions  
The interpretation of the law on assisted suicide provided by the Criminal law 
Policy Unit Ministry of Justice circular states that apart from combining two 
offences into one, and replacing old-fashioned terms such as “aid, abet, counsel or 
procure” with more modern terms such as “assisting or encouraging”, there is no 
other change to the existing law on assisted suicide.25 However, the provisions of 
section 2 (1), (1A) and (1B) of the Act suggest otherwise. Section 2 (1) 
criminalises the distribution of information without any need to show that any 
particular person committed suicide or attempted suicide. This is contrary to the 
interpretation provided in the case of Abel and Others based on the old provision 
under section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act 1961. In this case Woolf J. held that  
 
“…for supply of the booklet [for example,] to amount to an offence under 
section 2 (1) of the Act of 1961 it had to be proved that the supplier, whilst 
intending the booklet to be used by a person actually contemplating 
suicide, and with the object of assisting or otherwise encouraging him, 
supply the booklet to such a person who then read it and, except in the 
case of an attempted offence, was assisted or encouraged by reading it to 
commit or to attempt to commit suicide….”26
 
The provision regarding substitution under section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act27 
makes it clear that the crime of assisted suicide is a ‘conduct’ crime rather than a 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 See ‘Minister of Justice Circular 2010/03’ at URL: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/circular-02-2010-coroners-justice-act.pdf.  
26 Attorney-General v Able and Others [1984] Q.B. 795, p. 796. 
27 The Suicide Act 1961 hereafter referred to as the Act. 
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‘result’ crime.28 Under the Act, it does not matter whether or not a person actually 
acts on the information that is supplied or provided by another person. If a person 
distributes information with intent to encourage or assist suicide, and the person is 
aware that his conduct is capable of providing assistance to any person 
contemplating suicide, this would fall within the scope of criminal liability under 
section 2 (1) of the Act. This means any proponent, particularly those directly 
linked to right-to-die societies, who distributes or publishes information on 
methods of committing suicide will face criminal liability, irrespective of the use 
of the information, as much as such a conduct of a person in the circumstances 
would fulfil the requirements of actus reus and mens rea.   
 
On the other hand, although section 2A (2) may seem harsh on those people who 
believe that their actions might assist suicide when there is no real possibility, 
arguably it provides a better understanding of the existing law on criminal 
attempts. For example under the law of criminal attempts, even attempting the 
impossible, such as providing harmless pills to a person ‘to assist in suicide’, 
would attract criminal liability.29
 
Similarly, those who escort their loved ones to Switzerland or those who make 
arrangements with Dignitas on behalf of their loved ones, can be held responsible 
for their actions in line with Section 2 (1) of the Act.30 The Minister of Justice, in 
Circular 2010/03, recently confirmed that the new language of ‘encouraging or 
assisting’ covers essentially the same actions that were previously covered by the 
                                                 
28 See section 2 (1B) above. 
29 See ‘Minister of Justice Circular 2010/03’ at URL: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/circular-02-2010-coroners-justice-act.pdf. 
30 This is explicit from the decision of the DPP in Daniel James’ situation (see pp. 43- 46 of the 
thesis) and from the most recent (19/03/2010) case of Caractacus Downes who escorted his 
parents (Sir Edward and Lady Joan Downes) to Dignitas and booked hotel room for their use in 
Switzerland. The DPP in this matter provided following reasons for holding consent to 
prosecution of Caractacus Downes. He said although there is sufficient evidence to charge 
Caractacus Downes with an offence of assisted suicide of his parents, “it is not in the public 
interest to do so”. The assistance provided can be characterised as minor and Caractacus Downes 
was “wholly motivated by compassion”. Furthermore his parents had showed a clear and settled 
decision to end their life. See ‘No Charges following deaths of Sir Edward and Lady Downes’. 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/113_10/index.html    
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old language i.e. to ‘aid, abet, counsel and procure’ under section 2 of the Suicide 
Act and the Criminal Attempts Act, as applied in case of section 2 of the Suicide 
Act.31
 
Section 2 (4) of the Act  
As has historically been the case,32 the prosecution under section 2(1) can be 
initiated only with the consent of the DPP.33 Section 2(4) of the Act makes 
provision for this. It provides: “…no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence 
under this section except by or with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.”34  The law under this subsection was clarified recently35 on the 
basis that it forms an integral part of section 2 (1) of the Act.36  Furthermore, the 
DPP has published the ‘Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging 
or Assisting Suicide’, a policy document37 which contains a number of specific 
factors, both for and against prosecution, in the circumstances of encouraging or 
assisting suicide.38   
  
Section 3 (3) of the Act 
Apart from the above-mentioned provisions, the Act also incorporates a proviso 
with regard to its jurisdiction. Section 3(3) of the Act provides that it extends only 
to England and Wales.39 The Law Lords in the case of Debbie Purdy40 were 
                                                 
31 ‘Minister of Justice Circular 2010/03’ at URL: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/circular-02-2010-coroners-justice-act.pdf.  
32 Since the inception of the Act. 
33 Bennion Francis. (2009) ‘Assisted Suicide: A Constitutional Change’. Criminal Law and Justice 
Weekly, Vol. 173, p. 521.  
34 The Suicide Act 1961. http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk  
35 On 25 February 2010. 
36 The clarification of the law on encouraging or assisting suicide under subsection (4) of the Act 
is the outcome of the case of Debbie Purdy who claimed that the law under subsection (4) of the 
Act was unclear (See R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403). More on this part of the chapter is 
said under subheading ‘The case of Debbie Purdy’. See p. 47 of the thesis.  
37  For the sake of brevity in future, this policy will be referred to as ‘offence specific policy’. This 
policy is annexed as ‘Appendix A’. 
38 The detailed analysis of the ‘offence specific policy’ is dealt further in this chapter under 
subheading, ‘Encouraging or Assisting Suicide: The Offence Specific Policy for Prosecutors’. 
39 See ‘The Suicide Act 1961’. http://www.statutorylaw.gov.uk  
40 Ibid., at p. 403. This case is examined little later under subheading ‘Decision in the case of 
Debbie Purdy’. 
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divided on the issue of jurisdiction.41 For instance, Lord Phillips showed concern 
over the probability that section 1 of the Act might not apply to suicide committed 
abroad, thus it would come under old law i.e., self-murder. As a result, such 
conduct would then attract a liability “…within section 9 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 which gives the English Courts jurisdiction over both 
principal and accessory liability in case of murder and manslaughter committed 
abroad”.42  
 
However, Lord Hope on the other hand, reasoned that the language of section 2(1) 
of the Act  
 
“…suggests that it applies to any acts of the kind it describes that are 
performed within this jurisdiction, irrespective of where the final act of 
suicide is to be committed. So acts which help another person to make a 
journey to another country, in the knowledge that its purpose is to enable 
the person to end her own life there, are within its reach. Its application 
cannot be avoided by arranging for the final act of suicide to be performed 
on the high seas, for example, or in Scotland. Otherwise it would be all too 
easy to exclude the vulnerable or the easily led from its protection.”43
 
Perhaps, the meaning of Lord Hope’s statement is that if section 2(1) applies to 
acts taking place outside of the jurisdiction, then section 1 must similarly apply to 
acts taking place outside of the jurisdiction, or the greater offence of accessory to 
murder would leave no room for the offence of complicity to operate.44  
                                                 
41 Heywood Rob. (2010) ‘R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP: Clarification on Assisted 
Suicide’. Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 126, p. 5; Buxton Richard. (2010) ‘R (on the application of 
Purdy) v DPP: Complicity in Suicide abroad’. Law Review, Vol.126, pp. 1-5. 
42 Buxton Richard. (2010) ‘R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP: Complicity in Suicide Abroad’. 
Law Review, Vol.126, p. 3. 
43 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 409. 
44 Alternatively, Lord Hope’s observation could mean that since assisted suicide is conduct-based 
offence, any act performed with intention to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt in suicide 
within the jurisdiction of England and Wales should be sufficient to hold one responsible for his or 
her conduct irrespective of the result. However, this could give rise to further concerns raised by 
Lord Philips. Similarly, this ambiguity could lead one to think that the defendant could be charged 
 16
Taking into account the opinion of Lord Phillips, Lord Hope addressed the issue 
further, stating that the conduct of Debbie Purdy’s husband in assisting Debbie 
Purdy to travel to Switzerland for the purpose of assisted suicide would 
potentially fall within the parameters of section 2 (1) of the Act.  It was this risk 
that caused Debbie Purdy to seek guidance from the authorities regarding the 
potential criminal liability her husband could incur in the event of escorting her 
travel to Switzerland.45  
 
On the contrary, Michael Hirst is of the view that it is not an offence for a person 
to do acts in England and Wales that aided and or abetted a suicide that 
subsequently took place in a jurisdiction where suicide is lawful.46 Although the 
Appellant Committee took his opinion into account in their oral discussion on this 
issue,47 Lord Philips, who pronounced the judgement in the case, held that the 
observations made by Lord Hope on the question of jurisdiction should remain 
valid unless it falls for the determination in the context of a prosecution. In 
addition, he stated the question should remain open since the interpretation 
provided by Lord Hope was not challenged and the issue requires a through 
study.48
 
Accepting the decision to keep the jurisdiction issue open, Hirst argues that the 
observation made by Lord Philip on the point of jurisdiction is mistaken. “One 
can, however, state with certainty that the spectre of prosecution for murder in 
such cases was properly laid to rest in 1961.”49 In Hirst’s view 
 
                                                                                                                                     
with two offences, complicity in suicide of another and principal in second degree or an 
accomplice to murder. Since these possibilities go against the clear and strait forward, view held 
by Lord Hope it is unlikely that this is what he meant. Hence Lord Hope must mean the above i.e. 
section 1 must apply beyond the jurisdiction. 
45  R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p.413. 
46 Hirst Michael. (2009) ‘Suicide in Switzerland: Complicity in England?’ Criminal Law Review, 
p. 335. 
47 Hirst Michael. (2009) ‘Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue’. Criminal Law 
Review, p. 870. 
48 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p.406. 
49 Hirst Michael. (2009) ‘Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue’. Criminal Law 
Review, p. 876. 
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“Section 3(3) indicates that the Suicide Act extends only to the law of 
England and Wales, and not to those of Scotland or Northern Ireland. But 
that is all that it does. It does not impose any territorial limitation on the 
ambit or application of the various provisions of the Act. So, when s. 1 of 
the Act abrogated the old felony of suicide, it did so for all purposes in 
English law, but only for the purpose of English law.”50
 
Having outlined the provisions of the Act, the following part of the chapter aims 
to explore the limited effect of section 1 in the light of section 2 of the Act.  
 
b) Negative and Positive Right to Die: The Limited Effect of Section 1 in 
the Light of Section 2 of the Act  
The law on suicide constitutes a negative, not a positive right to die.51 A negative 
right corresponds only to those rights which require a duty or duties of non-
interference.52 In other words, a negative right calls for non-action from others. A 
positive right, on the other hand, “is a justified claim to someone’s assistance”53. 
It entails not only a duty of non-interference, but also “the duty to help, at least in 
the cases where the right-holder would not be able to do the thing without help”54. 
Section 1 of the Act, permits any competent person to choose death over life.55 
The law “does not penalise the decision… to take their own life …nor does the 
law prohibit them from so doing”.56 Nonetheless, the language of the Act clearly 
indicates “…there is no right to be helped to die either by one’s own hand or the 
                                                 
50 Ibid., at p. 872. 
51 R (Pretty) v DPP (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2002] 1 A.C. 800, 
p. 846; Hale Dame Brenda (Lady Justice of Appeal). (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a 
Right to Die?’ Comm. L. World Review, Vol. 1, p. 9. 
52 Narveson J. (1999) Moral Matter. Canada: Broad View Press Ltd. pp. 34-5; Childress J.F. 
(1980) ‘Negative and Positive Rights’. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10, No.1, p. 19. 
53 Childress J.F. (1980) ‘Negative and Positive Rights’. The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 10, 
No.1, p. 19. R (Pretty) v DPP (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2002] 1 
A.C. 800, p. 846; Hale Dame Brenda. (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a Right to Die?’ 
Comm. L. World Review, Vol. 1, p. 9.  
54 Narveson J. (1999) Moral Matter. Canada: Broad View Press Ltd. pp. 34-5. 
55 Re Z (Local Authority: Duty) [2005] 1 W.L.R. 959.  
56 Ibid. 
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intervention of others.”57 In fact, those who encourage or assist the act of suicide 
may58 face criminal prosecution under section 2 (1) of the Act which proscribes 
any such conduct.59 As a result, in the light of section 2 (1) of the Act, the 
outcome of section 1 of the Act is such that a person who chooses to end his life is 
able to act alone.60 This leaves one with only two choices: to die unaided within 
the jurisdiction of England and Wales;61 or travel abroad unaided for example, to 
Switzerland to die with the help of Dignitas.62  
 
Taking Life ‘Actively’  
In order to benefit from the existing negative right to die, one must be competent 
to make a decision.63 Further to this, the person should be physically able to carry 
out the act of suicide.64 Therefore, under the Act, a person contemplating suicide 
should begin and end the whole process by oneself.65 Any sort of assistance 
provided either ‘before the fact’, ‘during the process of attempt to commit 
suicide’ or ‘after the attempt’66, would potentially bring the assistant “…within 
                                                 
57 Hale Dame Brenda (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a Right to Die?’ Comm. L. World 
Review, Vol. 1, p. 9. 
58 The word ‘may’ is used to emphasise the requirement of consent for prosecution under 
subsection (4) of the Act.  
59 R v Pitman (1997) 4 (9) Med L Monitor 2-3. Cited in Huxtable R. (2007). Euthanasia, Ethics 
and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. New York: Routledge. Cavendish. p. 151; R v Wallis 
[1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 342.  
60 Freeman Michael. (2002) ‘Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Dianne Pretty Case’. 
Medical Law Review, Vol. 10, p. 246. 
61 Coggon John. (2006) ‘Could the Right to Die with Dignity Represent a New Right to Die in 
English Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 14, p. 228. 
62 In Re Z (Local Authority: Duty) [2005] 1 W.L.R. 959. It is to be noted that although the 
husband of Ms Z was willing to accompany her, the moot point in this case is the court held that it 
had no power to stop Ms Z from travelling to Switzerland for the purpose of ‘assisted death’. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Without requiring any help from another person who comes within the jurisdiction of the 
English courts for the purposes of section 2 (1) of the Act. Although the law does not require one 
to be physically able to attempt to commit suicide, physical disability prevents one from doing so. 
As a result, such person cannot benefit from the negative right to die unless he depends on another 
person for assistance which would mean exposing that particular person to criminal liability. 
Hence, one should be physically able to benefit from section 1 of the Act. 
65 This means not only planning how to go about, but also to make arrangements for the means to 
end ones life successfully and peacefully. Such course of conduct is necessary in order to prevent 
another person falling within the scope of section 2(1) of the Act. 
66 Assistance provided after the attempt here refers to cases in which a person may require more 
help from the assistant to ensure one’s death like in case of Lynn Gilderdale who had to ask her 
mother to provide her with more morphine. For further details on this case, see footnote 68 and the 
last part of this chapter. 
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the meaning of section 2 (1) as an offender and render him [or her] subject to 
prosecution”67. This is exactly what happened in the case of Lynn Gilderdale.68 
Lynn took the first step to end her life (by taking almost the whole dose of 
morphine). It being insufficient to kill her, she had to depend on her mother, Kay 
Gilderdale, to provide her with more morphine. As a result, Kay Gilderdale’s 
conduct came within the scope of section 2 (1) of the Act which, as stated above, 
prohibits any kind of assistance in relation to the suicide of another.  
 
Regarding the law in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, the only help one was 
able to avail of, without implicating another person in their act of self-killing, was 
the provision of the information on how to commit suicide, which is mostly 
provided by the campaigners of right to die. Since 1st February 2010, this 
provision arguably, has taken a different mode. As stated earlier69 currently, any 
person who supplies information on how to commit suicide through any kind of 
source with intent to encourage or assist suicide of another or attempted suicide of 
another should attract criminal liability. 
 
Although it may be relatively easy to obtain information on how to attempt to 
commit suicide, it is more difficult to procure the means to end ones life quickly 
and painlessly.70  As a result, it is often the case that even able-bodied people 
have to rely on another person, not to perform an act, but to supply means. 
Terminally ill people normally rely on their doctors for this purpose. Although in 
most instances doctors would prescribe the drug for the purpose of pain relief, it is 
arguable that at times, they may in fact do so to assist their patients to put an end 
                                                 
67 Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted 
Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, (Jan), p. 5; HC Deb 14 July 1961 vol. 644 cc833-45. ‘Suicide Bill 
[Lords]’ at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1961/jul/14/suicide-bill-lords  
68 Lynn Gilderdale fell ill with ME in 1991 and since then her health kept on deteriorating, but her 
mind was sharp. She soon was paralysed from the waist to down and became bedridden. In 2007, 
she attempted unsuccessful suicide.  In 2008, she again attempted suicide and this time she did 
succeed, but only with the help of her mother. See Broadcast on: BBC One, 1st February 2010. ‘I 
helped my daughter die’, at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00qs930/b00qs8mk/panorama_I_Helped_My_Daughter_D
ie/  
69 See pp. 11-13 of the thesis. 
70 Humphry, Derek. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide 
for the Dying. New York: Dell Publishing. 
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to their suffering. This type of conduct by doctors is normally shielded by the 
doctrine of double effect.71 However, the obligation to comply with record 
keeping and the duty to prescribe doses of pills that are not more than necessary 
to relieve pain makes it difficult for doctors to assist in this manner.72
 
Taking Life ‘Passively’ 
On the other hand, a person may decide to end his or her life by passive means 
such as refusing food and water i.e. to starve oneself to death.73 Derek Humphry 
explains how painful and long this process of ‘silent suicide’ could last for.74   
 
In some cases self-starvation can be very painful. In 1987, after a court in 
Colorado gave Hector Rodas permission to starve himself to death (he was 
quadriplegic), morphine had to be administered to kill the pain of fatal 
dehydration. In the fifteen days it took Rodas, who had good medical care, 
to die he constantly slipped in and out of a coma.75
 
As is evident Mr Rodas’ experience killing oneself in this manner is an 
independent act for which the dying person takes full responsibility.76 However, 
even in this situation the possibility remains that another person will get involved, 
not to assist in suicide (a debatable issue), but to make dying comfortable and 
painless. This is precisely what Kay Gilderdale claimed she had done for her 
daughter, Lynn (who had actually attempted suicide herself) when she injected 
Lynn with morphine after Lynn lost consciousness.77 Humphry calls this type of 
                                                 
71 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. 
72 More on the role of doctors in the context of double effect is discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
73 Humphry Derek. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide 
for the Dying. New York: Dell Publishing. p. 58. 
74 Ibid., at p. 60.  
75 Ibid., at p. 59. 
76 Ibid., at p. 62. 
77 See Broadcast on: BBC One, 1st February 2010. ‘I helped my daughter die’. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00qs930/b00qs8mk/panorama_I_Helped_My_Daughter_D
ie/  
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conduct ‘assistance in dying’78, whereas legally such conduct could potentially be 
prosecute as ‘attempted murder’ or ‘murder’ depending on the facts and 
circumstances of the case.  
 
Apart from self-starvation, the issue of whether refusing life-saving treatment or a 
life-preserving intervention is itself a method of committing suicide has raised 
concern. If this is categorised as suicide, those who assist by administering drugs 
that reduce pain can be charged with assisting suicide. Some oppose this view 
claiming that refusing treatment is merely asserting one’s right to self-
determination.79 The courts have been reluctant to accept that dying, as a 
consequence of either withholding treatment or withdrawing treatment is a form 
of suicide. According to Lord Goff: 
 
“…there is no question of the patient having committed suicide, nor 
therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in so doing. It is 
simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do so, declined to consent to 
treatment which might or could have the effect of prolonging his life, and 
the doctor has, in accordance with his duty, complied with his patient’s 
wishes.”80
 
On the other hand, some commentators argue that “refusing treatment is, or can 
be a form of suicide….”81 For example Otlowski uses the following analogy: 
“…if a person deliberately chooses not to move from the path of an avalanche, or 
refuses to leave a burning building, it is arguable that the person is, in effect, 
                                                 
78 Humphry Derek. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide 
for the Dying. New York: Dell Publishing. p. 60. 
79 Freeman Michael. (2002) ‘Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Diane Pretty Case’. 
Medical Law Review, Vol. 10, p.247.  
80 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789.  
81 Williams Glenys. (2007) Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The Impact of 
Criminal Law Concepts on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. London; New York: Routledge. 
Cavendis. p.113; Hale Dame Brenda. (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a Right to Die?’ 
Comm. L. World Review, Vol. 1, p. 9; Otlowski M. (1997) Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common 
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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committing suicide”.82 However, it is possible that people may in fact have 
different reasons for so doing, e.g. religious reasons or a dislike of the side effects 
of the treatment. Nonetheless, it cannot be disputed that one such reason could be 
a desire to commit suicide.83 The Court of Strasbourg in the case of Diane Pretty 
noted “…that in domestic law, a person may exercise ‘a choice to die’ by refusing 
life-prolonging treatment”.84  This appears to recognise, at least for the purposes 
of European Human Rights law, that refusing treatment may amount to suicide. 
 
Arguably, another way of ensuring death after attempting suicide is of Kerrie 
Wooltorton. Importantly, this case shows that the negative right to die is not 
simply immunity from prosecution for those who attempt to take their own life, 
but a full right to prevent others from interfering to prevent someone from 
committing suicide85 Wooltorton was depressed (about her inability to have 
children) she had attempted suicide nine times previously. On 15 September 
2007, she drew up her directive, which clearly stated that she did not want to be 
saved. She had also expressed the wish that she wanted medical staff only to make 
her dying comfortable. Three days later she took an overdose at home and called 
the ambulance. However, she remained conscience in order to hand the letter to 
the doctors of the Norwich Hospital and to tell them that she did not wish to be 
saved. The only reason why she called the ambulance is that she did not want to 
die alone and in pain.86 Since the doctors found her mentally competent to make 
such a decision, and going beyond her wish would mean committing assault, the 
doctors found themselves in a position where they had to let her die.87 In fact Dr 
                                                 
82 Otlowski M. (1997) Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. p. 63. 
83 Keown J. (2003) ‘European Court of Human Rights: Death in Strasbourg – Assisted Suicide, the 
Pretty Case, and the European Convention on Human Rights’. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, p. 728. 
84 Ibid; Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1, p. 36. 
85 Rebecca Smith. (2009) Living wills Case could lead to ‘Assisted Suicide by Backdoor’. 
Telegraph.co.uk (accessed on 11 March 2010). 
86 ‘Suicide Woman allowed to die because doctors feared saving her life would be assault’. 30 
September 2009, Telegraph.co.uk  (accessed on 12th March 2010). 
87 Ibid. 
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Alexander Heaton88 said, “I would’ve been breaking the law and I wasn’t worried 
about her suing me, but I think she would have asked, 'What do I have to do to tell 
you what my wishes’”.89 If Dr Heaton had treated Wooltorton against her ‘will’, 
he would risk not only civil liability, but also criminal (battery and assault). 
 
Wooltorton was provided with pain relief in order to make her dying comfortable 
as it was done in the case of Mr Rodas90. As much as this could be seen as a duty 
on the part of the doctor to provide such care at the end of life of the patient,91 it 
could also be seen as assisted suicide. However, the Coroner came to the verdict 
that the hospital should not be blamed because the patient had the capacity to 
consent to treatment and the doctors acted within the law in following her living 
will.92  
 
Implications of Limited Scope of Section 1 in the Light of Section 2 (1) of the 
Act  
 
Section 2 (1) is an obstacle to physically disabled people as well as able-
bodied people  
As seen above it is not only cases involving disability which can come in the way 
of the people who wish to end their life peacefully and painlessly without 
implicating another person in their death. There is also often a difficulty in 
obtaining resources, which acts as a hurdle for both the ‘able’ person as well as 
‘disabled’ person. Section 2 (1) of the Act also prevents those who may be 
physically able and might even have access to means to end their life, but they are 
unwilling93 to perform the conduct (attempt to commit suicide) without 
assistance.94 Hence, the person who cannot commit suicide without help cannot 
                                                 
88 The hospital’s consultant renal physician. 
89 ‘Suicide Woman allowed to die because doctors feared saving her life would be assault’. 30 
September 2009, Telegraph.co.uk  (assessed on 12th March 2010). 
90 See p. 21 of the thesis. 
91 More on this aspect is said in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
92 Ibid. 
93 May be because they lack courage or probably because they do not want to die a lonely death.  
94  R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 426. 
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exercise the negative right to die except when one is dependant on medical 
treatment for one’s survival. Such a person may choose not to carry on living and 
refuse treatment either by orally means or through advance directives and opt for 
the treatment to make one’s dying comfortable like Kerrie Wooltorton, who got 
the doctors to assist her by making it more comfortable. Similarly, the distinction 
between ‘assistance in suicide’ and ‘murder’ requires the act to be treated as the 
cause of death to be an act of the suicide. This prevents a person who is incapable 
of undertaking the final act for themselves enjoying the negative right to die, not 
because of section 2 (1) of the Act, but because of the law of murder.  
 
Under the current law on suicide the only people able to die a ‘good death95’ 
without incriminating another are those who are physically capable to act alone 
and who have access to required information and means (e.g. drugs). Other 
options available (apart from prescribed drugs) to end ones life are easy to acquire 
but arguably these options do not ensure a ‘good death’. This is because it not 
only has bad side effects such as vomiting, body cramps, etc, but it can be violent 
and painful, and at times not guarantees death.    
 
As a consequence the negative right to commit suicide, under section 1 in the 
light of section 2 (1), operates only as a right to choose an uncertain and possibly 
painful death and also, perhaps, a lonely death. Humphry argues that there are 
different ways people attempt to commit suicide.96 He states that some people 
attempt suicide by ingestion of cyanide (which comes in different forms such as 
potassium cyanide, Ferrocyanide, sodium cyanide). He goes on to say that one 
must take large amount of it in order to ensure immediate death. He does not 
recommend this option because it does not ensure death in every case, and most 
of the time the side effects of the poison are extremely unpleasant. Ingesting the 
                                                 
95 One that is peaceful, painless and quick. 
96 Humphry Derek. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide 
for the Dying. New York: Dell Publishing. 
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poison could lead to bleeding, vomiting and cramps.97 Other methods that he 
notes include a method to inject oneself with air bubbles of 100 to 200ml (a 
process which must be performed quickly intravenously, and close to the heart i.e. 
one would have to fill the whole heart with air at once). Humphy does not 
recommend this method probably because the person does not die immediately 
and remains conscious during the last 5 minutes before death. This means ending 
life in this manner would amount to slow and painful process. Other common 
methods of suicide are hanging and drowning. Some more outlandish methods 
include hunting for poisonous plants to ingest and some even attempt to freeze 
themselves to death on a mountain by exposing oneself to the elements.98 It is 
also possible to take huge doses of drugs,99 bought without prescription. 
Generally, this method does not ensure death and if it does cause death, it is slow 
and painful. For example, taking heavy doses of aspirin will burn the lining of the 
stomach over several days. As stated above, some people may also attempt to 
starve themselves to death and while others try to use non-prescribed drugs, in 
combination with a plastic bag, to commit suicide. Humphry strongly suggests 
that one should somehow ‘shop’ for a doctor who is willing to assist in providing 
pills. When such an option is not available, according to him, one should choose 
sleeping pills and a plastic bag to ensure death. Hence, for Humphry, this method 
could prove preferable to the others suggested above.  
 
In the absence of a right in this country to receive drugs that can make death both 
certain and painless, some of those contemplating suicide choose to travel to 
countries where such drugs are available.100 Alternatively, those who are 
physically able and financially well off, travel to Switzerland to have a good 
death. This would almost always involve making the choice to die an earlier death 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Which are not lethal unless taken in large doses. 
100 Humphry Derek. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide 
for the Dying. New York: Dell Publishing. 
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in order to circumvent the restrictions regarding receiving the necessary assistance 
in the case of a delay.101   
 
c) The Role of the DPP under Section 2 (4) of the Act 
 
i) A Possible Rational for Inclusion of Subsection (4) of the Act 
The harshness of the law of assisted suicide, as set out above, has been 
ameliorated by a prosecution policy that fails to prosecute all cases where those 
committing suicide have been able to obtain assistance from others. That this 
could become a policy, rather than the ad hoc decisions of different prosecuting 
authorities, is a consequence of section 2 (4), which makes all prosecutions 
subject to the consent of the DPP. 
 
When Parliament passed the legislation in 1961, it made provision in section 2 (4) 
of the Act for the requirement of the DPP’s consent to prosecution. As stated 
above, no prosecution can be brought under section 2 (1) of the Act without the 
prior consent of the DPP. This provision was introduced in spite of there being a 
general practice that the prosecution does not follow automatically.102 This 
implies the provision under Suicide Act probably has a special purpose compared 
to a ‘general prosecutorial discretion’103 which provided guidance through the 
Code of the practice issued by the DPP under section 10 of the Prosecution of 
                                                 
101 This is assumed on the basis that people who are well enough to travel unassisted are not about 
to die. 
102 “‘In 1951 the question was raised whether it was not a basic principle of the rule of law that the 
operation of the law is automatic where an offence is known or suspended. The then Attorney 
General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, said: “it has never been the rule in this country – I hope it never 
will – be that criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution.” He pointed out 
that the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions only intervene to direct a 
prosecution when they consider it in the public interest to do so and he cited a statement made by 
Lord Simon in 1925 when he said: “… there is no greater nonsense talked about the Attorney 
General’s duty than the suggestion that in all cases the Attorney General ought to decide to 
prosecute merely because he thinks there is what the lawyers call a case. It is not true and no one 
who has held the office of Attorney General supposes it is.” Sir Hartley Shawcross’s statement 
was indorsed, I think, by more than one of his successors’.” See Regina (Purdy) v Director of 
Public Prosecutions (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children intervening) [2009] 3 W.L.R. 
403, p. 419. 
103 Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted 
Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Jan, pp. 5-6. 
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Offences Act 1985, in the form of ‘Full Code Test’. It comprises of two stages,104 
an evidential stage105 and public interest stage106. In this part of the chapter 
attempt is made to explore the different views held by academics and practitioners 
on a possible reason for inclusion of subsection (4) in the Suicide Act. Obtaining 
a view on the intention underlying this provision will help to understand the spirit 
of the law on assisted suicide.   
 
To Mark the Gravity of the Crime 
Huxtable is of the opinion that the requirement of the consent of the DPP to 
prosecution was included in the Act to mark the gravity of the crime.107 Huxtable 
argues that the reason for this is that the offence “can encompass cases which 
range ‘from the border of cold blooded murder down to the shadowy area of 
mercy killing’”.108 The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke, who read the Suicide Bill for a second time while it 
was under consideration, also remarked that the cases under this offence may 
vary.  
 
“The Committee recommended the creation of a completely new offence, 
aiding, abetting counselling or procuring the suicide of another or an 
attempt by another to commit suicide, and it recommended that this 
offence should carry a penalty of a maximum sentence of 14 years 
imprisonment. This may seem very high, but the offences are not likely to 
be frequent, and, with very few exceptions, may be expected to attract 
only a small penalty. But the complicity in the death of another can never 
be regarded lightly, and it is not difficult to think of circumstances in 
                                                 
104 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 463.  
105 It requires that prosecutors “…be satisfied that there is enough evidence to provide ‘a realistic 
prospect of conviction’”. See R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 463. 
106 Only when the requirement of the evidential stage is fulfilled, the prosecutor should then 
examine the case under second stage and “…decide if a prosecution is needed in the public 
interest”. See R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 463. 
107 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 78. 
108 Ibid., at pp. 62 – 78. 
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which the offence would be extremely grave, calling for severe 
punishment. Indeed, the gravity of these offences will also be marked by 
the requirement that they should be tried only at Assizes, and only by, or 
with the consent of, the Director of Public Prosecutions.”109
 
The language used in the passage suggests that there were various ways in which 
someone could be helped or assisted in committing suicide. It also shows an 
attempt to articulate two sides of the offence, both assisted suicide or complicity 
in suicide and attempt to murder or murder. Mr. Keir Starmer (DPP) also made 
reference to the same point in an interview with Guardian. He said the reason why 
Parliament thought it necessary to include section 2 (4) in the Act providing 
discretion to the DPP to consent to prosecution is because it recognised that the 
ways in which one may commit suicide, and the ways in which people may assist, 
are varied.110 This implies that some ways of encouraging or assisting suicide 
were not to be prosecuted and some ways were to be prosecuted. In the 
forthcoming sections attempt is made to explore the possible basis of distinction.    
 
To Spare those who had not offended against the Spirit of the Legislation 
In 2000, the Law Commission considered the justification for requiring consent to 
prosecution.111 Andrew Dismore (Hendon) MP, relied on a quote from the report 
of the then Attorney General, who said in 1959 that 
 
“the purpose of consent was ‘to prevent vexatious proceedings’, which is a 
more natural way of putting it [than saying that it was to ‘stop busy bodied 
blundering in and prosecuting people in circumstances which would not be 
seen as appropriate’112], and to restrict prosecutions in circumstances 
                                                 
109 HC Deb 14 July 1961 vol. 644 cc833-45. ‘Suicide Bill [Lords]’. 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1961/jul/14/suicide-bill-lords  
110 ‘Guardian Daily: Assisted suicide and the law’. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/audio/2010/jan/29/guardian-daily-podcast  
111 ‘Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’, HC Deb 14 April 2000 Vol. 348 cc 603 –66.   
112 The BBC’s legal correspondent for news and current affairs, Mr Joshua Rosenburg, provided 
this reason for provision of consent. See ‘Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’, HC Deb 
14 April 2000 Vol. 348 cc 603 –66.   
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where a law has, necessarily, been drafted in broad terms, thereby creating 
the risk that it would catch those who had not offended against the spirit of 
the legislation”.113   
 
Dismore makes two points here. Firstly, he notes that one reason for requiring 
consent is to avoid proceedings being brought with no legal basis.114 Secondly, he 
notes that another reason for requiring consent is to protect those persons who 
perform the action or get involved while fulfilling one’s duty from being 
prosecuted. In this scenario, the aim is not to assist in suicide or to attempt to kill 
or kill, but they may potentially fall foul of the existing criminal law. Dismore 
makes a special reference to doctors, noting that if a doctor becomes involved in a 
situation of assisted suicide the doctor would potentially fall foul of the existing 
criminal law under section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act.115  Hence, he argues that the 
‘consent provision’ is vital to protect doctors such as Dr David Moor,116 whose 
intentions are not to breach the law, but to treat the patient.  In Dismore’s opinion, 
these types of cases can be distinguished from other types of cases involving 
doctors such as Dr Shipman, who clearly offended against the spirit of the law, 
which is framed to protect vulnerable people117. If the ‘consent provision’ could 
be understood in the above context, and if it is appropriate to say that the spirit of 
the law on assisted suicide under section 2 (1) is to protect vulnerable people who 
are “…sometimes minded to wish themselves dead…” as observed by Lord CJ in 
Hough118, then it is arguable that subsection (4) is a legislative attempt so to 
qualify subsection 2(1) so to avoid injustice, without too seriously compromising 
                                                 
113 ‘Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’, HC Deb 14 April 2000 Vol. 348 cc 603 –66.   
114 Normally this happens when one intends to harass the defendant or has no sufficient ground to 
base the case in law. 
115‘Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’, HC Deb 14 April 2000 Vol. 348 cc 603 –66. 
116 Ibid. Dr David Moor was charged with murder of one of his patients to whom Dr David Moor 
had administered lethal dose of painkilling drug. He was prosecuted of the alleged offence. 
However, the jury found him not guilty. This case is examined in detail in chapter 2 of the thesis.  
117 ‘Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’, HC Deb 14 April 2000 Vol. 348 cc 603 –66. 
More on this is said in the following chapter of the thesis. 
118 R v Hough (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 406. In this case, Hough performed the last act on her friend 
who had attempted suicide, but did not die for several hours. Hough acted on the prior consent of 
her friend who had asked her to intervene if her attempt failed.  
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the sanctity of life.119 In other words, subsection (4) acts as a kind of ‘referee’, 
with the DPP performing the function in order to draw a line between assistance, 
to those who are not vulnerable (which does not require prosecution), and matters 
of complicity in death (which does require prosecution). The reason for this is that 
in the former scenario, the party involved does not offend the spirit of the law i.e. 
‘protection of the vulnerable’, but in the latter scenario, the party involved falls 
within the criminal element of the legislation and therefore, the party should be 
prosecuted.120 This means not only doctors who fall foul of the existing criminal 
law should benefit by section 2 (4) of the Act, but also lay people whose conduct 
is similar to that of a doctor for example.  On this basis, it is possible to suggest 
that the justification for the inclusion of subsection (4) is to enable the DPP to 
discern between those whose conduct defeats the purpose of the Act, i.e. 
‘protection of the vulnerable’ and those who do not and to act accordingly.121  
 
To Limit the Scope of Section 2(1) of the Act 
Richard Tur argues that the purpose of section 2 (4) was intended to restrict 
prosecutions in some kinds of cases. These cases, according to him, are morally 
justified assisted suicide “…in which conviction would be seriously absurd or 
grossly unjust”.122  He cites Diane Pretty’s case as an example in this context and 
suggests that if Mr Pretty had to assist Diane Pretty in suicide, he would be not 
guilty of any offence for so doing.123 Perhaps what he means is since the negative 
right to die already exist it would be insubstantial to count such an act as an act of 
                                                 
119 Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted 
Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Issue Jan, p. 6. 
120 Lord Hope in the case of Debbie Purdy did raise this point, but those who oppose assisted 
suicide are concerned about it. They think this reason coupled with ‘compassionate interest’ could 
integrate with ‘interested interest’ i.e. interest to gain as a result. See R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 
W.L.R. 403, pp. 423-424. 
121 Lady Baroness Hale while referring to the content of the policy the DPP required to promulgate 
observed that the DPP should focus on the characteristics which should distinguish between the 
cases in which the fear of prosecution will be “disproportionate” from those in which it will not. 
See R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 426.  
122 Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted 
Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Issue Jan, pp. 3-4. 
123 Ibid., at p. 3. 
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assistance in suicide in the given circumstances. As a result, Mr Pretty’s conduct 
would be morally excusable. 
 
It is obvious that for Tur, the case of Diane Pretty presented a set of facts that 
could allow the DPP to withhold his consent to prosecution. Tur makes a 
distinction between morally justified cases of assisted suicide and morally 
unjustified cases of assisted suicide and he opines that only the latter cases should 
be prosecuted.124 In stating this, Tur also accepts the idea that the ways by which 
one may attempt to commit suicide and the ways by which one may be assisted to 
commit suicide are varied. Hence, for Tur the role of the DPP under subsection 
(4) should be to make distinction between cases on the basis of moral culpability. 
Therefore, the DPP should not ask merely ‘who assists in suicide of another’ but 
rather ‘under what circumstances one assists in the suicide of another’.  
 
However, it is not easy to divide assisted suicide into what is morally justifiable 
and what is morally not justifiable. While Tur argues it is possible to make a 
morally justifiable argument in favour of assistance in suicide in Diane Pretty’s 
case125, he thinks the McShane’s case126 was not morally justifiable. In this case, 
McShane attempted to assist in the suicide of her mother127 by supplying her with 
pills to end her life. However, McShane did this so that she could eventually 
benefit financially from her mother’s death.128  Although Tur’s perspective, based 
on these two cases, seems appealing, it only deals with the problem on a case to 
case basis. To come to a definite solution to the problem it is necessary to address 
the issue at a deeper level i.e. by taking into account the moral values surrounding 
the concept of assisted suicide. Arguably, the three most important and competing 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 That is Diane Pretty was competent and non-vulnerable. Her choice to end her life in 
preference to slow, distressing and undignified death was clear and stable, and that what prevented 
her from taking her life was her physical disability. See, Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative 
Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Issue 
Jan, p. 4.  
126 Tur Richard H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: The Sad Case of Assisted 
Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Issue Jan, p. 6.  
127 Who was old and in a social care.  
128 McShane (1997) 66 Cr. App. Rep. 97.  
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values pertaining to this concept are ‘self-determination’ (each individual is free 
to do what he or she wants with his or her life), ‘sanctity of life’ (the state has a 
duty to protect life and the interests of vulnerable persons) and ‘humanity’ (the 
duty to eradicate suffering).  These principles play a vital role in the debate 
concerning assisted suicide. In order to resolve the current debate in England and 
Wales concerning ‘end of life’ issues, these three core values need to be 
addressed. This is necessary in order to ensure justice and fairness in meeting the 
needs of those who desire to die a ‘good death’.   
 
To Prosecute only when there is Realistic Prospect of Securing a Conviction 
and when it will be in the Public Interest 
Lord Pannick, counsel for Debbie Purdy at the Court of Appeal, focused his 
arguments in the same direction as Lord Steyn who thought section 2 (4) had a 
limited purpose. In using discretion, under his general guidelines129 the DPP 
should consider “…whether there is a realistic prospect of securing a conviction 
and whether a prosecution would be in the public interest”.130 Lord Pannick cited 
the reasoning provided by Lord Philips in the case of Dunbar v Plant131 in favour 
of his argument in relation to subsection (4).132
 
“When the Act is considered … it gives a clear indication that the 
circumstances in which the offence is committed may be such that the 
public interest does not require the imposition of any penal sanction. This, 
in my judgment, is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the ‘consent’ 
provision.”133
 
In other words, the point Lord Pannick makes is that even in cases where there is 
sufficient evidence to prove that an offence has been committed, if the person to 
be prosecuted does not deserve to be punished taking into account the type of 
                                                 
129 Section 10 of the Prosecution Offences Act 1985. 
130 R. (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 All E.R. 1, para. 65. 
131 [1998] Ch. 412 p. 437. 
132 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 485. 
133 Ibid. 
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intervention, then the DPP should withhold consent to prosecution. It is arguable 
that Lord Pannick’s submission is comparable with Tur’s claim that only some 
kinds of assisted suicide should be prosecuted particularly those which lacks 
moral justification i.e. a good reason to do so. Once again, it is arguable that the 
requirement of section 2 (4) in the statue is not purely based on dispensing a 
person involved in assisted suicide, but that it also refers to the fact that assisted 
suicide is justified morally i.e. where there is good reason to do so.  
 
Similarly, Judge Hedley in the case of Ms Z observed: “Although not unique, it 
[the requirement for consent] is rare and is usually found where parliament 
recognises that although an act may be criminal, it is not always in the public 
interest to prosecute in respect of it.”134 For example, the DPP may decide not to 
prosecute ‘in the public interest’ in cases where the anticipated sentence could be 
perceived as being light,135 or when it is clear that the prosecution could cause 
grave injustice or harm to the person prosecuted or when the case involves “…a 
doctor of repute ‘acting in good faith’ in a situation of great difficulty…”136. That 
is probably performing an act which is actually illegal but medically justified in 
the circumstances in which it is performed.  
 
To Prevent the Risk of Prosecutions being brought in Inappropriate 
Circumstances 
While addressing the provision in section 2 (4) in the case of Debbie Purdy,137 
Lord Hope stated that “it has long been followed that prosecution does not follow 
automatically”138 and the purpose of the subsection must be understood in the 
light of this background.139 He examined the submission made by Lord Pannick 
                                                 
134 In re Z (Local Authority: Duty) [2005] 1 W.L.R. 959, p. 964 
135 In fact, this (that court is unlikely to impose custodial sentence) was one of the reasons why the 
DPP in the case of Daniel James decided not to prosecute his parents and his friend for assisting 
Daniel James to attain his desire of ending life with the help of Dignitas. See, Mullock Alexandra. 
(2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) law?’ Medical law Review, Vol. 17, No.2, p. 294. 
136 Williams Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd. p.292. 
137 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 419. 
138 See footnote 102. 
139  R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403, p. 419. 
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in the case of Debbie Purdy at the Court of Appeal that the purpose of section 2 
(4) is only to prosecute when there is realistic prospect of securing a conviction 
and when it will be in the public interest. He also considered Lord Chief Justice 
submission that “the basic reason for including in a statute a restriction on the 
bringing of prosecutions was that otherwise there would be a risk of prosecutions 
being brought in inappropriate circumstances.”140 Lord Hope found the approach 
adopted by the Lord Chief Justice more persuasive.141 The reasons provided in 
support of this perspective are as follows: to ensure consistency in bringing 
prosecution, to avoid vexatious proceedings, to take into account mitigating 
factors and to provide control over the criminal law in dealing with sensitive and 
controversial cases.142 It is suggested that these reasons reflect the general 
concept of public interest and hence this resembles the guidelines provided by the 
DPP under section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  
 
Implications: From Spirit to Policy 
It is apparent from the reasons outlined above that the inclusion of section 2 (4) 
had a special purpose, in contrast to how it is viewed today.143 It is arguable that 
this special purpose included an intention both to mark the gravity of the 
offence144 as well as to spare those who did not offend against the spirit of  
section 2 (1), which is to protect the interests of persons who could be described 
as ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’.145 In other words, it is suggested that parliament 
incorporated section 2 (4) to ensure the freedom to commit suicide, provided to all 
under section 1 of the Act, and at the same time to protect vulnerable persons, 
who may be made to believe that their life is not worth living.146 Hence the 
                                                 
140 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 485. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA; 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p.78.  
144 That the offence committed under section 2 (1) could be grave such as murder and at the same 
time, it could be trivial assistance such as opening the bottle of pills for the victim. 
145 The Court of Strasbourg in the case of Diane Pretty held this. See Pretty v United Kingdom 
(2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
146 R v Hough (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 406. However, it is relevant to note that they are not allowed 
to harm another person in doing so. 
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suspect, who provides assistance to an adult who is mentally competent and non-
vulnerable with settled desire to die, should be spared from prosecution and those 
who intervene in the life of weak and vulnerable should be prosecuted.   
 
The modern approach, in the context of subsection (4) on the other hand, focuses 
on the “generalised concept of public interest”147. However, it is important to 
mention that the ‘offence specific policy’148 promulgated by the DPP, reflects (to 
some extent) the intention of parliament for incorporating section 2 (4) of the 
Act.149 Hence, the ‘offence specific policy’ and the decisions taken based on this 
policy appear to recognise the intention of parliament for incorporating subsection 
(4) and in this way, the spirit of the law (the need to protect the vulnerable) is 
captured in the ‘offence specific policy’. 
 
Having outlined the possible reasons for the inclusion of subsection (4), the 
following section discusses how the DPP performs his function in practice. 
 
        ii) The Practice of the DPP  
Although it is appropriate to say that the person who assists in suicide runs the 
risk of exposure to criminal liability, it is also true that there is every possibility 
that that particular person may not reach the stage of prosecution.150 As stated 
above section 2(4) provides for flexibility in the application of section 2(1) by 
giving the DPP a discretionary power to consent to the prosecution. The DPP 
applies discretion by taking into account the facts and circumstances of each case, 
to which he applies the guidelines provided for Crown prosecutors under section 
10 (1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.151 However, recently the DPP has 
                                                 
147 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 426. 
148 The ‘offence specific policy’ is discussed in detail under subheading ‘Encouraging or Assisting 
in Suicide: The Offence Specific Policy’ for Prosecutors. 
149 Most important point is that the DPP has shown willingness not to prosecute those whose 
conduct in encouraging or assisting suicide would not amount to more than trivial and also that the 
person acts with compassionate motive.  
150 This is evident from the situation of Daniel James whose parents did not reach at the stage of 
prosecution. This case is discussed little later in this chapter. 
151 See ‘Prosecution of Offences Act 1985’.  http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk  
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published additional offence-specific factors i.e. the facts and circumstances to be 
taken into account when deciding whether or not to prosecute in cases of assisted 
suicide.152 Nevertheless, the procedure adopted to determine whether proceedings 
should be instituted remains the same. The decision process involves two stages:  
 
“ (i) the evidential stage; and (ii) the public interest stage. The evidential 
stage must be considered before the public interest stage. A case which 
does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed, no matter how serious 
or sensitive it may be. Where there is sufficient evidence to justify a 
prosecution, prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is 
required in the public interest.”153
 
Evidential Stage 
After the police have investigated the alleged complicity in suicide, the case will 
be forwarded to the Crown Prosecution Services.154 At this stage, the DPP 
exercises discretionary power by taking into consideration the facts and 
circumstances of each case. The evidentiary test that is then applied requires the 
conduct element (actus reus) and the mental element155 to prove prima facie the 
conduct of the suspect was sufficient to be found guilty. If the case passes this 
stage successfully, then the prosecutors must apply the factors in the public 
interest by looking at all the facts and circumstances of the case.156  
 
Public Interest Stage 
At the public interest stage, the “…prosecutors must apply the public interest 
factors set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the factors set out in [the 
                                                 
152 See Appendix A. 
153 See, point 13 of the ‘Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting 
Suicide’.  www.cps.gov.uk  
154 Decision on Prosecution – ‘The Death by Suicide of Daniel James’, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james_html.  
155 That is intention to assist and the knowledge that that conduct was capable of assisting the 
victim in committing suicide. 
156 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32. 
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‘offence specific policy’] in making their decisions”.157 As stated in point 14 of 
the ‘offence specific policy’, “[t]he DPP will only consent to a prosecution for an 
offence of encouraging or assisting suicide in a case where the Full Code Test is 
met”.158
 
Having considered the function of the DPP, it is necessary to consider recent 
developments in relation to the role of the DPP under subsection (4) of the Act. It 
is arguable that these developments brought about an increased degree of clarity 
and transparency. How this is achieved and to what extent, will be seen by 
examining the following: the case of Diane Pretty159, Daniel James’ situation160 
and the case of Debbie Purdy161. 
 
iii) Immunity 
In the year 2002, the Court of Strasbourg on the European Convention of Human 
Rights pronounced a landmark judgment in the case of Diane Pretty on the issue 
of assisted suicide.162 She approached the Court on the ground that the refusal of 
the DPP to grant immunity to her husband from prosecution under section 2 (4) 
and proscription of assisted suicide under section 2 (1) infringed her rights under 
Articles 2, 3, 8 and 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, 
she also argued that her right under Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights was also violated on the ground of her disability. She contended 
that those who did not suffer from any disability i.e. an “able-bodied person, 
might exercise the right to suicide”163. 
 
                                                 
157 See, point 38 of the ‘Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting 
Suicide’.  www.cps.gov.uk  
158 See point 14 of Appendix A. 
159Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 1.  
160 Decision on Prosecution – The Death by Suicide of Daniel James, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.html.  
161R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403. 
162 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
163R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 A.C. 800. 
 38
Diane Pretty was in the last stage of motor neurone disease when she decided to 
end her life, maintaining that she did not want to live in an undignified and 
unbearable situation during the last moments of her life and she was afraid of 
dying in that condition if she were to let nature take its course.164 In these 
circumstances, she was able to choose death over life, but could not end her life 
unaided.165 Although she was of sound mental capacity, she was paralysed up to 
her neck and had to be fed through a tube.166 Her husband was willing to help her 
provided he would not be prosecuted for the offence of complicity in suicide of 
another.167 Diane Pretty filed an application asking the DPP to declare that her 
husband would not be prosecuted if he assisted her in committing suicide.168 The 
DPP rejected her application on the ground that he had no such power to grant her 
husband immunity from prosecution before the crime was committed.169 Diane 
Pretty then filed a judicial review to the Division Court. On its refusal, she filed 
an appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the House of Lords which held that 
there was no violation of her rights. It further held if any rights were engaged, 
interference was justified under Article 8 (2) of the Convention and the law on 
assisted suicide was needed to “protect the vulnerable and prevent abuse….”170 
Upholding the decision of the DPP it held:  
 
“That, since the executive had no power to dispense with or suspend law 
or their execution without parliament consent, the Director had no power 
to undertake that a crime yet to be committed should be immune from 
prosecution….”171
 
                                                 
164 Hale Dame Brenda. (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a Right to Die?’ Comm. L. World 
Review, Vol. 1, p. 2. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 A.C. 800. 
171Ibid., at pp. 800 –801. 
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Following this decision, Diane Pretty approached the European Court of Human 
Rights.172 This Court also decided that none of Diane Pretty’s Convention rights 
were violated under the domestic law on assisted suicide.173 However, the court 
acknowledged that:  
 
“The applicant [Diane Pretty] in this case is prevented by law from 
exercising her choice to avoid what she considers will be an undignified 
and distressing end to her life. The court is not prepared to exclude that 
this constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private life as 
guarantee under Article 8 (1) of the Convention.”174  
 
“Nevertheless, the Court finds… that States are entitled to regulate 
through the operation of the general criminal law activities which are 
detrimental to the life and safety of other individuals. The more serious the 
harm involved the more heavily will weigh in the balance considerations 
of public health and safety against the countervailing principle of personal 
autonomy. The law in issue in this case, section 2 of the 1961 Act, was 
designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and vulnerable and 
especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions 
against acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life. Doubtless the 
condition of terminally ill individuals will vary. But many will be 
vulnerable and it is the vulnerability of the class which provides the 
rationale for the law in question. It is primarily for States to assess the risk 
and the likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted 
suicides were relaxed or if exceptions were to be created. Clear risks of 
abuse do exist, notwithstanding arguments as to the possibility of 
safeguards and protective procedures.”175
 
                                                 
172 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 1. p.40.  
173 Ibid.  
174 Ibid., at p. 37. 
175 Ibid. at pp. 38-39. 
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On this basis and on the basis that the law on assisted suicide was flexible176 the 
Court stated the absolute prohibition on assisted suicide was not 
“disproportionate” and by keeping in mind the gravity of the “act for which the 
immunity was claimed, the court concluded that in this situation the decision of 
the DPP cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable”.177
 
Even though Diane Pretty lost her battle at the Court of Strasbourg, her case drew 
attention to the power of the DPP and also to the fact that the law on assisted 
suicide interferes with the right to respect for private and family life guaranteed 
under article 8(1) of the Convention rights. The Strasbourg Court observed that:  
 
“Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected 
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that 
notions of the quality of life take on significance. In an era of growing 
medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many 
people are concerned that they should not be forced to linger on in old age 
or in states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which conflict 
with strongly held ideas of self and personal identity.”178
 
Nevertheless, it was found that such interference was justified under article 8 (2) 
which provides:  
 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
                                                 
176 That it required the consent of the DPP for prosecution and allowed the courts to impose even 
the least sentence. See Keown John. (2003) ‘European Court of Human Rights: Death in 
Strasbourg - assisted suicide, the Pretty case, and the European Convention on Human Rights’. 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, No.4, p.725. 
177 Ibid., at p. 39. 
178 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
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crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.”179  
 
Huxtble states, regarding the case of Diane Pretty, that the case: 
 
“…provided a battleground for three competing ethical injunctions: there 
is a right to be assisted in suicide, premised on an appeal to patient 
autonomy, and may be a corresponding duty to help; there is a need, 
perhaps a duty to, to uphold the sanctity of life; [i.e. to protect life] and 
there is a need, again perhaps a duty, to eradicate suffering.”180  
 
It is clear from the decision of the Strasbourg Court, that the State’s interest to 
protect life, including the lives of weak and vulnerable people, ‘stood its 
ground’181 as it did throughout her case.182 However, this led to criticism on the 
grounds that the decision of the Strasbourg Court “attached insufficient 
importance to individual autonomy and to the alleviation of human suffering and 
[it] exaggerated the difficulties of framing and enforcing adequate safeguards 
against abuse”.183 Huxtable on the other hand, adopts a neutral view in this 
regard. He argues that the law in this area i.e. assisted suicide “discloses a 
compromise of values”.184  
 
There is little doubt that the case of Diane Pretty proved to be one of the most 
important cases on the law on assisted suicide, and as noted above, it went all the 
way to the Human Rights Court at Strasbourg. Diane Pretty did not succeed in 
earning immunity for her husband (in case he had to assist her suicide). 
                                                 
179R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 A.C. 810. 
180 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA; 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 82. 
181 Ibid., at p. 137.  
182 From the Division Court to the House of Lords and then in the Court of Human Rights.  
183Keown John. (2003) ‘European Court of Human Rights: Death in Strasbourg - assisted suicide, 
the Pretty case, and the European Convention on Human Rights’. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, No.4, p. 726. 
184 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA; 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 82. 
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Nonetheless, it was suggested that the power of the DPP is flexible and 
furthermore, that there was scope for non-prosecution of the suspect but only after 
the offence was committed.  
   
iv) The Moves towards Greater Clarity through Guidance 
 
Decision in the situation of Daniel James 
In 2008, the DPP considered the offence under section 2 (1) of the Suicide Act in 
relation to the Daniel James’ case.185 Daniel James, at the age of 21, suffered a 
major accident during rugby training, which left him totally paralysed. Medical 
authorities agreed that he would never be able to overcome his disability.186 This 
had such a detrimental impact on Daniel James’ life that he decided to end it. He 
unsuccessfully attempted suicide a few times and finally chose to die with the 
help of Dignitas against the will of his parents.  His parents and a family friend 
reluctantly decided to help Daniel James to carry out his wish.187 His parents 
helped him to make arrangements with Dignitas and they decided to travel with 
him. A family friend arranged tickets for Daniel James and his parents to fly to 
Switzerland and back.188 Daniel James travelled with his parents to Switzerland 
where in the presence of his parents and with the help of the doctor (who 
prescribed him with the lethal drug) at Dignitas, he successfully ended his life.189  
The conduct of his parents and their family friend in providing assistance to 
Daniel James to end his life, proved risky. Their role in suicide was investigated 
and the file was subsequently perused by the DPP according to the correct 
procedures of the law.190 Despite finding sufficient evidence against Daniel 
                                                 
185Decision on Prosecution – The Death by Suicide of Daniel James, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.html. 
186 Mullock A. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 
290. 
187 Chrispin E., English V., Harrison C., Sheather J. and Sommerville A. (2009) ‘Ethics briefings’. 
J. Med. Ethics. Vol. 35, p.80. 
188 Decision on Prosecution – The Death by Suicide of Daniel James, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.html.  
189 Chrispin E. and others. (2009) ‘Ethics Briefings’. J. Med. Ethics. Vol. 35, p.80. 
190 Mullock Alexandra. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 
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James’ parents and their family friend, the DPP decided not to prosecute them in 
the public interest, having taken into consideration the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case.191 Although the DPP thought that the nature of the 
offence committed by the suspects in this case was serious and that the assistance 
provided could warrant conviction, the factors against prosecution prevailed.192 
Those factors included: the strong will and full mental capacity of the victim to 
commit suicide; the reluctance of the suspects to concur with the victim’s desire; 
the remoteness of the acts committed in comparison to other cases such as 
Wallis193 and Hough194 and, finally, the fact that the acts were undertaken purely 
out of a selfless motive without any materialistic gain.195 The DPP concluded 
that: 
“Taking those factors [above stated] into account and bearing in mind the 
observation of Lord Lane CJ in Hough that in enacting section 2(1) 
Suicide Act 1961, “Parliament had in mind the potential scope for disaster 
and malpractice in circumstances where elderly, infirm and easily 
suggestible people are sometimes minded to wish themselves dead”, I 
have decided that the factors against prosecution clearly outweigh those in 
favour. In the circumstances I have concluded that a prosecution is not 
needed in the public interest.”196
The DPP’s view that even “arranging and paying for the flights” is sufficient to 
bring the conduct within the scope of section 2 (1) is arguably a strict 
interpretation of the Act in relation to the evidential test.197 This can be compared 
                                                 
191 Ibid. 
192 Decision on Prosecution – The Death by Suicide of Daniel James, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.html.  
193 R v Wallis (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 342. In this case, Wallis helped his flatmate to commit 
suicide by providing her means to end life as well as encouragement in spite of knowing the 
unstable position of her mind. 
194 See footnote 118. 
195 Decision on Prosecution – The Death by Suicide of Daniel James, 9 December 2008. 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.html.  
196 Ibid. 
197 Mullock Alexandra. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 
298. 
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to what happened in the case of Chard where the supply of pills to a person was 
interpreted by the court as simply providing an option.198  The DPP’s decision 
means that even those who escort the victim when he or she travels to Switzerland 
for the purpose of assisted death may actually violate the law on assisted suicide. 
Hence, there is every possibility that they will be prosecuted unless their conduct 
falls within the public interest factors against prosecution.199 At the same time, 
the decision of the DPP has in fact “through his analysis of the public interest 
factors, effectively promulgated a code of sorts for those who assist in a suicide 
tourism case”200. Central to this concept of public interest are the ideals of 
competence, commitment, altruistic motive and compassion.201 It is arguably a 
good approach to take in relation to assessing the involvement of potential 
suspects in the cases of suicide tourism, but as it was rightly observed by the 
House of Lords, the reasons provided in the Daniel James case are not sufficient 
or transparent enough to guide the public in their behaviour.202 For example, the 
supply of pills as stated above in the case of Chard was held to be not 
incriminated enough to find the defendant guilty of assisted suicide.203 As seen 
above, the DPP in Daniel James’ situation reached the decision that arranging and 
paying for flight tickets amounts to aiding and abetting a suicide.204  However, he 
also concluded that even if Daniel James’ friend was successfully prosecuted, it 
would be “very unlikely” that a court would impose a custodial sentence on 
him.205 This reason provided by the DPP makes it difficult to predict the legality 
and illegality of the action performed in connection with a suicide case. 
 
Furthermore, the discretionary power of the DPP allows him to take 
considerations of morality and intuition into account as part of the decision 
                                                 
198 The Guardian 23 September 1993. 
199  Mullock A. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 298. 
200 Ibid.  
201 This is visible from the ‘offence specific policy’.  
202 In spite of this further clarity aimed by the House of Lords, there will still remain ambiguity in 
the process because of the filtering role of the DPP. 
203 The Guardian 23 September 1993. 
204 Mullock Alexandra. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 
298. 
205 Ibid., at p. 298. 
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making process.206 Although the conduct of Daniel James’ parents and family 
friend would arguably warrant conviction, it was stated by the DPP that their 
moral culpability was not found to be as severe as that of Wallis. It appears that 
the DPP in this matter has taken into account the facts and circumstances in which 
Daniel James was helped by his parents and a friend. It is possible to suggest that 
compared to the case of Wallis, Daniel James situation was such that he was not 
vulnerable and competent to make decision about his life and death. He was also 
very clear that his disability is unacceptable for him. Furthermore, his parents had 
made every attempt to dissuade him from taking that recourse. That they wished 
he could change his mind indicated that they did value life, but in the light of 
Daniel James personal autonomy and his subjective view on his disability, they 
had to compromise. As a result, decisions in individual matters attract an element 
of subjectivity on the part of the DPP that arguably creates scope for uncertainty. 
 
 
The DPP published his decision along with the factors that he had taken into 
account in deciding the Daniel James case. This case has provided a precedent for 
those who may contemplate travelling to Switzerland for the purposes of assisted 
suicide. However, there still remain some doubts with regard to the exact terms of 
the guidance set out in the general Code (most of which the DPP found irrelevant 
in the Daniel James case).207 At the same time, the decision provided in the case 
was made subject to changes in future cases.208 Arguably, this does not meet the 
goal that the law on assisted suicide should be clear and transparent. Therefore, 
the House of Lords recognised the need to provide further clarity and 
transparency in the law in the later case of Debbie Purdy. This case is discussed 
next. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
206Ibid., at p. 295.  
207 Mullock A. (2009) ‘Prosecutors making (bad) law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 294. 
208 Other than assisted suicide abroad.  
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Decision in the case of Debbie Purdy 
The case of Debbie Purdy has a close resemblance to that of Dianne Pretty.209 
Debbie Purdy also sufferers from physical disability owing to her incurable illness 
(MS), she also wishes to end her life (before natural death comes to her), to avoid 
pain and suffering which would effect the quality of her life and thereby her 
dignity210. Furthermore, Debbie Purdy wanted to rely on her husband for 
assistance, but feared his prosecution. She wanted to know under what 
circumstances her husband could face prosecution and hence she asked for 
clarification on this matter. This is where her case differed from that of Dianne 
Pretty.211 Debbie Purdy decided to challenge the law on assisted suicide by 
seeking an order requiring the DPP to set out the policy he had adopted when 
deciding whether to give consent to prosecution under section 2 (4) of the Suicide 
Act. She claimed that the information provided under section 10 of the Crown 
Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985, was not sufficiently clear in relation to 
assessment of the behaviour of the assisting person under section 2 (1). The 
concerned authority (the DPP) declined her request to publish details of policy. 
As a consequence Debbie Purdy sought judicial review on the basis that  
  
“…his refusal to publish details of his policy as to the circumstances in 
which a prosecution would be brought for complicity in a suicide contrary 
to section 2 (1) and/or of his failure to promulgate such a policy [was 
unlawful], relying on her right to respect for her private life under article 8 
(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act 1998.”212  
 
Debbie Purdy’s claim did not succeed either at the Divisional Court of the 
Queen’s Bench Division, nor at the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal 
                                                 
209 Stephens G. C. (2008) ‘From Pretty to Purdy: Suicide and Assistance from across the border – 
R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions’. Scots Law Times, Vol. 39, p. 
267.  
210 R  (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 459. 
211 The case discussed earlier in this chapter. 
212R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 W.L.R. 403. 
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provided the following reasons for its dismissal: The court held that it was bound 
by the decision of the House of Lords taken in the case of Diane Pretty and that 
Debbie Purdy’s case did not fall in the category of ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
which would allow for overriding the binding precedent.213 The Court of Appeal 
decided to follow the law of precedent (i.e. the decision of the House of Lords in 
the case of Diane Pretty) and decide the matter on the basis that Article rights 
were not engaged. The Court of Appeal felt unable to adopt the decision of the 
Court of Strasbourg in the case of Diane Pretty and explored Debbie Purdy’ claim 
on the basis that Article 8 rights were engaged (at the same time the Court urged 
the House of Lords to provide clarity).214 In addition, and on the substantive point 
of whether the DPP could be required to issue offence specific guidance, the 
Court held that “the DPP could not dispense with or suspend the operation of s.2 
(1),” nor could he set out “a case-specific policy in the kind of certain terms 
sought which would, in effect, recognise exceptional defences to the offence 
which Parliament had not chosen to enact….215. This is because in the Court’s 
“…judgement the DPP is not in dereliction of his statutory duty”.216 Nor “[t]he 
absence of a crime-specific policy relating to assisted suicide …make the 
operation and effect of s.2 (1) of the 1961 Act unlawful…”.217
 
Debbie Purdy next appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords decided 
the matter in favour of Debbie Purdy in the light of the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the case of Dianne Pretty.218  The House of Lords held 
that Debbie Purdy’s right under Article 8(1) was engaged and the law on section 2 
(4) was not accessible and foreseeable so that a person would know exactly how 
to act accordingly and control one’s behaviour without breaching section 2 (1) of 
the Act.219 The Court further acknowledged the prime importance of section 2 (4). 
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The court recognised that a blanket ban on assisted suicide, which provides for no 
exceptions, could in fact breach Article 8, according to the Strasbourg court.220 As 
a consequence, the only way a person can avoid breaching the law under section 2 
(1) is by knowing the exact factors under which they could be prosecuted for such 
an offence.221 In other words, it is necessary for people to know in what 
circumstances a breach of the law would result in prosecution. The House of 
Lords also remarked, in relation to the factors provided by the Code, that most of 
the terms of the Code (as outlined by the DPP’s decision in respect of Daniel 
James) were irrelevant in cases of assisted suicide.222 Overall, the decision handed 
down in the case of Daniel James was insufficiently clear and furthermore, it was 
potentially subject to change at any time.223 In addition, the House of Lords 
recognised the problem faced by Debbie Purdy and many others like in a similar 
position. The court accepted that this problem will not go away.224 As a 
consequence the House of Lords saw the need for an offence specific policy and 
found that the DPP  
 
“…was under a duty to clarify his position as to the factors which he 
regarded as relevant for and against prosecution in such a case and he 
would be required to promulgate an offence-specific policy identifying the 
facts and circumstances which he would take into account in deciding 
whether a prosecution under section 2 (1) of the 1961 Act should be 
brought.”225    
  
From this decision of the House of Lords, it follows that section 2 (4) forms an 
integral part of section 2 (1) of the Act.226 The role of section 2 (4) is to help 
                                                 
220 Ibid. 
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222 Factors regarded as not relevant to the case on assisted suicide (while dealing with Daniel 
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people to comprehend what conduct would put them at risk of prosecution under 
section 2 (1). In its decision, the House of Lords stated that the law on assisted 
suicide under section 2 (4) lacked clarity.227 Hence, their Lordships required the 
DPP to set an offence specific policy. Lady Baroness Hale, observed that in 
clarifying the law under section 2 (4) the DPP should direct his attention onto the 
“features which will distinguish those cases in which deterrence will be 
disproportionate from those cases in which it will not”228 in order to overcome the 
existing confusion. She argued that he should do this rather than to focus “…upon 
a generalised concept of the public interest….”229 It is arguable that the reasoning 
of Lady Baroness Hale reflects the intention of parliament for the inclusion of 
subsection (4) of the Act.230 The provision which is observed as an exception to 
the absolute ban on assisted suicide, provides the DPP with the option of 
withholding consent to prosecution of an individual under section 2 (1) of the 
Act.231
 
It is submitted that the purpose of the House of Lords judgement in requiring the 
DPP to set offence specific guidelines was to respect the right to family and 
private life. The court also stressed the need to provide maximum certainty under 
the law in relation to the justification for its interference with the right. However, 
it is important to consider whether the policy has achieved this task. It is certainly 
arguable that the policy does “guarantee legal certainty”232.  
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Encouraging or Assisting Suicide: The ‘Offence Specific Policy’ for 
Prosecutors 
The main points of the additional offence specific factors promulgated by the DPP 
in the public interest (for and against prosecution) are as follows233: 
  
1) Public interest factors in favour of prosecution 
• The victim was under 18 years of age; lacked mental capacity234 to 
reach an informed decision and did not have a settled, long-standing 
wish to commit suicide. 
• The victim did not ask the suspect for help on his own initiative and 
did not indicate his wish explicitly. 
• The victim was capable of undertaking the act that constituted 
assistance; the victim was coerced into making a decision and the case 
lacked altruistic motive and compassion. 
• That the suspect failed to ensure the seriousness of the decision; that 
the relationship of the suspect with the victim was not good; that the 
suspect was unknown to the victim and provided specific information 
via internet or publication; that the suspect provided assistance to more 
than one victim; the suspect was under duty of care towards the victim; 
the suspect was aware that the victim intended to commit suicide in a 
public place where the members of general public may be present; the 
suspect was attached to the organisation which provides environment 
in which to allow the victim to commit suicide.      
 
2) Public interest factors against prosecution 
• The victim had reached informed decision which was voluntary, clear 
and settled.  
• The suspect was wholly motivated by compassion. 
• The suspect only provided “minor encouragement or assistance”235. 
                                                 
233See Appendix A for the full content; Here “Victim” is referring to the person who commits 
suicide; “suspect” is referring to the assistant. 
234 As required in accordance with the law on Mental Health Act 2005. 
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• The suspect had tried to dissuade the victim from taking ones life and 
the assistance provided by the suspect was of reluctant nature. 
• The suspect informed the police of his involvement in assisted suicide 
and provided cooperation in investigation of the case. 
 
The key features of these factors are: competence, commitment, communication, 
act and motive. Hence, it can be said that the guidance list focuses on the mental 
capacity of the victim, the action undertaken by the suspect and also, the motive 
of the suspect. Arguably, the guidelines place a heavy burden on the suspect. The 
suspect is expected to ensure the victim’s competence and commitment. The 
suspect is also expected to try and dissuade the victim from taking that particular 
course (suicide) if possible. Under these conditions, the DPP may decide to 
withhold his consent to prosecution. However, this does not mean the conduct of 
the suspect is not criminal. The fact remains that his or her conduct is still 
criminal. This creates room for morality and subjective judgement but also scope 
for uncertainty. 
 
In the following section, an attempt is made to analyse this policy in order to see 
whether it serves the purpose of bringing clarity and a sense of legal security to 
people. This was what Debbie Purdy requested, and the promulgation of the 
policy is the outcome of the decision of her case.236
 
Comments on the ‘Offence Specific Policy’ 
It is important firstly to look into some statements which are clear from the 
‘offence specific policy’. Arguably, the ‘offence specific policy’ serves two main 
purposes. Firstly, it provides guidance to prosecutors, police and general public. 
Secondly, it explicitly states that the policy does not in any sense ‘decriminalise’ 
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the offence of encouraging or assisting in suicide nor does it assure ‘immunity’ to 
persons giving encouragement or assistance to suicide.237  
Regarding the concrete content of the ‘offence specific policy’, it is clear that it is 
also very careful to exclude ‘generality’. In fact, the policy is firm in stating that 
each case has to be examined individually. Therefore it is useful with regard to 
the evaluation of the clarity of the guidelines, to go through the exact wording of 
point 39 (while keeping in mind that the prosecutors have to follow this point):  
 
“Assessing the public interest is not simply a matter of adding up the 
number of factors on each side and seeing which side has the greater 
number. Each case must be considered on its own facts and on its own 
merits. Prosecutors must decide the importance of each public interest 
factor in the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall 
assessment. It is quite possible that one factor alone may outweigh a 
number of other factors which tend in the opposite direction.”238
 
It is useful to also compare point 47:  
 
“These lists of public interest factors are not exhaustive and each case 
must be considered on its own facts and on its own merits.”239
 
Point 45 (2) is equally relevant:  
 
“[T]he actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the 
definition of the offence, were of only minor encouragement or 
assistance.”240
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Considering the first two points, an important question must be asked. Is there any 
use at all in the publication of the factors? The policy at first glance gives the 
impression that these newly published factors strongly reflect the practice of 
prosecution. However, it is also possible to suggest that the ‘offence specific 
policy’ somehow parallels the intention of Parliament regarding the Act. The 
‘offence specific policy’ clearly takes note of section 1 of the Act by imposing the 
important requirement of mental capacity, as otherwise required by the law, and it 
imposes a heavy burden on the suspect to justify his or her conduct of 
assistance.241 But oddly enough, one of the main reasons why a victim needs 
assistance is not given prime importance i.e. whether or not the victim was 
physically able to attempt to commit suicide, with only minor assistance. 
Arguably, this means that the ‘offence specific policy’ is not doing justice to the 
arguments put forward by Diane Pretty and Debbie Purdy, because people in their 
position would not be able to attempt suicide with ‘minor’ assistance (if this term 
is interpreted literally). Their claim was based on the fact of their own physical 
disability. They argued that owing to their physical disabilities they are in fact 
unable to attempt to commit suicide without significant assistance. Diane Pretty’s 
physical condition was such that she could not have done anything more to help 
herself, except to bite on a switch242 or give consent to lethal injection. This is 
because her physical condition was such that she was paralysed up to her neck.243 
In this regard she needed much more assistance than what appears to be allowed 
through the ‘offence specific policy’ guidelines. Similarly, Debbie Purdy’s 
condition is such that she is dependent on her husband for most things although 
she is able to move around with the help of a wheelchair. For instance, her 
condition at present is such that she is even unable to open a bottle of pills.244 
                                                 
241 See, factors for and against prosecution.  
242 The extreme step one may have to take owing to one’s physical disability. This means the 
assistant will have to carry out all the necessary steps from procuring a lethal dose, preparing the 
mixture to be fed through tube and placing the switch between the teeth of the victim. This is how 
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243 Hale Dame Brenda. (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When Is There a Right to Die?’ Comm. L. World 
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Hence, if she decides not to travel to Switzerland and decides instead to end her 
life in this country, the assistance her husband will have to provide her could be 
more than ‘trivial’.245  
 
Issues arising from the ‘Offence Specific Policy’  
In some respect, the ‘offence specific policy’ guidelines attempt to shed some 
light on the most problematic aspects of the law on assisted suicide. One such 
example is of providing minor assistance above stated. This factor gives rise to 
two concerns. Firstly, it fails to specify what kind of assistance amounts to 
‘trivial’. Hence, the difficulty in this area lies in the evaluation of when an act can 
be considered as “minor” or “trivial”. What matters is assistance not form.246 
Providing assistance, in travelling for example, is arguably like providing 
assistance in any other form.247 Secondly, its vagueness could lead to further 
litigations.248 The decision regarding what counts as trivial will always involve 
subjective judgements. As a result, it is obvious that the application of such 
approach may lead to a potential discrepancy in decision-making process. 
 
At the same time, it is possible to suggest that the ‘offence specific Policy’ should 
express the intention of Parliament under section 2 (4). In a sense, the ‘offence 
specific policy’ should specify the circumstances under which one may be 
prosecuted. It should be possible to infer that those people who do not get 
prosecuted could be said to have not offended against the intention of parliament 
and hence persons should not be regarded as criminals. Those who are prosecuted 
and found guilty are all criminals249 and that the degree of their culpability is 
reflected in their sentences, ranging from conditional discharge to imprisonment.  
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In addition, the factors being non- exhaustive,250 the policy still leaves scope for 
ambiguity. Finally, as argued earlier, those who need assistance most, such as 
those who are not able to carry any act are potentially still at the mercy of the 
law.251 This gives cause for concern and it also leaves open the possibility that the 
law in this area requires further development. 
 
v) Likely Future Developments arising from the Case of Debbie Purdy  
The House of Lords has explicitly recognised in the case of Debbie Purdy that 
Article 8 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is engaged 
regarding ‘end of life decision-making’.252 It is further arguable that this decision 
could be used as a stepping-stone to develop the law further in this area. Three 
possible future developments could arise: Firstly, the ‘offence specific policy’ 
which is an outcome of Purdy’s case could act as an exception to section 2 (1). 
This means those who assist in suicide of another, and whose conduct comes 
within the specific factors ‘against prosecution’ would be immune from 
prosecution. This means the limited scope of a negative right to die253 which 
provides immunity to suicidal from prosecution would further extend to those 
who would encourage or assist in suicide of another provided this other person is 
wholly motivated by compassion and his or her conduct does not progress assisted 
suicide and the person whom he or she assist is competent with a settled desire to 
end his or her life.254 Secondly, the existing negative right to die may give way to 
the right to die with dignity (under Article 3 of the ECHR).255 Thirdly, the idea of 
‘assistance in suicide’ could lead to an idea of ‘assistance in attaining a good 
death’.  
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Immunity from Prosecution for those who may encourage or assist Suicide of 
another    
The decision in the case of Debbie Purdy to some extent256  “…reflects society’s 
increasing acceptance that individuals are entitled to make choices to end life with 
the help of another”257. As noted above, an examination of the contents of the 
‘offence specific policy’ also helps support this idea.258 The policy allows any 
person to assist in the suicide of another as long as his assistance is at a minor 
level. However, what amounts to minor or trivial, other than escorting the person, 
arranging flight tickets,259 booking hotel room,260 putting bag over victim’s head 
and helping to arrange to put together the gas apparatus,261 is unclear. The 
principal reason why it is assumed that escorting and arranging for flight tickets is 
permitted is because there is some evidence that no one has been prosecuted since 
2002, the approximate date that this practice, of dying abroad with assistance 
started.262 Similarly, Daniel James’s friend, who paid for flight tickets and made 
travel arrangements for Daniel James and his parents, did not face prosecution. 
This legality of this practice is further strengthened by the ‘offence specific 
policy’ promulgated by the DPP.  The ‘offence specific policy’ allows this 
practice to be carried forward without any fear of prosecution and therefore 
sanctions,263 unless the motive of the suspect is ‘selfish’, the conduct was more 
than trivial and the victim lacked competence and commitment.264 The ‘offence 
specific policy’ also appears to appreciate the idea that “…autonomous 
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individuals have different views about what makes their lives worth living”265 by 
not imposing any impediment on who can be assisted in suicide. There is one 
exception to this, the ‘offence specific policy’ incorporating one point in favour of 
prosecution i.e. where “the victim was physically able to undertake the act that 
constituted the assistance him or herself;”266 It is submitted that this point should 
not be used literally against the able bodied people, because as stated by the DPP 
in point 40 “[t]he absence of a factor does not necessarily mean that it should be 
taken as a factor tending in the opposite direction. For example, just because the 
victim is not ‘under 18 years of age’ does not transform the ‘factor tending in 
favour of prosecution’ into ‘factor tending against prosecution’.”267 This 
statement of the DPP concurs with his own decision in the recent case of 
Caractacus Downes.268 Caractacus Downes who apart from escorting his parents 
to Switzerland to Dignitas also booked room for their use in Switzerland which 
(booking room) they were capable of doing themselves. The DPP in his decision 
on this point said, although it is true that Caractacus Downes’ parents were in a 
position to perform the act of booking room, their competent, clear and settled 
decision to end their life with the assistance of Dignitas overrules the factor that 
they were physically able to undertake the action, their son, undertook for 
them.269  All of this arguably suggests that the ‘negative’ right to die with its 
limited scope is inching towards an extended negative right to die: “…that those 
who choose to provide …assistance [in suicide would] not be punished or 
threatened with the prospect of punishment….”270 Furthermore, the established 
practice of ‘immunity from prosecution’ would prove that what Debbie Purdy 
sought for (demand to know when the DPP will not prosecute) was no different 
from that what Diane Pretty sought for (demand that the DPP not prosecute) 
                                                 
265 More of this aspect will be said in the next chapter of the thesis. R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 3 
W.L.R. 426. 
266 See point 43 (10) of Appendix A. 
267 See point (40) of Appendix A. 
268 See footnote 30. 
269 See ‘No Charges following deaths of Sir Edward and Lady Downes’. 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/press_releases/113_10/index.html    
270 Richard Nobles and David Schiff. (2010) ‘Disobedience to Law – Debbie Purdy’s Case’. 
Modern Law Review, 73 (2), p. 296. 
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except that Debbie Purdy adopted a different strategy to that of Diane Pretty. In 
other words, as stated above, the ‘offence specific policy’ used in decision-
making process, to consent prosecution, could become a policy through the 
legislative act of Parliament.271
 
Right to Die with Dignity  
It is also feasible that one may use Debbie Purdy’s case to claim the ‘right to die 
with Dignity’ by invoking Article 3 of the Convention.272 The article provides:  
 
“‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.”273  
 
There is strong evidence to suggest that the main reasons why people like Debbie 
Purdy and Diane Pretty wish to end their life are to avoid suffering and to have 
dignified death.274  Persons in this situation fear suffering and they consistently 
argue that they want to have control over their death; they also want to preserve 
their self-respect and privacy at the time of their death.275 Owing to their physical 
disabilities, the absolute ban imposed by the law on assisted suicide276 forces 
them either to die an early death, or to die a degrading and undignified death. 
Although it is important to note, as held in the case of Diane Pretty, that it is not 
the state that subjects individuals to degrading treatment, but their own illness.277 
However, since the state is under a positive obligation to prevent degrading 
treatment, it is arguable that the failure of the law in this area should amount to 
                                                 
271 Cartwright N. (2009) ’48 Years On: Is the Suicide Act Fit for Purpose? R (on the application of 
Purdy) v DPP’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, p. 475. 
272 Coggon John. (2006) ‘Could the Right to Die with Dignity Represent a New Right to Die in 
English Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 14, pp. 219-237. 
273 This article imposes negative as well as positive obligation on the state to protect its subjects 
from the “ill-treatment proscribed”. See Morris Dan. (2003) ‘Assisted suicide under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: a critique’. European Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 1, p. 70. 
274 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32, p. 485. 
275 Cohen Almagor R. (2001) The Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine and 
Law. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. p. 76. 
276 Coggon John. (2006) ‘Could the Right to Die with Dignity Represent a New Right to Die in 
English Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 14, pp. 219-237. 
277 Ibid. 
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breach of Article 3. This right being absolute, the state would then have to either 
allow assistance in suicide or assistance in attaining a ‘good death’. This would 
necessarily lead to a change in the law in this area. This is because unlike Article 
8 which has qualifying conditions, Article 3 has no such conditions. It is an 
absolute right. As a result, a claim brought under Article 3 should follow different 
outcome to that of a claim brought under Article 8 of the ECHR. For example, in 
the case of a person who is physically handicapped to an extend that he or she 
could not end his or her life, it is possible that he or she is suffering a huge 
amount of pain and mental distress. In other words, “…it could be said that that 
person is enduring inhuman and degrading conditions”278 and these conditions are 
sustained because other persons who might wish to help are at risk of prosecution 
of attempt to murder.279  This problem would take the law a step further from 
encouraging or assisting suicide to assistance in attaining a ‘good death’.   
 
Stretching the Boundaries: From Assisted Suicide to Assistance in Attaining 
a ‘Good Death’   
To some extent, the decision in the case of Debbie Purdy has moved the law on 
assisted suicide from a position of confusion to a systemic ambiguity through 
guidelines. At present, the involvement of a person in suicide still falls within the 
boundaries of the existing criminal law. However, there is a likelihood that that 
person would not be prosecuted once it is established that his or her conduct was 
wholly motivated by compassion and it did not progress ‘assisted suicide’.280  
 
The introduction of ‘excusable’ circumstances in the ‘offence specific policy’281 
renders the law inconsistent. The ‘offence specific policy’ protects some people 
from being prosecuted despite the absolute ban on assisted suicide declared under 
                                                 
278 Mr Pushpinder Saini. (1999) ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Law of Murder’, Medico-
Legal Journal, Vol. 67, p.111. 
279 Like for example in the case of Kay Gilderdale.   
280 Although the assistance provided must be of trivial nature, since what amounts to ‘trivial’ is not 
defined, here it is assumed that as long as the assistance provided does not progress to another act 
liable of criminal liability, the suspect could rely on the immunity, provided his or her conduct 
fulfils other required factors. 
281 Keown, J. (2009). ‘In Need of Assistance?’ New Law Journal. Oct., pp.1340-1341. 
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section 2 (1) of the Act. The ‘offence specific policy’ through this liberal attitude 
has ‘effectively’ partially decriminalised assisted suicide by eroding section 2 (1) 
of the Act.282 Nonetheless, the DPP has disputed this claim by stating that he has 
not done so, nor he has the right to do so.283  Even if one agrees with him, it is 
clear the ‘offence specific policy’ has created exception to section 2 (1) by 
promulgating the policy setting out offence specific factors in cases of 
encouraging or assisting suicide cannot be disputed. As a result, although “the 
legal duty to obey the law [on encouraging or assisting suicide] remains in 
place”284, disobedience, under special circumstances, will provide suspect 
‘immunity from prosecution’.  
 
Keeping in mind the limited scope of the negative right to die, in particular the 
difficulty faced by people to acquire lethal drugs such as barbiturates to ensure a 
good death, it is desirable that the scope of the law should not be restricted to 
assistance in suicide, but extended to assistance in attaining a ‘good death’. This 
is because those who attempt to commit suicide may need further assistance in 
dying such as to ease the passing either by accelerating it or to make it painless or 
both. As a result, a dying person may still have to rely on another to act as 
happened in the case of Hough.285 Or the attendant may willingly choose to aid in 
dying knowing the intention of the dying person as it happened in the Gilderdale 
case.286  
 
Kay Gilderdale was charged with attempted murder of her daughter Lynn 
Gilderdale.287  Keir Starmer, the head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
                                                 
282 Ibid. 
283 ‘Guardian Daily: Assisted suicide and the law’. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/audio/2010/jan/29/guardian-daily-podcast 
284 Richard Nobles and David Schiff. (2010) ‘Disobedience of Law – Debbie Purdy’s Case’. 
Modern Law Review, 73 (2) pp. 297-8. 
285 See footnote 118. 
286 See Broadcast on: BBC One, 1st February 2010. ‘I helped my daughter die’. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00qs930/b00qs8mk/panorama_I_Helped_My_Daughter_D
ie/
287 The Daily Mail, 26 January 2010, ‘Decision to charge loving mother Kay Gilderdale with 
attempted murder of ME daughter was right, says DPP’. http://www.dailymail.ac.uk/news/article-
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said, Kay Gilderdale’s “…conduct, began as assisted suicide progressed to 
attempted murder when Mrs Gilderdale herself went on to administer 
morphine…to her daughter after her daughter had lost consciousness.”288 He 
further stated that the offence of assisted suicide involves assisting the victim to 
take his or her own life. However, the offence of attempted murder, which is 
much more serious offence, involves a direct attempt to take the victim’s life.289 
In the light of the facts presented by Kay Gilderdale, her conduct, in 
administering morphine to Lynn after she lost her consciousness, could have been 
treated as assistance in attaining a ‘good death’290 instead of attempt to murder, 
by treating such conduct as a continuum.291 Another possible reason why her 
conduct could have been treated as part and parcel of assisted suicide is because 
 
“[w]hen you know [as argued by Glanville Williams] that your conduct 
will have two consequences, one in itself good and one in itself evil, you 
are compelled as a moral agent to choose between acting and not acting by 
making a judgment of value, that is to say by deciding whether the good is 
more to be desired than the evil is to be avoided.”292  
 
The choice one has to make in the above case is either to sit and watch someone 
die a slow and painful death or to aid the dying person by doing what is necessary 
to complete the action already taken by dying person. This, no doubt will bring 
the conduct of that person under the criminal liability for attempted murder or 
murder, but without undermining the law on murder or attempted murder, such 
                                                                                                                                     
1246222/Keir-Starmer-says-decision-charge-Kay-Gilderdale-attempted-murder-daughter-Lynn-
public-interest.html#ixzz0zrNK  
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Here ‘assistance in attaining a ‘good death’ refers to that conduct of the assistant which is 
performed with intent not to kill, but to make ones dying comfortable and painless. A genuine case 
of palliative care at the end of life which doctors claim to do and so did Kay Gilderdale. More is 
said on this topic in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
291 That is, as the part of the process of assisted suicide by taking into account the suicidal intent of 
Lynn Gilderdale and the fact that the conduct of Kay Gilderdale was an attempt to fulfil that intent 
rather than attempt to murder. 
292 Williams Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd. p. 286. 
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conduct of the assistant could be judged in the same way as that of a doctor who 
provides lethal drugs (painkilling doses) to a terminally ill patient at the end of his 
or her life. For example, Kay Gilderdale actions could be determined to be similar 
to that of Dr David Moor, who assisted his dying patient Mr George Liddell yet 
was found not guilty.293 Whether such conduct and omissions in cases of duty of 
care amounts to active euthanasia or not is the subject matter of the following 
chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
293 More on this topic is discussed in the following chapter of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
The Law of England and Wales on Euthanasia 
 
 
2.1 The Law on Euthanasia  
Euthanasia is officially regarded as a form of murder.294 Hence one who performs 
euthanasia commits murder punishable with life imprisonment. By contrast, the 
ancient Greeks called it a ‘good death’.295 Somerville defines euthanasia as 
“…intentionally killing another person to relieve their suffering”.296 According to 
Foot it is an act “…of inducing or otherwise opting for death for the sake of the 
one who is to die”.297 Draper on the other hand, defines it as “death that results 
from the intention of one person to kill another person, using the most gentle and 
easy means possible, that is solely motivated by the best interests of the person 
who dies”.298  
 
There are three categories of euthanasia: voluntary euthanasia, nonvoluntary 
euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia.299 Voluntary euthanasia is said to occur 
                                                 
294 That is causing death of another person without a lawful excuse with intent to kill. See, 
Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland [1992] UKHL 5 p. 27; Williams Glanville. (1958) The 
Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and Faber Ltd. p. 283; ‘Attempted Murder 
of Terminally Ill Patient’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 1, 1993, p. 232.  
295 See Shaw D.M. (2009) ‘Euthanasia and Eudaimonia’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, p. 530. Here it is 
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the fact that people want to live and die in dignity. Most of the cases of ‘death tourism’ such as of 
Daniel James support this view. Diane Pretty also desired to die a dignified death. Debbie Purdy 
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who wishes to end her life before natural death comes to her (see chapter 1 of the thesis). Those 
who help or willing to help in these circumstances, their conduct is normally seen as an act of 
mercy. See Williams Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber 
and Faber Ltd. p. 279. 
296 Somerville Margaret. (2006) ‘Against Euthanasia’. Arts and Opinion Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 4. 
297 Foot Phillipa. (1977) ‘Euthanasia’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, p. 87. 
298 Draper H. (1998) ‘Euthanasia’, in Chadwick R. (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, Vol. I. 
San Diego, Academic Press. 
299 Simillis C. (2008) ‘Euthanasia: A Summary of the Law in England and Wales’. Medicine 
Science and the Law, Vol. 48, p.191. 
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when “a person’s life is ended following his own wish to die”.300 Nonvoluntary 
euthanasia involves the “ending of a person’s life when the person is not able to 
express his wish to die or to prolong his life, or is not competent to make that 
decision, e.g. an unconscious patient”.301 Involuntary euthanasia involves the 
“killing of a person against their will”. Each of these categories is further 
subdivided into two groups, active and passive euthanasia. The former involves “a 
deliberate act designed to kill” and the latter involves “withdrawing or 
withholding treatment while the disease process takes its course to cause death.” 
302 However, in a legal sense no such distinction is drawn. All categories of 
euthanasia are treated under one concept i.e. murder.    
 
Euthanasia is unlawful in England and Wales. However, acting to relieve the pain, 
suffering and distress of a terminally ill patient, by administering lethal doses of 
painkilling drugs in the knowledge that such action will or may accelerate death 
or cause death of the patient, is lawful.303  Similarly, withholding or withdrawing 
treatment from a patient, who refuses to consent to it, is lawful. Furthermore, it is 
permissible for a doctor to withhold or withdraw treatment in the best interest of 
the patient.304 The justification for this kind of behaviour is found not only in the 
patient’s right to autonomy and doctor’s duty of care, but also in the idea that 
“…causing a result by an action is serious from a moral point of view, than 
causing the same result by an omission”305. Similarly, the doctrine of double 
                                                 
300 Ibid. According to Glanville, such conduct would be “regarded as suicide in the patient who 
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302 Ibid. 
303 Palmer Henry. (1975) ‘Dr. Adams’ Trial for Murder’. Burke J., and Allsop P. (eds). Criminal 
Law Review. London: Sweet and Maxwell Limited. p. 365; Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland 
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of Murder’. Medico-Legal Journal, Vol. 67, pp.106-120; Jackson Emily (2010) Medical Law: 
Text, Cases, and Materials.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 856. 
304 Goff Robert. (1995) ‘A Matter of Life and Death’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 1-21; 
Keown J. (2000) ‘Beyond Bland: A critique of the BMA guidance on withholding and 
withdrawing medical treatment’. Legal Studies, Vol. 20, pp. 66-84. 
305 Kugler I. (2003) ‘Two concepts of omission’. Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 14, p. 447. 
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effect306 and the doctrine of omission in the absence of duty to act provide 
justification in above circumstances.307  
 
This chapter sets out the legal position and the scope of the doctrine of double 
effect and the ability to withhold and withdraw treatment on the basis of a notion 
of duty. The doctrine of double effect justifies the shortening of life, or the 
causing of death, as long as it is merely a foreseen (and not intended) side-effect 
of promoting a good end such as relieving someone from pain and suffering. In 
discussing these two doctrines, this chapter will show the disparity in the 
application of the criminal law in relation to medical professionals308 in 
comparison with laypeople.  The chapter also aims to discuss whether there is a 
real (legal) difference between what doctors are permitted to do (i.e. acting with 
the aim in order to relieve pain while foreseeing death and letting die by 
withholding or withdrawing treatment) and that what is prohibited as murder.309
 
a) Acts that Kill   
 
i) Double Effect Doctrine 
 The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is rooted in Roman Catholic theology.310 It 
has received  attention from moral philosophers and legal theorists.311 It was first 
imported into the criminal law of England and Wales through the law of self-
defence.312 Since then, the doctrine has found utility in cases dealing with health 
                                                 
306 Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland [1992] UKHL 5; Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: 
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care issues. Apart from using the doctrine to justify cases of abortion,313 it is 
employed to justify the use of potentially fatal opiods and diamorphine in the 
cases of terminally ill people and cases of those who suffer from severe pain and 
distress.314 In addition, it is also thought to have utility “…in relation to sedation 
and the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment”.315  
 
The Meaning of the DDE 
The doctrine is commonly understood to draw a distinction between 
“…impermissible intended consequences and permissible (merely) foreseen 
consequences”316. As stated above, the most common example in this regard is 
“the administration of drugs in order to suppress the pain of the dying with the 
knowledge that they will hasten death.”317  Glanville Williams sees no difference 
between an outcome that is foreseen as certain and that what is desired or 
intended. He claims that if the DDE “…means that the necessity of making a 
choice of values can be avoided merely by keeping your mind off one of the 
consequences, it can only encourage a hypocritical attitude towards moral 
problems”.318 However, John Finnis thinks that Glanville Williams has 
misunderstood the doctrine. He states that it is not about keeping one’s “…mind 
steadily off the consequence…”319 i.e. the way it is understood by Glanville 
Williams. For John Finnis, it is about “…what figures in the rational proposal 
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Faber Ltd. p. 286. 
319 Ibid. 
 67
(moral or immoral) which one adopts by choice and which thus constitutes one’s 
immediate reason for acting as one does”320.  Finnis explains this in the following 
words: 
 
“On Williams’ own account, it is clear that the second doctor is acting ‘in 
order to relieve pain’ by giving a dose which is ‘the minimum necessary to 
deaden pain’, all that figures in this doctor’s proposal is his responsibility 
to relieve pain, and the fulfilling of that responsibility by administering a 
dose calculated not so as to bring relief by bringing death but so as to 
relieve pain. Such a doctor can realistically and resolutely resolve never to 
intend to kill, or intentionally bring about death, and yet welcome the 
patient’s death just insofar as it is a relief from suffering. This is not a 
‘direction of intention’, artificial, hypocritical, or at all.” 321
 
Kugler, on the other hand, states that the doctrine that makes a distinction in the 
following way is known as the DDE. 
 
“It is forbidden to kill the person with direct intention (i.e. to act in order 
to kill him as a means to achieve the good result) but it is allowed to act in 
order to achieve the good result, with the knowledge that the act will 
certainly cause the death of an innocent person as a side effect.”322
 
Kugler comprehends the meaning of the doctrine from the contextual point of 
view.323 According to him, “…there are circumstances in which it is morally 
permissible to knowingly bring about as a side effect something which it would 
be forbidden to bring about purposely as a means, even if the balance of benefit 
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and harm in the consequences remains the same”.324 Although utilitarian does not 
envisage a difference between the two scenarios325, Kugler argues that the 
doctrine makes a distinction on the basis that in the former case there is a desire to 
kill, whereas in the latter case death is only “…known to follow as a by-
product…” of the action performed.326   
 
Both, Finnis and Kugler seek to provide an explanation as to why and how this 
type of conduct which knowingly causes death which is justified under the DDE, 
is treated morally different to the conduct that intentionally causes the same 
result. 
 
The Rational basis for the DDE  
One line of argument put forward by Kugler327 is that the DDE provides a 
“…reasonable explanation for our moral intuitions concerning certain cases”328 
i.e. cases where the motive and the outcome remains the same, but the intention is 
different.329 This notion is analysed by Kugler from two perspectives. Firstly, the 
doctrine could be explained with a direct appeal to intuition “…so that the 
doctrine is viewed as one of our basic moral beliefs, without further 
explanation”.330 Secondly, it could be understood within the context of the actor, 
victim or value itself. In other words, one who intends the consequence disregards 
moral norms such as the moral integrity of the actor, the right of a person to life 
and the respect for value of human life.  
 
The distinction drawn by the DDE also reflects the fact that morality is not only 
about attaining overall good with good motives. It is also about the actions of the 
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actor.331 Hence, morality “…sometimes instructs him that he is not allowed to 
perform a certain act even if it would produce the best overall outcome”.332  At 
this stage, the deontological constraints that impose personal responsibilities upon 
each individual become active. For example, the reason why one should not kill 
another person is to preserve one’s own “moral integrity”.333 Similarly, another 
reason why one should not kill could be to respect the other person’s right to life 
and to not treat that other person as a means to an end.334 Furthermore, one should 
not do harm to abstract values such as value of human life.335  
 
Finally, as put forward by John Finnis the doctrine “…in no way suggests that one 
can chose ‘regardless’ of the certain side-effects. One’s acceptance of the double-
effects must satisfy all moral requirements…”336  The side effect of the act must 
be proportionate.337 The result of the act must be morally acceptable and the 
reason for the action must be ‘good’ and the good effect must be immediate.338  
According to Finnis one of the most important moral requirements is that one 
should “never choose” or intend to destroy or damage “any instantiation of a basic 
human good”.339 He further states that the distinction between intended 
impermissible consequences and  side effect is “morally” significant because 
“…one who intends to destroy, damage or impede some instantiation of a basic 
human good necessarily acts contrary to reason, i.e., immorally”.340  In addition 
he states that “[a]ccepting – knowingly causing – harms caused to basic human 
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goods as side-effects will be contrary to reason (immoral) only if doing so is 
contrary to a reason of another sort…” i.e. by reason of “impartiality and fairness” 
or by reason arising from “role-responsibility and  prior commitments”.341  These 
moral norms “…do recognize that we have some discretion about which bad side-
effects to accept”.342  
 
In some cases, the options should be rejected, according to Finnis. This is 
“…because bringing about the side-effects would be unfair or unfaithful”.343  
 
“The only situation in which one can be, so to speak, a priori certain that 
harmful side-effects are not such as to give reason to reject an option is (i) 
the situation in which the feasible alternative option(s) involves intending 
destroy, damage or impede some instantiation of a basic human good, or 
(ii) the situation (if any) in which any feasible alternative option, while not 
involving such an intention, is necessarily accompanied by harmful side-
effects which it could not be reasonable to accept”.344  
 
Having briefly discussed the DDE, the following meaning of the doctrine is 
adopted for the purpose of the thesis. “[I]t is sometimes permissible to bring about 
as a side effect of one’s intentional action what it would be wrong to bring about 
intentionally.”345 For instance, suppose a patient is terminally ill and in severe 
pain, attempting to control the patient’s pain would mean risking the life of the 
patient. If, under these circumstances, the doctor administers the minimum pain-
killing drug required to relieve pain, and as a result, the patient dies, then the 
doctor’s conduct would fall within the scope of the DDE.  In this way, the 
doctor’s conduct i.e. acting to prevent pain, is justified ethically (being morally 
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good) and medically (it being a proper medical treatment in the given 
circumstances).346
 
Adoption of the Doctrine in the Criminal Law 
As stated earlier the doctrine plays a vital role in the health care issues. In 1957, it 
emerged in the context of ‘life or death treatment decisions’347 through the case of 
Dr Bodkin Adams.348 In this case, Judge Devlin made a distinction “between 
those outcomes that are directly sought and those that are incidental to the 
doctor’s purpose”.349  The doctrine has been invoked by doctors who find 
themselves in a similar position to that of Dr. Bodkin Adams.350 Generally, 
doctors in these situations have claimed that their intention, for example, in 
administering lethal drugs was not to kill, but to relieve pain.351 Notwithstanding 
the scope of the mental element for murder, which extends not only to direct 
intention, but also to indirect intention,352 doctors in these types of cases have 
generally managed to avoid criminal liability.353  In the following part of the 
chapter, the case of Dr Bodkin Adams and the case of Dr David Moor will be 
analysed in the light of the DDE. 
 
 
                                                 
346 Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’. Legal Studies, Vol. 17, p. 331. 
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350 Williams Glenys. (2007) Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The Impact of 
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ii) The Doctrine of Double Effect and the case of Dr Bodkin Adams and the 
case of Dr David Moor 
 
The Case of Dr Bodkin Adams 
As stated above, the case of Dr Bodkin Adams is important because in this case, 
the principle of double effect was recognised in the medical context.354 Dr. 
Bodkin Adams was charged with the murder of his terminally ill patient to whom 
he had administered increasing doses of morphine, barbiturate and diamorphine 
resulting in the immediate death of the patient.355 The autopsy report showed a 
high level of these drugs in the patient’s body and that consequently, the patient 
had suffered a stroke and a cerebral arteriosclerosis.356 The counsel for Dr. 
Bodkin Adams argued that the treatment provided “‘was designed to promote 
comfort’”357. Further to this, evidence was shown that under certain 
circumstances doctors are medically justified in giving drugs to their patients 
which would ‘incidentally’ lead to death.358 Hence, in these cases there exists a 
risk of shortening the life of a patient, which doctors are allowed to take, provided 
their conduct is medically justified in doing so.359 Thus, Judge Devlin directed the 
jury with the following words:  
 
“If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health can no longer be 
achieved there is still much for a doctor to do and he is entitled to do all 
that is proper and necessary [to relieve pain and suffering, even if the 
measures he takes may360]… incidentally shorten life.”361
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361 Arlidge Anthony. (2000) ‘The Trial of Dr David Moor’. Criminal Law Review, Jan, p. 34. 
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Judge Devlin further observed:  
 
“This is not because there is a special defence for medical men but 
because no act is murder which does not cause death. We are not dealing 
here with the philosophical or technical cause, but with the commonsense 
cause. The cause of death is the illness or the injury, ‘and the proper 
medical treatment that is administered and that has an incidental effect on 
determining the exact moment of death is not the cause of death in any 
sensible use of the term. But …no doctor, nor any man, no more in the 
case of the dying than of the healthy, has the right deliberately to cut the 
thread of life.’ It is not contended by the defence that Dr Adams had any 
right to make that determination.”362
 
The jury found Dr Bodkin Adams not guilty. It is arguable that the jury were 
influenced by the words of Judge Devlin on the application of the ‘standard tests’ 
on intention and causation principles.363 Firstly, Judge Devlin made it clear to the 
Jury that Dr Bodkin Adams was not the cause of death of his patient. Secondly, 
Judge Devlin adopted a narrow definition of intention which “…does not fit into 
the conventional criminal law” as it excludes foreseeable consequences.364 Hence, 
although Judge Devlin placed heavy emphasis on the cause of death, it is arguable 
that “…the case is nonetheless authority for the proposition that a doctor, whose 
primary intention is to relieve pain, even if life is incidentally shortened, has an 
exceptional defence to murder”.365 In other words, the verdict supported the 
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364 Ibid., p. 42; Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, pain relief and double effect’. Legal Studies, Vol. 17, 
p. 334. 
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observation made by Judge Devlin regarding the context of double effect, thereby 
providing it with a “…clear legal recognition”366 in medical cases. 
 
The Case of Dr David Moor  
The case of Dr David Moor is another prominent example of the double effect 
doctrine. Dr David Moor was charged with the murder of his terminally ill 
patient, but like Dr Bodkin Adams, Dr David Moor was found not guilty.367 The 
verdict in this case once again established that “…doctors who administer drugs 
to relieve pain are acting within the law whether or not the patient dies as a 
result”.368  What appears to be paramount in these types of cases is the action 
taken in order to relieve pain rather than the result i.e. death that follows as a side 
effect. Since doctors are medically justified to administer lethal doses of pain 
killing drugs, which may incidentally cause death, their intention in so doing must 
be to relieve pain. Hence, as far as the law is concerned, it is necessary for the 
court to know only the prime purpose of the doctor behind such an act. As far as 
the cause of death is concerned, as seen above in the comments of Judge Devlin, 
‘illness or injury’ remains the operational and substantial cause of death of the 
patient. Alternatively, as suggested by Huxtable, medication cannot be said to be 
a cause of death because it is provided for the relief of ‘pain, suffering or 
distress’.369 In other words, it is provided for the benefit of the patient.  
 
In this case, Dr David Moor injected his patient with 60 mg of diamorphine while 
the patient was unconscious.370 The patient died soon thereafter. Although Dr 
David Moor had identified correctly that his patient was in pain and close to 
                                                 
366 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 88. 
367 Arlidge Anthony. (2000) ‘The Trial of Dr. Moor’. Criminal Law Review, pp. 38-39. It is to be 
noted that Dr David Moor admitted in the media of helping many of his patients to die by 
administering lethal dose of drugs. See BBC News, Tuesday, 28 November, 2000. ‘Dr. Moor: 
Landmark verdict’. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/background_briefings/euthanasia/331263.stm 
368 Ibid. 
369 Huxtable R. (2004) ‘Get out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law’. 
Palliative Medicine, Vol. 18, p.63. 
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death, he wrongly presumed that the pain was caused by cancer. It later transpired 
that the patient was dying from heart failure.371 Owing to this complication, Judge 
Hooper decided to direct the jury to find intention on the basis of the subjective 
test.372 The issues raised to help the jury come to the decision were as follows: 
 
• Whether the dose administered exceeded 60mg? 
• Whether Dr David Moor caused the death of his patient?  
• What was the purpose of Dr David Moor for 
administering such a dose? Was it to treat or was it to 
kill?373 
 
The verdict was pronounced in the favour of Dr David Moor who had taken the 
same stance as Dr Bodkin Adams i.e. he argued that his intention was not to kill, 
but to treat the patient.374 In this case, Judge Hooper placed more emphasis on the 
intention of the doctor rather than the cause of death, as Judge Devlin did in the 
case of Dr Bodkin Adams.375 Once again the ‘standard tests’ on intention and 
causation principles were suspended and the doctrine of double effect was applied 
which as seen above justifies doctors conduct that causes death as a side effect of 
prescribed treatment. Under these circumstances, doctors are not treated as 
murderers because they are under a professional duty376 to treat the patient and 
this behaviour of a doctor fits within the DDE which has earned position in the 
criminal law. 
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Inferences drawn from the case of Dr Bodkin Adams and the case of Dr David 
Moor 
The consideration that “…the jury is not entitled to convict… [the doctor] of 
murder if his purpose is to give treatment which he believes, in the circumstances 
as he understands them, to be proper treatment to relieve pain”377, has almost 
become a rule378. Nonetheless,  “‘…it remains the law, that no doctor, nor any 
man no more in the case of the dying than the healthy, has the right to deliberately 
cut the thread of life’”379. In other words, the directions of the Judges in these 
types of cases show that doctors may take the risk of providing medication, 
whether of analgesics or sedatives380, to their patients in the last moments of life. 
The law accepts that such conduct is justified medically. However, what the law 
does not accept is the providing of such treatment with the intent to kill.381 Dr 
Carr, who was charged with attempted murder for allegedly overdosing his 
terminally ill patient with phenobarbitone was, however, found not guilty. 
However, Dr Carr was told by the judge that: “A doctor is not entitled to play God 
and cut short life because he believes the time has come to end the pain and 
suffering and to enable his patient to ‘die with dignity’.”382   
 
Furthermore, it is possible that administering even a palliative drug could prove 
dangerous legally, in the circumstances where the dose administered is more than 
is required to relieve pain. Such conduct by a doctor could be observed as being 
of ‘single effect’ rather than ‘double effect’. This interpretation could also be 
applied in the cases where the drug used to treat the patient had no therapeutic 
effect. Under these circumstances doctors cannot claim defence of double effect 
because their sole aim is to end life. This is despite the fact that the reason for so 
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doing may be morally right and good i.e. to relieve the patient from pain and 
suffering and to enable him or her to die with dignity as correctly referred to by 
the Judge in the case of Dr Carr.383
 
iii) The Position of Doctors who cannot claim Double Effect  
A doctor who intends to cause death, or shorten the  life of a terminally ill or 
severely ill patient, by injecting a substantial dose of morphine in order to relieve 
or avoid further pain and suffering, would be acting beyond the boundaries of the 
doctrine of double effect.384 The first reason for this is that the intention of the 
doctor in this scenario is not consistent with one of the requirements of the double 
effect doctrine i.e. that the intention must be “…to produce good effect”.385 
Secondly, since deliberately causing death or shortening life is inherently morally 
wrong, it contravenes another proviso of the doctrine which requires that “…the 
action itself (as distinct from its consequences or effects) must not be inherently 
morally wrong”386. Lastly, by bringing good effect through the medium of the bad 
effect, the doctor in this scenario breaches the third provision of the doctrine 
which specifies, that the “…good effect must not be brought about via the bad 
effect”387. 
 
Similarly, the DDE is of limited assistance in cases of terminal sedation.388 Even 
though the purpose, in a case of terminal sedation, is to relieve pain and suffering 
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by diminishing consciousness, life prolonging therapies such as food and water 
are withdrawn with the intent to hasten death.389 Arguably, this could raise 
allegations of active voluntary euthanasia (when it is done with consent) and 
active involuntary euthanasia (when it is performed without consent).390 In other 
words, a doctor could be accused of murder. “Terminal sedation would thus not 
be permitted under the rule of double effect, even though it is usually considered 
acceptable according to current legal and medical ethical standards.”391   
 
Similarly, even if the intention is to relieve pain, if the doctor administers more 
than the required painkilling dose to the patient and the patient dies as a result, the 
conduct of the doctor would arguably not fall within the scope of the DDE. This is 
because such conduct would fall short of the standard of proportionality required 
to be fulfilled in order for the conduct to be in accordance with the principle of 
double effect.392 The doctrine requires that the reason for so doing must be grave. 
However, it is evident from some of the cases393 that the legal officials, including 
the jury, have a tendency to find doctors under these conditions ‘not guilty’ of 
murder unless the doctor has been grossly negligent. Under these circumstances, 
the doctor would in all likelihood be found guilty of unlawful killing (generally 
manslaughter)394 in spite of the act done for the lawful purpose.395 It is also 
possible that there could be a case of premeditated murder as with the case of 
Harold Shipman, who was found guilty of murdering 15 of his patients by 
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injecting them with a lethal overdose of painkilling drugs (diamorphine 
Hydrochoride).396
 
The Case of Dr Cox 
In the situation where a doctor uses a drug, which has no therapeutic effect, but 
which eases the pain of the imminently dying patient, this conduct could fall short 
of the doctrine, as happened in the case of Dr Cox397. Dr Cox injected his patient, 
Lillian Boyes, with potassium chloride. This was a drug which would certainly 
kill the patient, but which would, at the same time, provide relief from pain in the 
last moments of the life of the patient.398 It was decided by the jury that Dr Cox 
intentionally caused the death of his patient, albeit, with her consent.399 The fact 
was that Lillian Boyes was in severe bodily pain in the last stages of her life. It 
was so severe that even if her son touched her, it would cause her pain. She 
repeatedly requested Dr Cox to put an end to her unbearable suffering. 
Consequently, Dr Cox finally decided to accord with her wish by injecting a 
substance that was intended to kill her. Following the act, Dr Cox was arrested, 
charged and found guilty of attempt to murder.400  
 
Dr Cox denied that he had an intention to kill. He attempted to make the same 
argument as Dr Bodkin Adams and Dr David Moor i.e. that his intention was to 
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treat the patient’s pain and suffering.401 Judge Ognall directed the jury in the 
following terms to decide whether Dr Cox intended to kill Lillian Boyes: 
 
“‘There can be no doubt that the use of drugs to reduce pain and suffering 
will often be fully justified notwithstanding that it will, in fact, hasten the 
moment of death. What can never be lawful is the use of drugs with the 
primary purpose of hastening the moment of death. 
 
And so, in deciding Dr Cox’s intention, the distinction the law requires 
you to draw is this. Is it proved that in giving the injection, in that form 
and in those amounts, Dr Cox’s primary purpose was to bring the life of 
Lilian Boyes to an end? If it was then he is guilty. If on the other hand, it 
was, or may have been, his primary purpose in acting as he did to alleviate 
her pain and suffering, then he is not guilty.’”402   
 
In light of the evidence, the jury decided that Dr Cox’s main purpose was to end 
Lilian Boyes’ life. What appears to be markedly different in this case is the 
particular drug used to kill Lillian Boyes.403 It is possible to suggest that the jury 
could have inferred Dr Cox’s intention from the substance used, rather than the 
consequence that followed from his action. If Dr Cox had used an analgesic drug 
even in high doses, the outcome of his case would probably have been different, 
despite the fact that he acted with intent to kill.404 Furthermore, it is arguable that 
the sentence pronounced in this case also supports this view; Dr Cox was awarded 
a suspended sentence.405   
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Implications drawn from the case of Dr Cox 
It is arguable that the decision in the case of Dr Cox once again throws light on 
the double effect doctrine, which prohibits intended impermissible 
consequences.406 As stated by Huxtable, “…the legal officials want only to afford 
an explicit justification to those doctors taking positive steps that might shorten 
life whose conduct can be reconciled, however, shakily, with the DDE.”407 As 
stated above, the doctrine disapproves of any and all intended evil ends and evil 
means, which result from the actions of the doctor, as morally wrong. In addition, 
the doctrine approves of some consequences which are brought about knowingly 
and which occur as a side effect of the main act, as long as the good effect 
outweighs the bad consequence and the drug used was proportionate to the pain 
relief.408 However, in spite of the strict application of the rule of double effect to 
cases involving ‘life or death treatment decisions’, at times, when the conduct of 
the doctor does not fall within the scope of this doctrine and the doctor is found 
guilty, the courts appear to be reluctant to punish such doctors with 
imprisonment409 as happened in the case of Dr Cox.410  In other situations, as 
noted by Glanville Williams, “… a jury will be reluctant to convict a doctor in 
these circumstances, and may only seize upon any defect in evidence as a reason 
for acquitting, but may even acquit when the evidence and the judge’s direction 
leave them with no legal reason for doing so”.411 However, when it comes to 
laypeople, the law treats them differently from doctors, even when the action 
taken is the same as the action of the medical professionals.  
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iv) Exploring the difficulties faced by laypersons in relying on the Double 
Effect Doctrine 
The DDE, as noted above, is understood as a principle of justification.412 It 
justifies unintended, merely foreseen consequences that follow from intended 
action.413 As stated above, the relevant intended action must always be good and 
morally permissible. The unintended merely foreseen consequence which is 
otherwise evil and morally impermissible may be justified when “…there is a 
serious reason for undertaking the action”414.  For example, the serious reason 
could be to save a person’s life or to avoid being killed.415 Similarly, acting to 
relieve the serious pain, suffering and distress of another person is considered to 
be a ‘good’ reason to justify one’s actions.416 As stated above, Doctors employ 
this reasoning when it comes to ‘life or death treatment decision-making.417 In 
these situations doctors use analgesic or sedative drugs to treat the pain of 
terminally ill or severely ill patients, in the knowledge that this could mean 
accelerating or causing the immediate death of the patient. This type of conduct 
by the doctor is potentially justifiable, not only morally, but also medically and 
legally, as noted above.418 In fact, one commentator has stated:  
 
“…namely, that a doctor is not in breach of his duty to his patient when he 
administers pain relieving drugs which incidentally shorten the patient’s 
life. By contrast, the law does not consider it to be any part of a doctor’s 
duty to act for the sole purpose of killing his patient. This argument 
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418 Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’. Legal Studies, Vol. 17, p. 324. 
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requires us to accept that a consideration of a doctor’s duty is relevant not 
only when death follows from the omission to treat a patient but also when 
it results from his acts.”419  
 
However, when it comes to laypersons the same exception does not apply.420 The 
position of laypersons does not reconcile with the position of doctors, even when 
the action, the circumstances and the consequence are one and the same. The first 
reason for this results from the fact that laypeople cannot argue, as doctors can, 
“…they understood their actions to be in line with the actions of other responsible 
doctors….”421 i.e. laypersons cannot argue that their conduct is medically 
justified. That, like a doctor, he or she has responsibility to the patient to relieve 
his or her suffering. Their (i.e. laypersons) intention was ‘to treat’ the patient and 
not to kill.422 Similarly, as argued by Glanville Williams, an overdose 
administered by a doctor is difficult to establish because of the nature of evidence 
required.423 As a result, it will often be difficult to establish the crucial amount of 
the final dose that killed the patient in the case where the amount of the dose is 
said to be the cause of death.424 All this goes against the layperson whose 
involvement in the given circumstances would be seen as interference in the 
absence of the authority (status of a doctor) that imposes responsibility on the 
doctor to act to relieve pain. Under these circumstances, even if the conduct of a 
layperson is justified under the doctrine of double effect by arguing that every 
human being has some kind of moral responsibility towards the other, not to let 
that other person suffer,425 when it comes to legal justification, the layperson will 
lack the authority (licence) to perform such a task that permits the licence holder 
                                                 
419 ‘Attempted Murder of Terminally Ill Patient’. (1993) Medical Law Review, Vol.1, p. 234 
420 Except when one acts in self-defence. See, Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double 
Effect’. Legal Studies, Vol. 17, p. 325. 
421 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 104. 
422 Williams Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd. pp. 291-292. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. p. 130. 
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to do all that is necessary for the wellbeing of the patient. This assertion is made 
on the basis that Lord Goff also acknowledged the idea that  
 
“…a doctor may, when caring for a patient who is, for example, dying of 
cancer, lawfully administer painkilling drugs despite the fact that he 
knows that an incidental effect of that application will be to abbreviate the 
patient’s life. Such a decision may properly be made as part of the care of 
the living patient, in his best interest; and, on this basis, the treatment will 
be lawful”426.  
 
As a result, although the jury are legally free to convict the accuse of murder in 
the circumstances in which the death is virtually certain and the defendant 
foresaw it to be virtually certain, the jury are unlikely to find a doctor guilty. This 
is because the doctor acts in accordance to medical requirements and thus does no 
wrong. However, in the case of layperson such verdict is unlikely to follow.427 
This is because as argued earlier since layperson stands in a different position to 
that of a doctor it would prove difficult for the jury not to find the defendant 
guilty of a crime that explicitly supports the verdict of guilt. Under these 
circumstances, there is high possibility that the jury would find the defendant 
guilty. From this, it follows that different rules are applied between laypeople and 
doctors.428  
   
As a result, it is arguable that in comparison to laypersons, doctors enjoy a unique 
position in their profession. It allows them to act during the critical moment in the 
life of the patient in a manner which may lead to the death of the patient. 
Furthermore, as stated by Glanville Williams, a doctor under these circumstances 
will “…be able to preserve a measure of ambiguity about his acts, which helped 
                                                 
426 Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland [1992] UKHL 5, p. 12. 
427 For example, if at all the layperson is found not guilty of murder he or she will not get away 
with manslaughter conviction or attempt to murder. See ‘Manslaughter –ingredients of offence 
where death caused by gross negligence’. Criminal Law Review, 1998, Nov., pp. 830-833. 
428 The case of Dr Bodkin Adams, Dr David Moor and the case of Woollin are good examples of 
this. 
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to still both his conscience and any fear he might have of the law”.429  In this way, 
it is not just the act that is justified but it is also the person i.e. the doctor who is 
excused.430 Therefore, as argued by Price, only a person in the capacity of a 
doctor, who is under a duty of care towards the patient, can perform the action of 
administering a drug which inevitably leads to death.431 It is knowledge, skill and 
authority (licence to practice medicine) of a doctor that prevails over the 
subjective view of laypeople432 who fall short of this position.433 This is clear 
from the two most recent cases: the case of Kay Gilderdale and the case of 
Frances Inglis. 
 
The Case of Kay Gilderdale 
Kay Gilderdale administered morphine to her dying daughter Lynn Gilderdale, 
who had attempted suicide.434 Consequently, Kay Gilderdale was charged with 
attempted murder of her daughter.435 She contended that her purpose in doing so 
was not to attempt to kill her daughter but to comfort her as she was dying. The 
DPP had found sufficient evidence against Kay Gilderdale to charge her with 
attempted murder.436 The court and the jury on the other hand, took a different 
view from the course taken by the DPP. Justice Bean opined that Kay Gilderdale 
should not have been brought before the court. When the jury acquitted Kay 
Gilderdale, Justice Bean commented on the Jury’s verdict by stating that the jury 
used common sense, decency and humanity in acquitting Kay Gilderdale.437   
 
                                                 
429 Williams Glanville. (1973) ‘Euthanasia’. The Medico-Legal Society, Vol. 41, p. 15. 
430 Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’. Legal Studies, Vol. 17, p. 327. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Smith J.C. (2000) ‘A Comment on Moor’s Case’. Criminal Law Review, p.42. 
434 For further details on this case, refer chapter 1. 
435 It is relevant to note as discussed in chapter 2, she was also charged with separate offence of 
assisted suicide to which she pleaded guilty and was awarded a suspended sentence.  
436 The Daily Mail, 26 January 2010, ‘Decision to charge loving mother Kay Gilderdale with 
attempted murder of ME daughter was right, says DPP’. http://www.dailymail.ac.uk/news/article-
1246222/Keir-Starmer-says-decision-charge-Kay-Gilderdale-attempted-murder-daughter-Lynn-
public-interest.html#ixzz0zrNK  
437 BBC News Online, 26 Jan 2010. ‘Should law be changed on ‘Mercy Killing’? 
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Since the jury provide no reason on their decision, the acquittal of Kay Gilderdale 
from the charge of attempted murder leaves one to speculate whether the jury 
released Kay Gilderdale in the light of the double effect doctrine (i.e. her intention 
was good), or, because they considered her conduct to be part and parcel of 
assisted suicide (a continuing act that began as a process of assisted suicide), a 
charge to which she pleaded guilty to and for which she was awarded a suspended 
sentence.438 It is unlikely that they found Kay Gilderdale not guilty on the basis of 
double effect because as argued above Kay lacked the authority to act in the 
capacity of a doctor439, even though she probably had the required knowledge and 
skill to act in that manner taking into account that she acted as a carer for her 
daughter.440 Hence, it is more likely that they acquitted her on the basis that she 
had already pleaded guilty of assisted suicide (for which she was awarded 
sentence).  
 
The Case of Francis Inglis 
Francis Inglis injected her brain-damaged son, Thomas, with an analgesic drug 
(heroin, also know as diamorphine441). Thomas died and Francis Inglis was 
charged with his murder.442 The toxicology report showed that Thomas was given 
“a very large dose of heroin” – a dose which fell within the fatal levels.443 Francis 
Inglis admitted injecting her son with the lethal painkilling drug. However, she 
contended that her act was an act of ‘mercy killing’, rather than murder. She said 
that she felt her son was in severe pain and that he was suffering. Her desire was 
to end his suffering by allowing him to have a painless death. She further argued 
                                                 
438 See chapter 1 of the thesis. 
439 That is to administer pain relieving drug in order to comfort dying as for example, doctors did 
in the circumstances of Wooltorton. 
440 Although the doctrine does not specify the requirement of the professional in these 
circumstances, one of the reasons that could justify the actor’s conduct is “role-responsibility”. 
This means the actor ought to be responsible to perform such an act in the given circumstances. If 
Kay Gilderdale is observed as a responsible agent for the best interest of her daughter in the given 
circumstances then it is possible to suggest that probably the jury found her conduct justifying 
under the doctrine of double effect and in this way, excused her from conviction.  
441 Huxtable Richard. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. 
USA and Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. 
442 Mother ‘injected brain-damaged son with fatal dose of heroin to end misery’. Telegraph News, 
5th January 2010.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime  
443 Ibid. 
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that her intentions in so doing were ‘good’ and she had acted merely out of love 
for her son.444  
 
Judge Brian Barker directed the jury that there was no such thing as ‘mercy 
killing’ under the law. Hence, he stated that the jury should not look at the motive, 
but at the intention of the accused to find out whether she murdered her son or 
not. Frances Inglis was found guilty of murder.445 The Judge awarded her a 
sentence of life imprisonment for a minimum of 9 years. 
 
Francis Inglis’ conduct clearly went beyond the scope of the DDE because her 
intention was to relieve pain by causing death. However, if she had not admitted 
the fact that she desired to end Thomas’ suffering by ending his life and if it had 
not been evident that she had attempted to end his life on previous occasion then 
the double effect doctrine would have been relevant446. However, under these 
circumstances the question arises as to whether her conduct would have been 
treated in the same manner as that of medical professionals. That is, she acted out 
of responsibility to relieve pain of her son. As argued by Huxtable, taking into 
account the proximity of her relationship with Thomas, she owes some duty 
towards him. Under these circumstances, morally her conduct should be treated 
analogous to a doctor. However, the question remains whether it will be justified 
legally. The answer to this question is that it is doubtful because of lack of 
authority to act. Hence, it is possible to suggest that the basis of the legally 
justification for the actions of doctors in these types of cases does not entirely lie 
within the DDE, their role as a doctor plays vital part. 
 
 
 
                                                 
444 By Ninemsn staff, on 15th January 2010.  http://news.ninemsn.com.au/world/1000181/mother-
explains-why-she-killed-son-with-heroin  
445 This is because the law “decrees all mercy-killing to be murder”. See Williams Glanville. 
(1973) ‘Euthanasia’. The Medico Legal Society, Vol.41, p. 16. 
446 Mother ‘injected brain-damaged son with fatal dose of heroin to end misery’. Telegraph News, 
5th January 2010.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime  
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This inference could also be drawn from Lord Goff’s observation:  
 
“It is this principle [that the doctor must act in the best interests of the 
patient]… which, in my opinion, underlies the established rule that a 
doctor may, when caring for a patient who is, for example, dying of 
cancer, lawfully administer painkilling drugs despite the fact that he 
knows that an incidental effect of that application will be to abbreviate the 
patient’s life. Such a decision may properly be made as part of the care of 
the living patient, in his best interests; and, on this basis, the treatment will 
be lawful.”447
 
By contrast, Lord Goff asserted that “it forms no part of a [doctor’s] duty to give 
his patient a lethal injection to put him out of his agony.”448
 
v) Exploring the DDE and the Criminal Law 
There are a number of important cases449 which support the principle that medical 
professionals who act in order to relieve the pain, suffering or distress of the 
terminally ill or severely ill patient, do not act unlawfully when that conduct kills 
the patient or incidentally leads to the death of that patient.  
 
However, it is relevant to note what Dr Oliver, a hospice director, has to say on 
the use of painkilling drugs. According to him diamorphine is likely to cause 
death only if used inappropriately450. This means not all actions done for the 
lawful purpose i.e. in order to relieve pain would be justifiable medically or 
legally. Glanville Williams on the other hand, claims that sometimes there can be 
an incident in which the minimum necessary dose required to relieve pain may 
kill the person.451 This implies that although there may be a possibility that death 
                                                 
447 Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland [1992] UKHL 5, at 12. 
448 Ibid. at p.12. 
449  Such as the case of Dr Bodkin Adams and the case of Dr David Moor. 
450 Oliver D. (1997) ‘Easing pain for the terminally ill’, The Times, 11 November. 
451 Williams Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and 
Faber Ltd. p. 285. 
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may follow as a result of the administration of the dose to relieve pain, there is 
also a chance that death may not follow as a result of the administration of the 
dose unless used inappropriately. Hence, as argued by Huxtable, it is necessary 
that the legal officials take a hard look at these types of cases452 so to maintain a 
distinction between death that follows as a side effect of pain killing drug and 
death that is brought about deliberately. This is necessary to ensure that doctors 
such as Dr Bodkin Adams do not get away with criminal acts by trying to fit their 
conduct within the DDE.453
 
However, as and when the legal officials encounter the cases of double effect in 
the context of palliative care, as argued above, it is rare that these cases reach the 
stage of prosecution. However, when these cases arise, the judges generally adopt 
a narrow construction of intention adopted by the DDE.454 At the same time the 
decision in the case of Woollin455 provides jury flexibility in finding the accused 
guilty or not guilty. As far as the rule of causation is concerned, the court tends to 
use a ‘common sense’ approach in order to show that the cause of death was not 
the drug administered, but the underlying disease of the patient.456 This kind of 
practice illustrates a level of inconsistency within the common law system, and it 
also shows disparity in the application of the law. It is arguable that there is 
unfairness in the way that the law is applied to doctors and the way that it is 
applied to laypeople.457 For example, in the case of Dr Bodkin Adams, where the 
                                                 
452 Huxtable R. (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise. USA and 
Canada: Routledge.Cavendish. 
453 It is alleged that Dr Bodkin Adams acted with malicious intentions. See ‘Crime File-Famous 
Criminal: Dr John Bodkin Adams’. http://www.crimeandinvestigation.co.uk/crime-files/dr-john-
bodkin-adams/biography.html  
454 Price D. (2009) ‘What shape to euthanasia after Bland? Historical, cotemporary and futuristic 
paradigms’. Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 125, p.146. 
455 That is the jury may find one guilty of murder if they “…feel sure that death or serious harm 
was a virtual certainty (baring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions 
and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case…. The decision is one for the jury to be 
reached upon a consideration of all the evidence”. See R v Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103.  
456 ‘Attempted Murder of Terminally Ill Patient’. (1993) Medical Law Review, Vol. 1, pp. 232-
234.  
457 Wilson W. (1995) ‘Is Life Sacred?’ Journal of Society, Welfare and Family, Vol.17, p. 137. 
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causation was very much present458, Judge Devlin deemed it absent.459 William 
Wilson suggests that the possible rational behind the reasoning of Judge Devlin 
“…may be that the doctor’s contribution was too negligible to be causal”.460 The 
autopsy report suggests otherwise.461 The patient died from a stroke and a 
cerebral arteriosclerosis caused by high level of drug administered. In other 
words, medically speaking the cause of death could be ‘drug administered’ rather 
than the underlying disease of the patient as it happened in the case of Thomas.462 
Therefore, even under the principle of causation the conduct of a doctor and 
layperson cannot be distinguished except on the basis of the status of a doctor as 
argued by Smith. “We cannot distinguish between a doctor and a layman doing 
the same act on grounds of causation, but only on the ground that what is 
permissible for the one is not permissible for the other”.463
 
The criminal law makes a distinction between the actions of a medical 
professional and the actions of a layperson when it comes to the rule of double 
effect.464 As a result, as argued by Saini the law is “…intellectually incoherent 
and intellectually dishonest …” in its application which illustrates a certain level 
of dishonesty within the law. 
 
In addition, even if death is not an immediate effect of the act, such an act could 
shorten life which according to Ashworth is sufficient to find the causal link 
between doctors’ conduct and the death of the patient.465 On the other hand, as 
argued by Glenys Williams, an act undertaken by a doctor may be the factual 
                                                 
458 William Glanville. (1958) The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber and Faber 
Ltd. p. 290. 
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cause of death of the patient, but it cannot be the legal cause probably because the 
doctor’s conduct under such circumstances would be justified medically and 
morally.466 That is, although but for the action of the doctor the patient would not 
have died, the action carried out was necessary in the best interest of the patient 
and the doctor had a duty to do so. As a result, death that follows from the action 
of the doctor is a side effect. 
 
In this way, the DDE not only assist legal officials to overcome the hurdle of 
dealing with the principle of causation but also helps to overcome the hurdle of 
principle of mens rea. It springs from the DDE that doctors do not intend to kill 
their patients in the cases of palliative care. In other words, the doctrine provides 
them with an opportunity to say that they did not cause nor did they intend the 
death of the patient.467 The aim of the doctor is to treat the pain or to relieve the 
pain of the patient. The potential criminal issues arising from the intention in such 
cases are overcomed with the help of the DDE468 and with the help of the ruling 
led down in the case of Woollin.  This reflects the arbitrary application of the 
general principles of the criminal law which differs in its role towards the cases 
involving doctors and cases involving laypeople. If the law was applied equally as 
argued by Huxtable, then doctors who administer a dose inappropriately (for 
example, those who administer more of a drug than what is actually required to 
relieve pain), should not be able to avoid criminal liability. 469  Hence, this 
possible scenario should provide reason for legal officials to pause and reflect on 
the state of the law at present.470  
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Hence, it is possible to agree with Huxtable’s view: 
 
“It certainly looks like a legal fiction, designed to aid the doctor and 
notably, if perhaps understandingly, unavailable to the layperson. Yet, 
even if this is a viable reading of Judge Devlin’s direction […better 
understood as signalling that morphine will not be recognised as a cause in 
law], the absence of causation does not equal innocence: the doctor could 
still be charged with attempted murder. However, this is highly unlikely, 
given the legal officials’ apparent willingness to find the innocent 
intention.”471  
 
On the other hand, in contrast to the position of doctors, the position of laypersons 
differs with respect to not only causation but also intention. If laypeople manage 
to get away with murder, on the basis that it cannot be shown whether it was the 
drugs or the underlying disease that killed the patient, they still cannot avoid the 
charge of attempted murder. This is because “…in ‘criminal’ type cases intention 
has been extended to include foresight, in ‘medical’ type cases involving doctors 
who foresee a patient’s death, the courts contrarily accept a narrower definition of 
intention which does not fit into the conventional criminal law”.472   
 
From the above analysis, it is more than clear that the DDE plays a vital role in 
the criminal law. Huxtable suggests that the doctrine is valuable and ought to 
survive in the law, but it needs to be ‘tidied’ up. He argues that it should apply to 
all cases of murder in like circumstances and not only when doctors are involved. 
If not, according to Huxtable, it is logical to envisage some trials and consequent 
sanctioning of those practitioners who foresee death as a virtually certain outcome 
of their actions.473  As stated above, if Dr Oliver is right in what he has to say, 
                                                 
471 Ibid. at, p.102.  
472 Williams Glenys. (2007) Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The Impact of 
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 93
then one should expect doctors to know for example how painkillers are to be 
administered safely, and the cases in which the patient dies there should be close 
examination.474 Furthermore, such practitioners should be asked the same 
question that Judge Ognall put to the jury in the case of Dr Cox when considering 
intention:475 “What did he know of the properties and potential of potassium 
chloride used in this way?”476
 
Arguably, it is not only the DDE that comes to the aid of doctors. When for 
example death is hastened deliberately by doctors who withdraw treatment or 
care, the law is constructed and interpreted in such a way that doctors are able to 
‘dodge the dock’, as stated by Huxtable.477 This occurs in circumstances where 
doctors withhold or withdraw treatment, either with consent or in the best interest 
of the patient. 
 
b) Omissions that Kill 
 
i) Understanding the Duties which make Omissions into Acts  
The criminal law in England and Wales does not impose a general duty on people 
to salvage another person from harm or peril.478 However, there are circumstances 
that arise through statutory law and the common law, where the criminal law does 
recognise a ‘duty of care’.479 Hence, the breach of that duty will result in criminal 
liability.480 William Wilson has remarked that the “basis upon which the duty of 
care is imposed is the foreeability of injury to those who might be imperilled by 
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careless [or deliberate] acts or omissions”481 of another person. This person could 
be for example, one who voluntarily agrees to care for that person who is 
dependent on him or her. The reason for this dependency could be age, illness or 
severe physical disability. This normally is the case in the parent-child 
relationship, or relationships involving legal guardians or spouses.482 Similarly, 
this person could be a doctor who has a duty to provide appropriate care483 to his 
or her patient.484 For example, if a doctor withholds or withdraws treatment of a 
patient when under a duty to do so, such conduct of a doctor could amount to 
breach of his duty, unless he or she has a good reason to do so. One such good 
reason could be that the patient has refused to consent to treatment.485  The 
subject matter of this part of the chapter is based on such duties in the context of 
the doctor-patient relationship and the relationship between a patient and a 
layperson.  
 
Duty of care  
A duty of care in a medical and legal sense refers to a duty “that exists where 
there is a doctor-patient relationship in existence”.486 A doctor’s duty of care, 
under the common law, is to take “reasonable steps (as other reasonable doctors 
would) to save or prolong life”, or to act in the patient’s best interests. This duty is 
“applicable in the setting of end of life care”.487 Hence, for example, when a 
doctor accepts a patient, he acquires a duty of care towards that patient. The 
failure of a doctor to act in accordance with the duty of care would amount to a 
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Longman. p.376.  
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breach of his duty.488 However, it is relevant to note that doctors have no absolute 
duty to save life.489 For example, as stated by Glanville Williams, “[t]he Roman 
Catholic Church has for over twenty years accepted that whereas the physician 
may never kill his patient by positive act, here is a limit to the extent to which he 
is required to fight for the life of a dying patient”490. Similarly, Wilson states that 
a doctor’s “duty to sustain life lasts only so long as the patient’s interests are 
being furthered”.491 In the following part of this chapter, an attempt is made to set 
out the circumstances and conditions under which a doctor is able to cancel his or 
her duty or duties towards the patient.   
 
ii) The Ability of Doctors to cancel those Duties 
Although a physician would normally be “under a duty to use reasonable care to 
conserve [or prolong] his patient’s life, he is probably exempted from that duty if 
life has become a burden to the patient”.492 The circumstances of the case may be 
such that the patient is unable to communicate his or her wishes and the only 
possible way to act in the best interest of the patient is to let the patient die a 
dignified death.493 In the same way, if the person has positively forbidden 
particular treatment494 or refuses to consent to treatment495 or withholds consent 
to it, the doctor is absolved from his duty.496 The same effect would transpire in 
the case when a patient consents to the withdrawal of continuing treatment.497 The 
reason that justifies a doctor’s conduct in the first case is the ‘decision taken in the 
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best interest of the patient’. The justification in the second case relies on the 
patient’s right to self-determination.498
Refusal to Consent to Treatment or Refusal of Continuing Treatment 
It has been stated that “[i]f the competent patient refuses consent to treatment or 
continued treatment, the legal effect is that the doctor is absolved from his or her 
duty by the patient.”499 This means that doctors in these circumstances are neither 
lawfully permitted to intervene, nor liable for failing to prevent the death of the 
patient.  This is because the doctrine of omission or withdrawal of treatment in 
this context is “duty-driven than rights- or interest-led”500. That is the patient has 
the right to refuse to consent to treatment and the doctor (who otherwise has right 
and duty to act in the best interest of the patient) has a concurrent duty to respect 
the patient’s right to self-determination. Another line of argument in this context 
(i.e. the reason why doctor ought to respect patient’s decision) is found in the 
criminal law itself. That is since a duty to treat the patient also means providing 
for a duty to care for that patient “intervening against the patient’s wishes [as 
argued by Wilson could mean] is not an act of caring but an assault on his or her 
autonomy”.501 Hence, for example, if a person has positively forbidden particular 
treatment, a doctor will be acting illegally if he or she administers the treatment 
without the consent of that patient.502 In the light of this scenario, an example of 
Kerrie Wooltorton and the case of Re C and Ms B are briefly explained below, 
and discussed thereafter in the context of omissions which kill. 
 
The instance of Kerrie Wooltorton 
Wooltorton, who attempted suicide prevented doctors from saving her life but 
permitted them to treat her pain in order to make the dying process painless. She 
drew up advance directives that clearly indicated her wish not to be treated to save 
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her life, but to make her dying process painless.503 The doctors cooperated with 
her desire by letting her die a painless death. The Coroner in this case held that 
the doctors acted in accordance with the law.504 The possible reasons why the 
doctors under these circumstances cannot be said to have abetted suicide, in spite 
of possessing the required knowledge, are as follows. Firstly, the doctor cannot 
act without the consent of the person as he has no such right. Secondly, if the 
doctor refrains from acting on the request of the patient, the intention of the 
doctor is merely an omission to act in the absence of a duty to act, such conduct of 
a doctor arguably could not amount to abetment to suicide. The exception to this 
is when a doctor has a legal right to control the patient in the circumstances and 
when a patient is mentally disordered and the protection is required in the 
interests of the patient’s safety.505   
 
The case of Re C 
The patient in the case of Re C was told by his doctors that he required serious 
treatment in order to save his life. The patient who had gangrene in his left leg, 
refused to consent to the treatment of amputating his leg which was considered 
necessary to save his life. He was detained in a mental hospital on the basis that 
he was a paranoid schizophrenic and his illness rendered him incapable to make 
decision about his health.506 He approached the court to bring an injunction 
against the hospital to prevent the hospital treating him without his consent. The 
hospital, which refused to respect his decision, was directed by the court in the 
following way. It was stated that every person of full age and mental capacity has 
the right to refuse treatment, even if that refusal would cause death, or permanent 
injury, to the patient. Furthermore, it was held that although the patient was a 
paranoid schizophrenic, his mental illness did not render him automatically 
incapable of making decisions about his health.507  
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The case of Ms B 
In another case, a patient known as Ms B desired that her treatment be withdrawn. 
Ms B was granted relief by the court against the doctors, who had declined to 
accord with her decision.508 Ms B suffered from a serious physical disability and 
she was kept alive with the support of artificial respiration. Ms B asked the 
doctors in charge of her to remove her life support when she could not see any 
scope for improvement in her condition. The doctors refused to do so, on the 
ground that she did not possess the mental capacity to refuse her treatment. The 
court allowed Ms B to decide the issue for herself. The court further held that 
forcing treatment on her against her wish would amount to an unlawful trespass 
which could accrue civil as well as criminal liability509 As a result, it is 
established law that doctors are bound to act in accordance with the wishes of the 
patient.  
 
The Consequences of Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment on Refusal to 
Consent 
Under the right to refuse treatment, a person is able to protect oneself from 
unwanted intrusion to his or her body.510 However, it also enables a person to 
ensure the manner and time of his death.511 Furthermore, it arguably helps people 
to die a painless death. This is possible not only in the cases like that of Ms B 
whose pain was controlled at the time of her death, but also people like Kerrie 
Wooltorton, who managed to die a painless death, after first attempting to 
deliberately inflict death upon her self. 
 
This gives rise to a relevant concern. The concern is that although the doctors in 
such cases were capable of being tried for the offence of assisted suicide or 
attempted murder if not murder, avoided liability apparently because of their 
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status as doctors which allows them to act or omit to act in certain circumstances 
in which a layperson would attract criminal liability. This claim is made on the 
basis that the conduct of a doctor who acts to make dying comfortable of a patient 
who has attempted suicide for example, in fact, not only intends to assist in 
suicide (by administering pain relieving drug), but also know that his or her act 
will help the dying person attain a painless and probably quick and peaceful 
death. Such doctors could also be held responsible for attempted murder because 
their act most probably would accelerate the death. Similarly, in cases like that of 
Ms B, who received pain killing drug to die a painless death after refusing life 
saving treatment, doctors could be said to assist in her dying by making it painless 
and probably peaceful and quick. However, as argued earlier, since doctor is 
under a duty to act in the best interest of the patient, so if patient desires 
painkilling drug after attempting to kill one self, doctors seem to have an 
obligation to act in the best interest of the patient which include not letting patient 
suffer in pain. 
 
Lord Goff in the case of Anthony Bland refuted the possibility that this could be 
classed as assisted suicide by stating that 
 
“…there is no question of the patient having committed suicide, nor 
therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in so doing. It is 
simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do so, declined to consent to 
treatment which might or could have the effect of prolonging his life, and 
the doctor has, in accordance with his duty, complied with his patient’s 
wishes.”512
 
Arguably, this interpretation prevents Lord Goff from having to consider whether 
the statute overrides the common law developments on consent to medical 
treatment. Under the current legal position (particularly focusing on the 
circumstances of Wooltorton), the observation made by Lord Goff seems to raise 
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a certain amount of doubt. This is because it is a fact that Wooltorton ended her 
life by way of suicide, and furthermore, that the doctors did facilitate her in her 
dying process by making it painless. It is true that the doctors did not have her 
consent to act in order to save her life and therefore, they had to let her die. 
However, the fact arguably remains that they facilitated suicide.513   
 
Similarly, the right to refuse treatment, which Lord Goff stated effectively, 
absolves the doctor from his or her duty to provide treatment, and to let the patient 
die. Doctors also do not have unlimited obligation to fight a hopeless battle”514 
and as a result this should justify their conduct in ‘hopeful cases’. Furthermore, 
doctors are also absolved from their duty of care in cases of the premature death 
of the patient on patient’s own terms.515
 
In the Best Interest of the Patient 
The basis on which the act or omission distinction is drawn in cases of withdrawal 
of treatment of a patient who is in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is founded 
upon the ground of quality of treatment. In other words, the treatment must be 
either futile or burdensome to the patient, rather than helping to improve the 
quality of life of the patient.516 One of the important cases in this scenario is that 
of Anthony Bland.517
 
 
The case of Anthony Bland 
In this case, Anthony Bland, who had suffered injuries in the Hillsborough 
football ground disaster, was in a PVS. His doctors, in consensus with his parents, 
applied to the court seeking a declaration stating that if they withdraw Anthony 
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Bland’s nutrition and hydration, their conduct would not fall foul of the existing 
criminal law of murder. The House of Lords decided that the doctors could 
lawfully withdraw Anthony Bland’s nutrition and hydration, and withhold other 
treatment, despite the fact that to do this would inevitably cause Anthony Bland’s 
death.518 This is because firstly, such conduct by the doctors would not amount to 
a positive act. It would amount to a negative act (omission). Secondly, the doctors 
would be acting in the best interest of the patient.519 Lord Mustill stated that: 
 
“(iv) All hope of recovery has now been abandoned. Thus, although the 
termination of his life is not in the best interests of Anthony Bland, his 
best interests in being kept alive have also disappeared, taking with them 
the justification for the non-consensual regime and the co-relative duty to 
keep it in being.  
(v) Since there is no longer a duty to provide nourishment and hydration to 
failure to do so cannot be a criminal offence.”520
 
In other words, the finding of the House of Lords was that despite the fact that the 
doctors intentionally let Anthony Bland die, the doctors did not breach the law. 
As stated by Constantinos Simillis “[t]he House of Lords attempted to classify the 
Anthony Bland’s case as one relating to ‘medical futility’ rather than 
euthanasia”.521 As per the courts decision, it was clear that the presence of a 
‘reasonable medical opinion provided the ultimate key to the withdrawal of 
treatment’522.  In this case, a responsible body of doctors agreed that continuing 
treatment was no longer in the best interest of Anthony Bland. Therefore, it was 
agreed that the treatment served no purpose, since it neither cured nor improved 
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the condition of the patient.523 Hence, the doctors were not under an obligation to 
continue with the treatment provided to Anthony Bland. Therefore, the court held 
that the withdrawal of the treatment (an omission to act) which otherwise would 
take a form of a criminal act or omission, would not in this case amount to 
murder.524  
  
Exploring the Implications of Anthony Bland’s case 
As argued by Simillis, Anthony Bland’s case was complex because “it was 
difficult to define what was in his best interests”.525 Taking into account the 
condition of Anthony Bland, Lord Mustill observed that Anthony Bland 
effectively had no interests. He was neither in distress, nor in pain, and he had no 
potential to feel pleasure either. Similarly, his condition was such that it would 
never improve. Furthermore, there was not chance that Anthony Bland would 
ever regain his consciousness.526 Under these circumstances, withdrawing 
treatment on the basis that it was burden on Anthony Bland would not justify the 
doctor’s conduct. Hence, the other solution to the problem was to justify 
withdrawal by holding that the continuation of such treatment would amount to 
unnecessary invasion on Anthony Bland’s body.527   
 
Price is of the view that “[t]he issue …is rightly determined in the context of the 
duties of the doctor founded upon the interests and rights of the patient”528. 
Similarly, commentators such as Wilson and Smith argue that the doctors in fact 
acted in accordance with their duties to Anthony Bland by withdrawing his 
treatment.529 They further argue that the doctors may have ‘desired’ the death of 
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Anthony Bland, However, the doctors had no intention to kill Bland. The 
commentators claim that the two elements were mixed up by the House of Lords, 
when the court stated that the doctors intended to cause the death of Bland.530 
Arguably, had this actually been the case then this would have probably been 
incompatible with the standards of ethics of medical practice, as well as an 
offence under the criminal law.531 In other words, it is the argument of these 
commentators that in Anthony Bland’s case, the doctors had no ethical or legal 
basis to continue his treatment.532  
 
Keown on the other hand argues that the decision in Anthony Bland’s case is 
properly assessed by judging the value of life itself from the ‘quality of life’ of the 
patient rather than the sanctity of life in general.533  He further argues that the 
decision in the case of Anthony Bland has left the law in a “morally and 
intellectually misshapen state, prohibiting active, intentional killing but permitting 
(if not requiring) intentional killing by omission, even by those under a duty to 
care for the patient”.534  
 
iii) Examining the difficulties faced by laypersons in cancelling their Duties 
to provide care 
There is little doubt that the law treats laypersons differently when compared with 
the treatment of medical professionals, in relation to cancellation of duties of care. 
For example, in the case of Sara Johnson her parents were convicted of their 
negative conduct i.e. for merely sitting with their dying daughter and failing to 
call medical assistance.535 The possible reason as to why her parents were held 
responsible for Sara’s death could be because the court felt that they had a duty of 
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care towards their handicapped daughter.536  Sara was disable and dependent on 
her parents for help to perform her everyday life.537  In past she had attempted 
suicide and shown clear determination to end her life. This time she left a suicide 
note with clear instructions – not to save her life. Under these circumstances, 
arguably her parents should have been absolved from their duty of care.538 As it is 
done in the cases involving doctors, who are allowed to withhold treatment of 
patients, and to subsequently let them die, in the absence of duty to act.  
 
However, laypersons who withdraw treatment from their loved ones because they 
think that it imposes an unnecessary burden on the patient, are treated as intruders 
by the law. This can be compared with the position of doctors who perform the 
same act in the same circumstances. For example, Mrs Watts, who allegedly 
disconnected a tracheotomy tube from her severally brain damaged young 
daughter, was charged with murder.539 Similarly, Mr Karapetian was charged 
with the attempted murder of his grandmother. It was found that he had 
disconnected the life support machine by cutting a tube with scissors. It was his 
argument that he felt his grandmother was being tortured by being kept alive 
artificially through tubes and machines.540 In other words, he probably thought 
that the treatment provided to her was burdensome. The jury found Mr Karpetian 
guilty. He was sentenced for 18 months, but given a 2 years suspended sentence.  
 
The stated reason why Mr Karpetian disconnected the life support machine was 
the same reason doctors often provide when they decide to withdraw treatment in 
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the best interest of the patient. However, as seen above, doctors under these 
conditions are treated differently under the law. The conduct of doctors is treated 
as an omission. This legal position is contrary to that of the layperson. Such 
conduct of the layperson is interpreted as an act rather than omission. As a result, 
the layperson is held responsible for commission of a crime unlike a doctor whose 
conduct is interpreted as omission. Furthermore, doctors are absolved from their 
duty to treat or to provide care to the patient. As a result, the failure to act does 
not attract any criminal liability.541
 
The way that the doctrine of omission is used to ‘smuggle’ notions of justification 
has been criticised by Moore.542 Moore is of the opinion that both the doctor and 
the intruder in the above circumstances ‘act’ rather than ‘omit to act’.543 This is 
because he understands omissions to mean “…simply absent actions”544. The 
conduct of the doctor in a case of withdrawal of treatment does not amount to an 
omission because it involves a muscular movement of the body.545 According to 
Moore, the conduct of the doctor amounts to killing, but it is of a lesser evil to 
that of active killing.546   
 
Huxtable suggests that the problem to the solution could be found by holding that 
the conduct of the doctor as well as of the intruder amounts to an act. This would 
provide doctors with a defence. Alternatively, it is possible to say that the intruder 
is at wrong because he has a duty not to interfere with the life support machine.547  
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Glanville Williams, on the other hand, rests his distinction on either the 
relationship between the parties or on the status of the doctrine. In other words, 
the doctor has responsibility for the patient548 while the intruder does not.549
 
iv) Examining the Implications that can be drawn from the Acts that Kill and 
the Omissions that Kill: Should doctors be permitted to kill either by act or 
by omission in the best interest of the patient? 
Under the current law of England and Wales, a person who intentionally and 
unlawfully causes the death of another person, either by act or omission, including 
when under a duty to act, commits the offence of murder.550 A person is said to 
have acted intentionally if his or her purpose is to kill, or the situation is such that 
the result is virtually certain, and the person involved foresees it to be virtually 
certain from whose state of mind the jury is entitled to infer intention.551 
Similarly, a person is said to be the cause of death when his or her conduct proves 
to be the factual as well as the legal cause of the death.552
 
It is apparent from the facts of the cases involving double effect, in the medical 
context, that the aim of the doctor who acts to relieve pain may not be to kill, but 
to treat the patient. But at the same time it is also possible to suggest that 
sometimes doctors may foresee the fatal consequences of their action virtually 
certain.553 Despite this, the doctors are hardly found guilty of their conduct that 
causes death. This is probably because the case of Woollin compromises the 
justificatory potential of double effect or because a jury can still refuse to find 
intention in cases of double effect.    
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As far as the rule of causation is concerned, arguably, even if the conduct of the 
doctor does not cause immediate death in most of the pain killing circumstances, 
it often allegedly accelerates the death of the patient. As a result, it is possible to 
argue that ‘but for’ the actions of the doctor the death would not have occurred at 
the time when it did occur. Arguably, this should prove sufficient to be in line 
with factual cause of death.554 However, whether such conduct could also fulfil 
the requirement of ‘legal cause’ would depend upon the way the policy rule is 
applied by the court. For example, Glenys Williams argues that since a doctor’s 
action is justified medically, it would not be seen as the legal cause of the death of 
the patient.555 On the other hand, if Judge Devlin’s observation in the case of Dr 
Bodkin Adams is applied i.e. “[i]f ...life was cut short by weeks or months; it is 
just as much murder as if it were cut short by years”556 then it is arguable that the 
doctor could be found to be the legal cause of death. In spite of this, it is evident 
from the cases of Dr Bodkin Adams and Dr David Moor, for example, that the 
court, by using a narrow construction of intention, as well as the rule of ‘common 
sense’, in relation to causation, helps the jury to find doctors not guilty of the 
charge. As a result, it is possible to argue that undertaking a killing by an action in 
the context of double effect is permissible under the law. However, as seen above, 
the principle of double effect is invoked only in the cases of doctors and not in the 
cases of laypersons in spite of the case of Woollin that leaves it open to the jury 
not to find intention in cases of double effect.557
 
Similarly, medical professionals are also permitted to withdraw treatment 
intentionally in order to terminate life.558 This is justified by adopting the doctrine 
of omission.559 For example, as argued by Moore, the possible justification 
provided in cases of withdrawal of treatment is that the patient is returned to 
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‘some baseline’ condition.560 It has been remarked that “[t]his condition 
according to courts is ‘natural’ condition the patient would have been in without 
any medical treatment, where ‘medical treatment’ includes intravenous (as 
opposed to oral nutrition and hydration)”561. Likewise, with the help of the notion 
of ‘duty of care’, in cases of medical practice the courts have successfully shown 
that when the doctors act in the best interests of the patient, on the consent of the 
patient they are absolved from their existing duty of care. As a result, they cannot 
be held legally responsible for omitting to act in the cases of withdrawal of 
treatment. 
 
Moore provides the following example in case of withdrawal of treatment, in 
order to show how the conduct of the doctors amounts to act and not omission.   
 
“Suppose I throw a rope to an otherwise clearly drowning man. Is the 
relevant baseline ever after that he was dying when I first intervened? May 
I thus throw him back in the water, or shoot him a year later, and be said 
only to have omitted to save him?”562
 
If we agree with Moore, then the above conduct of doctors amounts to an act and 
therefore, the potential questions of duty do not arise because these are not cases 
of omission. Hence, a doctor’s conduct in a case of withdrawal of treatment 
effectively kills the patient, rather than merely lets the patient die. 
With regard to active euthanasia, Keown argues that the objection raised by the 
British Medical Association (BMA) against legalising active euthanasia and 
assisted suicide is undermined by the BMA’s own guidelines.563 These guidelines 
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not only allow the withholding and withdrawing of treatment, such as tube-fed 
food and water from PVS patients, but also from non terminally ill people such as 
those with severe dementia or those suffering from a serious stroke.564
 
v) Conclusion 
Over all, it is clear that the law in England and Wales has explicitly not accepted 
the legality of euthanasia.565 However, the cases discussed above show that the 
law does allow some forms of euthanasia 566 by balancing the competing values 
and interests of the individuals, as stated by Simmillis.567 Nevertheless the law on 
euthanasia is still unclear except in the following circumstances. It is clear that a 
competent patient can refuse treatment, even if that would mean the patient would 
die. Similarly, doctors could withhold or withdraw treatment in the best interest of 
the patient even when they foresee or intend the death of the patient. 
Alternatively, although doctors are allowed to administer lethal doses of a 
painkilling drug knowing that it may lead to the death of the patient, they can be 
found guilty if a jury finds intention in cases of double effect.  
 
Accordingly it is possible to argue that not only passive euthanasia is permitted 
under the current law, but also that active euthanasia is permitted, but only in 
special circumstances. These are the circumstances in which the death of the 
patient is caused as a side effect (which is merely foreseen consequence) of the 
good conduct of a doctor. Similarly, as seen in chapter 1 of the thesis, laypersons 
are permitted to assist in the suicide of another person as long as their actions 
amounts to a trivial level of assistance and their motives are compassionate.  
 
Taking into account the current practice on euthanasia that permits doctors to kill 
under certain circumstances such as killing in the context of double effect; letting 
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565 Simmills C. (2008) ‘Euthanasia: A Summary of the Law in England and Wales’. Medicine 
Science and the Law, Vol. 48, p. 197. 
566 See chapter 2. 
567 Simmills C. (2008) ‘Euthanasia: A Summary of the Law in England and Wales’. Medicine 
Science and the Law, Vol. 48, p. 197. 
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die by way of withholding and withdrawing treatment in the best interest of the 
patient or in the circumstances of refusal of treatment. It would be appropriate to 
consider that the next step in this direction could be to codify this practice along 
with the practice of assisted suicide on the basis of ‘pain relief’ and ‘best interest 
of the patient’ rather than value of life.568  
 
Alternatively, one could argue that since doctors do not have an absolute duty to 
save or prolong life, the above behaviour of doctors does not trump the sanctity of 
life. However, the question remains - how can this principle be codified? 
Cartwright suggests this could be achieved by balancing respect for autonomy 
with the need to protect vulnerable persons who may be persuaded to end their 
life. Thus, it is arguably time to consider the relevant options available in order to 
find out which form of protection is best i.e. procedural or substantive. In the 
following chapter, an attempt is made to set out the legal regimes adopted by the 
Netherlands, the State of Oregon and Switzerland in order to see whether it is 
possible to learn from the experiences in the foreign jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
568 Price D. (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’. Legal Studies. Vol. 17, pp. 323-
342. 
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 Chapter 3 
Exploring the Legal and Extra-Legal Regimes adopted by the 
Netherlands, the State of Oregon and Switzerland in relation to 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 
 
  
This chapter examines the practices of three different places: the Netherlands, the 
State of Oregon in the U.S. and Switzerland. In the Netherlands, both voluntary 
active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are permitted under special 
provisions. In contrast, the State of Oregon permits only physician-assisted 
suicide. In Switzerland, assisted suicide has been practiced since 1918.569 The 
peculiarity of Switzerland is that anybody, either a physician or a non-physician, 
may assist in suicide, provided that the person has no self-interest in compliance. 
In the Netherlands, and in Switzerland in particular, these practices have long 
been recognised. Hence, these practices are now deeply embedded in the culture 
of these countries. As briefly mentioned in chapter 1 of the thesis, the Swiss law 
does not restrict foreigners from making use of the services. People from other 
countries, and especially from Germany, France, Austria and England, are known 
to have travelled to Switzerland in order to die.  
 
This chapter sets out the legal and extra-legal regime that exists in the 
Netherlands, the State of Oregon and Switzerland. The purpose of this chapter is 
                                                 
569 In 1918, the Swiss Federal government stated that assisting in suicide is criminated only if the 
assistant has been motivated to do so by selfish reasons (see Mauron A. and Hurst Samia A. 
(2003) ‘Education and Debate’. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: allowing a role 
for non-physicians’. BMJ, Vol. 326, p. 271). Ziegler has stated that this tradition which started a 
century ago originated in a different context totally unrelated to its recent application with terminal 
illness and controversy stemming from the desire to regain control over the dying process. 
“Historically, the Swiss regarded assistance in suicide as an honourable deed to help a friend – an 
act motivated by unselfishness. Eventually this was reflected in their law”. See Ziegler S.J. (2009) 
‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide for its Potential to 
enhance oversight and demedicalize the dying process’. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 
Vol. 37, p. 323. 
 112
to analyse the liberal approach that has been adopted by these jurisdictions, in 
order to find out whether the jurisdiction of England and Wales can take any 
lessons from the experience of these foreign regimes, in light of the need to 
overcome the problems that currently arise in England and Wales as a result of a 
stricter regime. 
 
 3.1 The Legal Structure of the Regime of the Netherlands on Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia  
Suicide is not illegal in the Netherlands, but both assisted suicide and euthanasia 
are offences under Articles 294 and 293 of the Dutch Penal Code respectively.570 
However, it is noteworthy that these two articles have been amended by the 
‘Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
2001’571, in order to exempt physicians, and only physicians, from criminal 
liability. Hence, a physician may perform an act of euthanasia, or partake in 
physician-assisted suicide (PAS), as per the requirements of the statutory Act 
2001. Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code reads as below: 
 
“Any person who takes the life of another person at that other person’s 
express and earnest request shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding twelve years or a fifth category fine (that is, a fine not 
exceeding NLG 100 000).”572
 
And Article 294 reads: 
 
                                                 
570 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. pp. 29-30. 
571 Hereafter referred to as the statutory Act 2001. 
572 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, 
p. 58. 
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“‘[A] person who intentionally incites another to commit suicide, assist in 
the suicide of another, or …[procures] for that other person the means to 
commit suicide’ is guilty of a serious offence….”573
 
How did the practices of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia enter the Legal 
System? 
In 1984, in the case of Schoonheim, (a general practitioner performed an act of 
euthanasia on the request of a 95 year old woman owing to her bad medical 
condition), a defence of necessity was claimed under Article 40 of the Dutch 
Penal Code. Article 40 states: “‘A person who commits an offence as the result of 
a force he could not be expected to resist is not criminally liable’”.574 Thus, the 
Dutch Supreme Court delivered the judgement in Schoonheim’s favour. It held 
that  
 
“…a doctor, confronted by the request of a patient who is unbearably and 
hopelessly suffering, can be regarded as caught in a situation of conflict of 
duties. On the one hand, there is the duty to respect life, as reflected in 
articles 293 and 294 of the Penal Code. On the other hand, there is the 
doctor’s duty to relieve suffering. If, in such a situation of conflict of 
duties, the doctor chooses a course of action that considering the norms of 
medical ethics, is ‘objectively’ justifiable, he is not guilty of an 
offence….”575  
 
This result represented a u-turn in relation to the existing law on assisted suicide 
and euthanasia. Article 40 of the Penal Code was used in the defence of a doctor. 
Since then, it has informally been the case that the practices of physician-assisted 
                                                 
573 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 30. 
574 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, 
p. 59. 
575 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 77. 
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suicide and euthanasia have formed part of the Dutch tradition, but only when 
performed in the medical context.576
 
Over the years, contributions have been made on the subjects of PAS and 
euthanasia, not only by the courts decisions, but also by Parliament and the 
prosecution services: 
 
“Parliament … enacted a change to the Burial and Cremation Act, which 
reflects the decision of the Supreme Court in the Schoonheim case. A 
reporting procedure was created for doctors who had performed 
euthanasia; they had to fill in a form with so-called points requiring 
attention, which largely corresponded to the jurisprudential rules of careful 
practice, and report themselves to the prosecutorial authorities. And the 
Board of Procurators-General of the Public Prosecution Services had 
adopted the policy of not prosecuting doctors who had reported 
themselves after having performed euthanasia in accordance with the rules 
of ‘careful practice’.”577
 
Finally, in 2001, the ‘Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act’ was enacted. This Act was based on the output of the 
“jurisprudence from the Supreme Court, statute law and prosecutorial policy”.578 
The statutory Act 2001 came into force in April 2002. It consists of three parts. 
“The first codifies the ‘requirements of due care’ and makes the Regional Review 
Committees [RRCs] principally responsible for reviewing reported cases.”579
                                                 
576 It is to be noted that the first case of euthanasia to come before the court was in 1971. Dr. 
Geertruida Postma killed her patient (her mother) on request, who was in a very bad medical state. 
Court found Dr. Postma guilty under article 293 of the Penal Code for intentionally causing death 
of the patient. However, her case was treated in a special way by ordering only a week’s 
suspended sentence and one year’s probation.  See Euthanasia in Holland. 
http://www.euthanasia.cc/dutch.html 
577 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, 
pp. 59-60. 
578 Ibid.  
579 It is relevant to note that apart from the above responsibilities the RRCs who play an important 
role in the control of the Dutch regime also have other responsibilities and duties specified under 
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In relation to the second part, the following has been noted: 
 
“The second amends articles 293 (euthanasia) and 294 (assisted suicide) of 
the Penal Code to make euthanasia and assisted suicide legal if performed 
by a doctor who has conformed to the requirements of due care and has 
reported what he did to the municipal pathologist.  And the third part 
amends the Burial and Cremation Law to provide for the forms and the 
procedure to be used in reporting a case of euthanasia or assisted 
suicide.”580  
 
As stated earlier it is relevant to note that both euthanasia and assisted suicide are 
still ‘crimes’. However, a physician who performs such an action can successfully 
claim a defence under Article 20 A or B of the statutory Act 2001, which 
addresses the amended articles of the Penal Code i.e. Article 293 and 294 
respectively. A physician can claim this defence provided that he or she complies 
with the ‘due care’ requirements581 and all the other requirements of the statutory 
Act 2001. As far as Article 293 and 294 of the Penal Code are concerned these are 
amended as follows:  
 
 “Article 293 
                                                                                                                                     
Article 8, 9 and 10 of the statutory Act 2001. The RRC (to which the case is reported) make final 
judgements on the matter without involvement of criminal law institutions. Only those matters are 
referred to the Board of Procurators General which fails to carry out the requirement of the due 
care and those which raise doubt on the conduct of the physician who carries out euthanasia (see 
Haan Jurriaan De. (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 10, pp. 
65-66).They are also responsible for the registration of basic data concerning the cases reported to 
them and for an annual joint report of their work. This is said to provide transparency in the 
system (see Griffiths J. and others (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. p. 82). Similarly, they 
have set their own opinions and views over period of time in dealing with the practice of 
euthanasia and assisted suicide where law has remained silent. This is mainly pertaining to the 
procedure and working method. Article 11, 12 and 13 of the statutory Act 2001 provide them 
power in this matter. More on this aspect is said further in this chapter. 
580 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. pp. 82-83. 
581 Stated under Article 2 of the statutory Act 2001. 
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1. A person who terminates the life of another person at that other person’s 
express and earnest request is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more 
than twelve years or a fine of the fifth category. 
2. The offence referred to in the first paragraph shall not be punishable if it 
has been committed by a physician who has met the requirements of due 
care as referred to in Article 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act and who informs the municipal 
autopsist of this in accordance with Article 7 second paragraph of the 
Burial and Cremation Act.” 582 
 
“Article 294 
1. A person, who intentionally incites another person to commit suicide, is 
liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine of 
the fourth category, where the suicide ensues. 
2. A person who intentionally assist in the suicide of another or procures for 
that other person the means to commit suicide, is liable to a term of 
imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine of the fourth category, 
where the suicide ensues. Article 293 second paragraph applies mutates 
mutandis.”583 
 
In this way, the statutory Act 2001 acts as an exception to the prohibited 
behaviour i.e. killing on request and providing assistance in suicide. These 
conditions comprise both substantive and procedural requirements, as outlined by 
the statutory Act 2001:  
                                 
• “the patient’s request was ‘voluntary and carefully 
considered’ 
• the ‘patient’s suffering was unbearable, and …there was 
no prospect of improvement’ 
                                                 
582 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, 
p. 73. 
583 Ibid. 
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•  the doctor informed the patient concerning ‘his situation 
and his prospects’ 
• the doctor and the patient were convinced that there was 
‘no reasonable alternative in light of the patient’s 
situation’ 
• the doctor consulted ‘at least one other, independent 
physician who must have seen the patient and given a 
written opinion on the due care criteria ([ie the preceding 
four items])’ 
• the doctor ‘terminated the patient’s life or provided 
assistance with suicide with due medical care and 
attention’ 
• the doctor reported the case to the municipal 
pathologist”584 
 
The Request 
Although, the law is silent as to the nature (written or oral) of the request, it is 
evident according to Griffths, Wayer and Adams585 through case laws, and also 
from the RRCs decisions (in cases) the request must be written especially in the 
patient’s own handwriting on the printed form.586 The time gap between the 
request made and the act of euthanasia performed should not be less than one day, 
except in special circumstances.587 Similarly, the RRCs are of the opinion that a 
request made several weeks in advance should be reaffirmed shortly before 
euthanasia is to be performed.588 In addition, the RRCs have also specified that 
the physicians should consult the patient and ensure that the patient’s request is 
free from any pressures. It is also necessary to assess whether the patient is in a 
                                                 
584 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 84. 
585 Ibid., at p. 85. 
586 Ibid., at pp. 85-86. 
587 Ibid., at p. 86. 
588 Ibid. 
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sound state of mind.589 However, this does not necessarily exclude those who 
have a “cognitive or communicative impairment or existence of a psychiatric 
disorder…” from consenting to euthanasia.590
 
Finally, in cases where a patient is incompetent at the time of the performance of 
the act of euthanasia, but has left a written request for euthanasia, (especially in 
cases of dementia) a doctor can avail himself of the defence under this statutory 
law.591 However, the RRCs takes the position that “‘it is generally necessary that 
communication between the doctor and patient continues right to the end’”592. In 
this case, the request applies in the same way as an ‘advance treatment directive’, 
where time of the written request is not an issue. 
 
Unbearable suffering 
Since what can amount to ‘unbearable suffering’ depends upon the perspective of 
each individual, it is assessed ‘subjectively’. However, the assessment is said to 
be objective in the sense that it should be ‘understandable’ to a doctor. 
Furthermore, the RRCs should also be able to comprehend it. It has been held that 
the ‘suffering’ of the patient must be conscious. Thus, a patient in a coma cannot 
be brought under the umbrella of the statutory Act 2001. 593 At the same time the 
condition of the patient must be ‘hopeless’. This relates to the prospect of 
improvement. What also matters is whether there is any alternative treatment 
available, including palliative care. It is also important to assess the reason why 
the patient has refused the available treatment options. According to the Annual 
Report 2000 of the RCCs 
 
“if a patient’s refusal of treatment is ‘understandable’, it does not stand in 
the way of euthanasia (thus morphine can be refused by a patient who 
                                                 
589 Ibid., at p. 87. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Article 2 (2) of the statutory Act 2001. See De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on 
Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, p. 69 
592 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 89. 
593 Ibid., at p. 90. 
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does not want to become less clear-headed, and radiation by a patient for 
whom the side-effects outweigh the benefits)”.594  
 
Consultant 
As stated above, an independent consultant must be approached for the 
examination of the patient in order to have a second opinion in the matter. 
However, in a case of disagreement between the physician and the independent 
consultant, the physician may go ahead with the act of euthanasia as long as he 
can explain his decision. This is probably because physician knows the patient 
best (compared with independent consultant) and who is convinced that the 
patient suffers unbearably.595 Furthermore, the physician remains responsible for 
his actions, because he is the one who is entrusted with the final decision. In other 
words, the consultant’s opinion has the status of an advice which doctor need not 
follow.596  
 
Other requirements of due care  
The continuous presence of a doctor is required after performing the act of 
euthanasia.597 The physician is required to keep all the records. He or she is also 
required to file a registration form with the RRC and to report the death to the 
municipal pathologist.  
 
Cases involving minors 
                                                 
594 Ibid., at p. 91.Here it is relevant to note that prior to 2000, “it was forcefully argued (and 
generally supposed) that a patient’s refusal to treatment was no obstacle to legal euthanasia, 
although in the Chabot case [in 1994] the Supreme Court did make an exception for the case of 
non-somatically based suffering” ( Ibid). This is probably because “[a] person who is not 
psychiatrically ‘sick’ may suffer unbearably as the result of a traumatic experience, and there may 
be no treatment acceptable to the person concerned, or none with so favourable a prognosis that its 
benefits can be considered to outweigh the burden to the patient. (This was the situation in the 
Chabot case, on Chabot’s view.)” Ibid., at p. 122. 
595 Rietjens. J.A.C., Tol D.G. Van and Schermer M. (2009) ‘Judgement of Suffering in the case of 
a Euthanasia request in the Netherlands’. J. Med Ethics, Vol. 35, p. 506. 
596 This has come to the light through past cases of euthanasia. See footnote 211 of Griffiths John, 
Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice’ book   Euthanasia and law in Europe. (2008) Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. 
597 Except when a patient may desire to die in private or among intimates. Ibid., at p. 101. 
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The statutory Act 2001 also covers children between the ages of 12 to 18. 
However, children are divided into two categories. Those who are between the 
ages of 12 to 15 have the right to make a request, but the consent of parents or 
guardians is mandatory. On the other hand, those who are between the ages of 16 
to 17 also have the right to make a request. However, whilst in such situations it is 
not mandatory to require the consent of the parents or guardians they should 
nevertheless, be informed and consulted.598
Apart from holding the RRCs responsible for the smooth functioning of the 
regime, the statutory Act 2001 also gives a statutory power to the RRCs, whose 
judgement on the report provided by the doctor is final and authoritative.599  
 
The RRCs are also given the liberty to conduct investigation. They may call on 
the doctor in order to get further clarifications on the report submitted or to rectify 
any error or in order to recommend ways to improve the service provided by the 
doctors to their patient in this regard.  In addition, the RRCs have imposed a 
special rule with regard to those who suffer only from a non-somatic disorder. It 
is their decision that in such cases patients can avail themselves of only physician-
assisted suicide. Thereby making a distinction between the cases of euthanasia 
and the cases of physician-assisted suicide, despite the fact that the statutory Act 
2001 is silent in this respect. However, it is noteworthy that the way ‘non-somatic 
disorders’ came to be recognised under the ‘termination of life’ practices is 
through the case of Chabot. In this case, it was held that the reason that non-
somatic patients might not be in a proper frame of mind to make a voluntary 
decision is not a good reason not to include such cases because even in somatic 
cases patients may suffer from diminished competence.600  
 
                                                 
598 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, 
p. 64; Marker R.L. (2006) ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Today’. Society, Vol. 43, p. 60. 
599 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 130. 
600 Otlowski M. F.A. (1997) Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. p. 404. 
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a) The Extra-Legal Procedure in cases of the Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted suicide 
The practice of assisted suicide and euthanasia in the Netherlands is standardised 
and formal. Thus, the doctors must comply with the guidelines set out in the 
statutory Act 2001, to avail themselves of the defence provided to them under this 
law. However, in the context of use, it can only be set in motion by the patient’s 
request i.e. the patient must state “I want to die”601. This desire must be repeated 
over a period of time in order to ascertain that such a wish has been well 
considered by the patient. In the Netherlands, the act of euthanasia, as well as the 
act of physician-assisted suicide, is carried out in almost every hospital602, nursing 
home, residential home, and hospice. It sometimes takes place in the homes of the 
patients. Apart from the doctor who is directly involved in the practice, nurses, 
and the patients’ family members, also play some minimal role in making such a 
practice successful and facilitating a ‘good death’.603  
 
As stated above, any physician who is willing to perform an act of euthanasia or 
assisted suicide must meet the substantive and procedural requirements. If he 
breaches these requirements, a physician takes the risk of exposing himself to 
criminal liability. Thus, the substantive requirements are requirements of ‘careful 
practice’604. The substantive requirements are as follows. There must be a 
voluntary request from the patient, there must be no alternative treatment 
available, the patient’s suffering be ‘unbearable’ and his or her condition must be 
‘hopeless’, as noted earlier. On the other hand, the procedural requirements often 
involve briefing the patient, taking advice from an independent consultant, 
                                                 
601 Cohen- Almagore R. (2008) ‘The Right to Die with Dignity: An argument in Ethics and Law’. 
Health Law and Policy. Vol. 2, p.4. 
602 These hospitals (most of them) are private and run by non-profit organisations, who are free to 
determine their own policy and most of these hospitals permit euthanasia. See Griffiths John, 
Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 6. 
603 The doctors consult nurses when they receive a request (to put an end to the misery) from the 
patient under whose care the patient is. Family member (s) remains present at the time of the death 
of their love ones. Sometimes even family member makes a request on behalf of the patient. See 
Kimsma G.K. and Leeuwen E.V. (2007) ‘The Role of Family in Euthanasia Decision Making’. 
HEC Forum, Vol.19, No.4, pp. 365-373. 
604 This is referred as the ‘requirements of Due Care’ under Article 2 of the statutory Act 2001. 
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remaining present on the scene, unless there is a good reason not to, record 
keeping, reporting the death to the municipal pathologist and filing a report to the 
RRC. Once the physician is satisfied that the request made by the patient is 
voluntary and well considered, the next step is to examine the patient to make 
sure that the patient’s suffering is ‘unbearable’ and ‘hopeless’. Furthermore, the 
doctor must establish that there is no alternative treatment available. If the above 
requirements are successfully complied with, the doctor then must consult the 
patient. This is one of the most important steps in fulfilling the procedural 
requirements. The physician is expected to discuss the situation with the patient, 
including whether any possible alternative treatment is available. Both the doctor 
and the patient must be convinced that either there is no alternative treatment 
available to cure the illness or that every effort has failed. This is best seen in the 
case of Chabot, in which Dr Chabot, a psychiatrist assisted a middle-aged woman 
to commit suicide owing to “her persistent grief at the death of her two sons”605. 
Her position was such that she suffered mentally as a result of a traumatic 
experience and there was no treatment that was acceptable to her.606 Every effort 
made by Dr Chabot in her case had failed. As a consequence Dr Chabot fulfilled 
her desire to end her life via assisted suicide.  
 
As noted above, an independent opinion from a consultant is another requirement. 
This requirement functions as ‘quality control’. The physician is required to 
contact the independent consultant soon after he or she has examined and briefed 
the patient. The current position is such that the trained independent consultants 
who form part of Support and Consultation of Euthanasia in the Netherlands 
(SCEN) provide a second opinion, as legally required, regarding the case in hand. 
They are supposed to examine the patient and give a written report regarding ‘due 
care’, not only to the physician concerned, but also to the RRC.607  
 
                                                 
605 Keown J. (2002) Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 87. 
606 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 122. 
607 Ibid., at pp. 94 -96 and 98 -99.   
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The continuous presence of the physician is essential. This condition ensures that 
the patient dies without any further complications or difficulties. There is an 
exception to this requirement if it is the patient’s wish to die only in the presence 
of his family members. In this case, the physician is expected to make himself or 
herself available at short notice.608  
 
Record-keeping is another requirement which physicians must fulfil. This 
normally comprises a patient’s written consent and his medical history. Other than 
this, the physician must also report the death to the municipal pathologist as a 
‘non-natural’ death and a registration form must be filed at the RRC. This 
registration form covers every possible detail with regard to the patient, including 
the illness and the ‘due care’ procedure adopted by the physician. The death must 
also be reported to the medical examiner who examines the body in order to 
ascertain the way in which life was brought to an end and also, the type of 
medicine used. The Medical examiner is also required to file his own report to the 
RRC.609
 
Once the physician has complied with the ‘due care’ requirements, as per the 
statutory Act 2001, and the physician has submitted the registration form to the 
RRC, he or she then must set the RRC procedure into motion. The Committee 
assesses the report provided, in order to ensure that the doctor has fulfilled the 
requirements of ‘due care’. If necessary, the Committee can request additional 
information if the report is not clear or even summon the doctor’s attendance. It 
may also make remarks on the manner and the conduct of the doctor who 
performed the act of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. These remarks will 
mainly be in relation to how to make the practice more effective. The Committee 
may also cross-check the facts by comparing the reports filed by the medical 
examiner, or the consultant in the case, or even by contacting the nurses regarding 
                                                 
608 This requirement originated from the Medical Disciplinary College of Amsterdam in 1994. See 
Adams Maurice and Nys Herman (2003) ‘Comparative Reflections on the Belgian Euthanasia Act 
2002’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 11, p. 361.   
609 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. pp. 101-103. 
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the matter,610 in order to confirm the accuracy of the report filed by the doctor. 
This could potentially happen in the case where the RRC has a doubt as to the 
conduct of the doctor or his practice. Once satisfied, within 6 weeks from the 
receipt of the report, the RRC passes a judgment and it also notifies the physician 
of the decision.611 The case then will be closed, but if, on any account, there is a 
failure on the part of the physician to comply with the statutory requirements, the 
prosecutorial authority and the Regional Inspector for Health Care will be 
informed to conduct further investigations in the matter.612 In other words, the 
main function of the RRCs is to make sure that every doctor reports the cases and 
follows the required procedures. 
 
Apart from the ‘due care’ requirements imposed by the statutory Act 2001 on the 
RRCs, the RRCs have set down standards in response to court decisions with 
regard to the practices of assisted suicide and euthanasia. As briefly stated earlier, 
two such decisions are particularly remarkable. First, those who do not suffer 
from a somatic illness can only avail themselves of physician-assisted suicide. 
This scenario emerged from the case of Chabot. The Supreme Court in this case 
held that assistance with suicide is legally justifiable in the case of a patient whose 
suffering does not have a somatic basis and who is not in the ‘terminal phase’.613 
The Court also held that the decision of a person suffering from psychiatric 
sickness or disorder can legally be considered the result of an autonomous i.e. 
competent and voluntary judgement and that the justification of necessity in this 
case is met by requirement of consultation.614 However, the court further held that 
if such a person refuses a realistic (therapeutic) alternative, then it cannot be said 
that his or her case is lacking any prospect of improvement.615 Since then, 
psychiatrists have assisted such people with suicide on request and reported their 
                                                 
610 As per Article 8 of the statute Act 2001. 
611 As per the article 9 of the statute Act 2001. 
612 As per the article 9 of the statute Act 2001. 
613 Griffiths J., Weyers H. and Adams M. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 114. 
614 Ibid.  
615 Ibid. 
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assistance to the concerned authorities.616 In 2003, the RRCs took the “…position 
that the request of a person whose suffering is primarily of psychiatric origin in 
principle falls under the law of 2002 [i.e. the statutory Act 2001] and hence within 
the committee’s jurisdiction”.617 The requirements in this case i.e. in non-somatic 
disorder are the same as in the case of somatic disorder except that in the former 
case, the ‘unbearable’ suffering should be ‘understandable’ to a psychiatrist, who 
may also assist in suicide.618 The above distinction between euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide springs solely from the RRCs decision. As far as the 
statutory Act 2001 is concerned, it makes no distinction between the two. 
Secondly, the RRCs have accepted that dementia patients may also make a 
request for euthanasia. Their requests made in the form of advance directives can 
be considered to be valid in cases where they have become incapacitated or 
incapable.619
 
As far as children are concerned, a special regime is applied in these cases. It is a 
regime based on age. Under section 2, clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the statutory Act 
2001, a physician may perform an act of euthanasia on request of the child 
between the ages of 12 to 15 as long as the child has his or her parents’ or 
guardians’ consent. For those who are between the ages of 16 and 17, and who 
make a request for euthanasia, the issue shall be discussed with their parents or 
guardians. A request can be fulfilled in relation to those who are aged 16 and 
above, who have slipped into an ‘incapacitate’ stage, and who have left a written 
request for euthanasia prior to entering this stage. All other requirements of ‘due 
care’, as already discussed, apply to both of these cases.620
 
In this way, the regime is subject to strict control through legal and administrative 
bodies. As seen above, the function of the RCCs as institution of legal control is 
                                                 
616 Ibid., at p. 115. 
617 Ibid.  
618 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. pp. 115-121. 
619 Ibid, at pp. 45- 46, 87-88, 175- 176. 
620 De Haan Jurriaan (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 10, 
pp. 64, 69. 
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vital. Apart from working to ensure abuse free system, it also focuses on 
encouraging effective rule following, rather than issuing sanctions, in order to 
make the system more effective and transparent. Thus, it plays the role of a 
watchdog. In addition, the involvement of the RRCs provides legal security to 
physicians who can be certain that the police will not investigate their conduct, 
unless they commit a felony. In this way, it encourages physicians to report cases 
to the regulating body. However, since the physicians621 act as ‘gatekeepers’ of 
the law i.e., they decide whether to fulfil the request of the patient or not, as stated 
by Rietjens, Tol and Schermer, the whole system is based on trust of a physician’s 
ability and willingness to be transparent about his or her acts.622  
 
It is alleged by the proponents of the ‘slippery slope’ argument that the previous 
tendency of doctors to be cautious regarding ‘end of life’ issues in the 
Netherlands is currently heading downhill.623 In line with this, it is claimed that 
the “strict guidelines, requiring patient’s consent are not consistently respected 
which results in involuntary euthanasia….”624 In addition, it has been alleged that 
there has been inconsistency in reporting some deaths that have occurred due to 
active euthanasia.625  
 
Gerrit van der Wal and Robert Dillmann on the other hand, have mounted a 
defence of the new laws. They stated that firstly, as far as the practice of 
euthanasia is concerned, the practice “is not fuelled by a scarcity of health care 
resources. Most such deaths take place at home in patients with a life expectancy 
                                                 
621 Who bear the full responsibility to perform euthanasia carefully. See Rietjens J.A.C., Tol D. G. 
van and Schermer M. (2009) ‘Judgement of Suffering in the case of a Euthanasia request in the 
Netherlands’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, p. 506. 
622 Rietjens J.A.C., Tol D. G. van and Schermer M. (2009) ‘Judgement of Suffering in the case of 
a Euthanasia request in the Netherlands’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, p. 506.  
623 Burgess J.A. (1993) ‘The great slippery-slope argument’, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 19, 
pp. 169-174; Wal G. V.D and Dillmann R.J.M. (1994) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands’, BMJ, 
Vol.308, pp. 1346-1349; Harris N.M. (2001) ‘The Euthanasia Debate’, Journal of The Royal Army 
Medical Corps, Vol. 147, pp.367-370. 
624 Harris N.M. (2001) ‘The Euthanasia Debate’, Journal of The Royal Army Medical Corps, Vol. 
147, pp.367-370. 
625 Ibid. , at p.368. 
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of less than a month, after hospital treatment has proved ineffective.”626 
Furthermore, the relevant death rate in nursing homes remains very low. 
Similarly, the majority of the population of the country has good health insurance. 
As a result, it can be said that money is not a motivating factor in decisions 
concerning the ‘end of life’.627 Furthermore, the analysis of Rietjens, Tol and 
Schermer shows,  
 
“that fears of slippery slope practice due to this system seem to be 
unfounded, because GPs are not inclined to judge patient’s suffering that 
is outside the reach of the law to be unbearable. As such, GPs can be 
considered the ‘gatekeepers’ of the legal system”.628
 
Regarding the issue of palliative care in the Netherlands, it is arguable that even if 
the Netherlands failed to provide these facilities, it would not lead to an increase 
in the rate of euthanasia.629 According to Gerrit van der and Robert Dillmann, it is 
clear that “in only about 5% of cases is pain the most important reason for 
requesting euthanasia”.630 In addition, they further suggest that “[t]here are no 
indications that palliative care in general is insufficient”.631 Hence, it is their view 
that there is evidence to suggest that doctors obey the correct policy guidelines 
and that the trend in obeying the relevant laws on these issues in the Netherlands 
is not going downhill, but uphill. For instance, there has been an increase in the 
number of reported situations, which is arguably a positive thing, as in the past 
many cases may have gone unreported.632 Furthermore, doctors are said to 
generally observe the “the rules of careful practice”633 when performing 
                                                 
626 Wal G. V.D and Dillmann R.J.M. (1994) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands’, BMJ, Vol.308, p. 
1348. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Rietjens J.A.C., Tol D G van and Schermer M. (2009) ‘Judgement of Suffering in the case of a 
euthanasia request in the Netherlands’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, p.506. 
629 Wal Gerrit van der and Dillmann R.J.M. (1994) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands’. British 
Medical Journal, Vol. 308, pp.1346-1349. 
630 Ibid., at p. 1348. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid., at pp. 1346-1349. 
633 Haan De (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’, Medical Law Review, Vol.10, p. 59. 
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euthanasia. Although it is possible to suggest that the doctors might not perform 
their function of gatekeepers effectively,634 since doctors are open to criminal 
prosecution,635 they could still be kept under control by imposing stricter 
regulations and by thoroughly supervising their conduct. In addition, as suggested 
by Harris, “[s]tipulating the requirement for an advanced directives, a so-called 
living will, would decrease the chances of abuse of any guidelines for active 
euthanasia”.636 Similarly, holding that the consent of the patient must be a 
prerequisite condition in instances of termination of life or in the instances of 
assisted suicide, and in addition, the eligibility and notification process acts as a 
safeguard against the abuse of the system.   
 
In addition, the current law of the Netherlands on assisted suicide and euthanasia 
serves two purposes: ensuring that the doctors do not abuse the permission given 
to them and respecting the value of life.637 It permits the practice of assisted 
suicide and euthanasia only under special circumstances and it justifies this 
practice in the context of the conflict of physicians’ duties638.  
 
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that the above law exists because the 
Netherlands is a secular country where “unlimited freedom of thought and 
expression” is highly valued.639 The state encompasses a democratic, liberated 
and permissive society that encourages the rejection of dogmas and the 
                                                 
634 Simon C. (1998) ‘Last Rights: Euthanasia, the Sanctity of Life, and the Law in the Netherlands 
and the Northern Territory of Australia’. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, 
p. 392. 
635 Wal G. V.D and Dillmann R.J.M. (1994) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands’, BMJ, Vol.308, p. 
1347. 
636 Harris N.M. (2001) ‘The Euthanasia Debate’, Journal of The Royal Army Medical Corps, Vol. 
147, p.369. 
637 See p. 114 of the thesis. 
638 Bossbard Georg, Fisher Susanne and Bar Walter states that “[t]he analysis of the different 
normative concepts underlying legislation reveals that in the Netherlands the basis for non-
prosecution lies in the conflict of the physician’s duties to respect life versus relief of suffering….” 
See Bossbard Georg, Fisher Susanne and Bar Walter. (2002) ‘Open regulation and practice in 
assisted suicide’. Swiss medical weekly, Vol. 132, p. 527. 
639 Fenigsen Richard. (1989) ‘A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia’. The Hastings Center Report, 
Vol. 19, p. 24. 
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overthrowing of taboos that uphold sacredness of human life.640 As a result, this 
may be another reason that has led to judge the sanctity of life or value of life in 
terms of the quality of life, as well as the suffering a patient or person has to 
undergo.  
Although relief from suffering is no doubt an essential condition in justification of 
the statutory Act 2001,641 the justification of autonomy is weak according to 
George, Finlay and Jeffery. This is because the final decision to assist rests with 
the doctor.642 A doctor may deny a patient’s request in a situation where a patient 
is “not suffering enough”.643 This arguably shows how crucial the role of 
physicians is in relation to ‘end of life’ issues in the Netherlands.  
 
The issue of life and death is also attached to religion in the Netherlands. 
However, the Netherlands is a country of believers and non-believers and hence, a 
religious motivation tends to weaken the stance of opponents.644 It has been 
stated: “Secular reasons – moral, rational, and medical – for rejecting euthanasia 
are still unknown to the Dutch people.”645   
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the Netherlands, who faced similar 
problem as of the England and Wales today, opted for an honest approach rather 
“than an outright denial of the practice of euthanasia….”646 It made an effort to 
resolve the conflict (faced over the ‘end of life’ issue which would carry on 
unofficially, even if illegal647)  by modifying the existing law in its Penal Code648 
                                                 
640 Ibid. 
641 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 93. 
642 George R J D., Finlay I G and Jeffery David. (2005) ‘Legalised euthanasia will violate the 
rights of the vulnerable patients’. BMJ, Vol.331, p. 684.  
643 Ibid. 
644 Fenigsen Richard. (1989) ‘A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia’. The Hastings Center Report, 
Vol. 19, p. 24. 
645 Ibid. 
646 Simon C. (1998) ‘Last Rights: Euthanasia, the Sanctity of Life, and the Law in the Netherlands 
and the Northern Territory of Australia’. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, 
p. 392. 
647 It was evident that since 1970 such practice was carried out by doctors and tolerated by the 
legal authorities such as prosecutors and courts. 
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and by passing a special legal regime and extra-legal regime to govern the 
practice of assisted suicide and euthanasia, and to ensure that the system is not 
abused and the respect for human life is not undermined.649  
  
3.2 The Legal Structure of the Regime of the State of Oregon applied in cases 
of PAS 
Like in the Netherlands, the Criminal Law in the State of Oregon also prohibits 
assisted suicide. The Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 163.125 (1) (b) reads as: 
“Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the second degree when a person 
intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide”.650  However, the 
construction of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 1994651 makes assistance in 
suicide possible in the medical context. The physician who performs the task in 
good faith and under the prescribed guidelines is not criminally liable. Physicians 
also escape civil sanctions, as well as any professional sanctions, under the State 
law. This immunity is defined under 127.885 s. 4.01 of the ORS. 
 
1. No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional 
disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance with 
ORS 127.800 to 127.897. This includes being present when a qualified 
patient takes the prescribed medication to end his or her life in a 
humane and dignified manner. 
                                                                                                                                     
648 Simon C. (1998) ‘Last Rights: Euthanasia, the Sanctity of Life, and the Law in the Netherlands 
and the Northern Territory of Australia’. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, 
p. 392. 
649 It is relevant to note that “[t]he sanctity of life position is the view that the law in most western 
countries reflects…” and it is considered the most fundamental factor in decisions about life and 
death. See Stevens Christine A. (1992) ‘Management of Death, Dying and Euthanasia: Attitudes 
and Practices of Medical Practitioners and Nurses in South Australia’. Available at, 
http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/22-90-pdf  
650 ‘InternationalTaskForce.org’ See 
http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/assisted_suicide_laws.htm  
651 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) was passed in a referendum in November 
1994. The implementation of it was delayed owing to “a court challenge to its constitutionality. 
On 27 October 1997 the injunction preventing its implementation was lifted by the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In November 1997 voters rejected a proposal to repeal the Act by 
60% to 40%.  Since then, several people have made use of the legislation to end their lives by 
PAS.” See Keown J. (2002) Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. p.167. 
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2. No professional organisation or association, or health care provider, 
may subject a person to censure, discipline, suspension, loss of 
license, loss of privileges, loss of membership or other penalty for 
participating or refusing to participate in good faith compliance with 
ORS 127.800 to 127.897. 
 
At the same time, the ODWDA prohibits acts of active euthanasia and mercy 
killing, including killing by lethal injection. The law reads as follows: 
 
“The construction of the Act652 shall in no way be construed to authorize a 
physician or any other person to end a patient’s life by lethal injection, 
mercy killing or active euthanasia. Actions taken in accordance with ORS 
127.800 to 127.897 shall not, for any purpose, constitute suicide, assisted 
suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law.” 
 
In other words, physicians are exempted from prosecution, provided that their 
conduct falls within the provisions of the ODWDA. Moreover, pharmacists are 
also protected by the Act from handing a patient (on the production of the 
prescription) a controlled drug.653 This mechanism of assistance in suicide is 
recognised as a form of medical treatment and hence, it is not classed as suicide.   
 
The ODWDA is the outcome of a people’s initiative’ rather than an act of judicial 
creation. However, it could be argued that its base is derived from the American 
Constitution, wherein concepts such as autonomy, liberty, freedom, and dignity 
play a fundamental role. However, it is to be noted that there is no constitutional 
right to PAS.654 The said ODWDA was implemented in 1997 under the following 
conditions. The act states: 
 
                                                 
652 Eight Annual Report on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Available at: 
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/index.shtml 
653 Ibid. 
654 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled this decision in 1997. 
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“[a]n adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been 
determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be 
suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his 
or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for the 
purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in 
accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897.”655
 
The ODWDA does not impose any obligation on a physician or a pharmacist to 
assist in suicide, or to hand over the medication to the patient, knowing the 
purpose of the use. The ORS 127.885 s.4.01 (4)656 reads as follows: 
 
“No health care provider shall be under any duty, whether by contract, by 
statute or by any other legal requirement to participate in the provision to a 
qualified patient of medication to end his or her life in a humane and 
dignified manner. If a health care provider is unable or unwilling to carry 
out a patient’s request under ORS 127.800 to 127.897, and the patient 
transfers his or her care to a new health care provider, the prior health care 
provider shall transfer, upon request, a copy of the patient’s relevant 
medical records to the new health care provider.”  
 
Lastly, the ODWDA also makes a legal provision that aims to punish those who 
may maliciously interfere with the patient’s medical records or put pressure on the 
patient to end his or her life. The liability is defined 127.890 s.4.02 as follows:  
 
“1. A person who without authorization of the patient wilfully alters or 
forges a request for medication or conceals or destroys a rescission of that 
request with the intent or effect of causing the patient’s death, [or] 
                                                 
655 Oregon Revised Statute 127.805 s. 2.01, see http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ors.shtml 
656 Ibid. 
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2. A person who coerces or exerts undue influence on a patient to request 
medication for the purpose of ending the patient’s life, or to destroy a 
rescission of such a request, shall be guilty of a …felony”.  
 
Finally, it could be said that the ODWDA is framed with the layperson in mind. It 
carries a simple and clear message that is comprehensible to all those who would 
seek medication under the ODWDA. 
 
a) The Extra-Legal Procedure to be followed in compliance with the 
ODWDA 
The act of PAS in Oregon is officially recognised as a request for medication to 
end life in a human and dignified manner. This is legal under the ODWDA. The 
law enables the people of Oregon not only to choose death, out of their own free 
will, in cases of terminal disease, but also gives them the right to choose the time 
and place of their death. It envisages a process whereby a physician prescribes 
lethal medication657 to a patient, who then self-administers it. However, in order 
to request a prescription, the ODWDA requires that a patient must be: 
 
- an adult (18 years of age or older),  
- a resident of Oregon,  
- capable (defined as able to make and communicate health care 
decisions), and 
- diagnosed with a terminal illness that will lead to death within six 
moths.658 
 
On the other hand, in order to receive a prescription a patient must fulfil the other 
requirements, stated as follows:  
 
                                                 
657 That is, controlled drugs banned by the legislation. 
658 ‘Eight Annual Report on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act’ p. 7, 
http://www.oregon.gov/DVS/ph/pas/index.shtml 
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1. A patient must make two oral requests and a written request. There must 
be at least 15 days gap between the two oral requests made. An oral 
request comprises of the following words by the  patient to the physician:  
 
“‘I’ve been given a diagnosis, what I want to do is to be assisted in 
dying and I would like a prescription from you to make that 
happen.”659
 
2. The written request is a declaration made on the form provided by the 
Department of the Health in the presence of two witnesses. 
3. The terminal illness diagnosed by a physician must be confirmed by a 
consultant. 
4. Whether the patient is of a sound mind, capable of making competent 
decision, must be determined by both the prescribing physician and also 
by a consulting physician. 
5. If either of the physicians thinks that the patient is suffering from a 
psychological disorder, the patient shall be referred to a psychiatrist for 
examination. 
 
Finally, apart from the above mentioned requirements, the attending physician is 
also required to “report to the Department of Human Services (DHS) all 
prescriptions for lethal medications”.660 This helps to ensure compliance with the 
law. However, a physician need not file a report in cases where a patient made a 
request, but did not make it to the stage of prescription. In 1999, the Oregon 
legislature added another requirement that must be complied with by the 
physicians, in addition to the existing ones. It requires that the relevant pharmacist 
must be informed of the prescribed medication’s intended use. As far as criminal 
liability is concerned, neither a pharmacists nor a physician who adheres to the 
                                                 
659LaFrance Arthur B. (2008) ‘Physician Assisted Death: The Oregon Experience’. Wyoming L. 
Rev. Vol. 8, p. 337. 
660 Oregon Administrative Rules 333-009-000 to 333-009-0030.  
http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/oars.shtml 
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rules and regulations of the ODWDA shall be criminally liable. In addition, this 
type of activity would also not affect the relevant health insurance policy of the 
patient. It has also been made clear in the revised statute that neither the doctor 
nor the pharmacist is under any obligation to participate in the ODWDA661. 
 
In Oregon, most of the patients (93%) die at home. Some may choose to die at a 
hospice.662 Their death is reported as a natural death, caused by illness.  As a 
result, it is not possible to know by looking at the death certificate whether the 
person died a ‘suicidal’ death. The only place where the full details of the medical 
history of the patient can be found is the Oregon DHS.  
 
Normally the relationship between the doctor and the patient does not last long. It 
may vary from 12 weeks to 3 months.  The role of the physician ends at the stage 
of prescription of the drug, although the physician may remain present at the time 
when the patient commits the final act. The nature of the practice is purely 
medical.663 Unlike in the Netherlands, in Oregon the ODWDA does not extend 
the treatment to a patient who suffers from a mental disorder, and it is limited 
only to cases of terminal illness. As a result, people with severe disability or with 
diseases such as motor neurone do not qualify under the ODWDA. The regime 
applied in the case of PAS in Oregon is clear and straightforward when compared 
to the Dutch regime.664 Keown is of the opinion that the “Oregon Act can claim to 
be the most permissive regime for PAS yet devised”.665
 
                                                 
661 Oregon Revised Statue 127.800-127.995.  http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ors.shtml 
662 It is relevant to note that most hospices which supports dying people, do not “participate in 
assisted death, because the practice is limited to Oregon” and they might care for the patients who 
are ‘non-residents’ of the state. See LaFrance Arthur B. (2008) ‘Physician Assisted Death: The 
Oregon Experience’. Wyoming L. Rev. Vol. 8, p. 341. 
663 Only physicians may assist in suicide under the ODWDA. As a result only physician enjoy the 
immunity from the law on assisted suicide which otherwise is a crime. Same is the case under the 
Dutch law on termination of life. 
664 Further detailed comparison between the Netherlands and the state of Oregon is dealt in the 
concluding part of the thesis. 
665 Keown J. (2002) Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 179. 
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The means by which the State of Oregon has tried to control this practice is 
explained as follows. Firstly, Oregon has maintained the law proscribing assisted 
suicide.666 Secondly, it has implemented an extra-legal regime that sets out the 
conditions under which a doctor is permitted to prescribe a lethal drug to a 
patient, as well as the conditions under which a patient is recognised as a fit 
candidate for such treatment.  Similarly, the Act requires the patient to take full 
responsibility for his or her death by signing a declaration.667 This condition could 
be significant for two reasons. It could prove to be a barrier to stop abuse and it 
could also prevent the implication of another person in a patient’s death. 
 
In addition, as far as the principle of sanctity of life is concerned, under the 
Oregon legislation this principle is understood from the perspective of ‘quality of 
life’ rather than the perspective of life as an intrinsic good.668  Another reason in 
support of this argument could be that since the option to end ones life is 
recognised as a medical treatment, ending life in this context is viewed as a 
natural death. 
 
Hence, it is suggested that the above measures, as adopted by the State of Oregon, 
appear to provide safer and more restrictive options in comparison with the law in 
the Netherlands. Nevertheless, Wesley Smith argues that it is not ‘abuse free’. A 
study conducted in 1998 by Georgetown University’s Center for Clinical 
Bioethics found “a strong link between cost-cutting pressures on physicians and 
their willingness to prescribe lethal drugs to patients”.669 Similarly, Wesley Smith 
has expressed fears that vulnerable people could be bullied into assisted 
                                                 
666 Ziegler S.J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted 
Suicide for its Potential to enhance oversight and demedicalize the dying process’. Journal of law, 
Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p. 320. 
667 A request form, ‘Request for medication to end my life in a humane and dignified manner. 
http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/index.shtml.  
668 Goy E.R. and others (2006) ‘Determinants of Oregon hospice chaplains’ views on physician-
assisted suicide’, Journal Palliate Care, Vol.22, pp. 83-90. 
669 ‘Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied Drugs for Life, But can Opt for 
Suicide’. http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=5517492&page=2
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suicide.670 He has made this allegation on the basis of the instances of Barbara 
Wagner671 and Randy Stroup672. Both of these patients were denied treatment by 
the state’s health insurance plan for the poor. However, they were told that the 
state’s plan would pay for their assisted suicide.673 In other words, there is a 
potential financial incentive in the State favouring the death of the patient. This is 
a cause of concern for the people of the State of Oregon, and especially for 
patients who desire help in order to live a pain-free life; some of these patients are 
instead offered help to end their lives.674 Dr David Jeffery is a palliative 
specialist. He conducted empirical research in Oregon and undertook an 
investigation of a range of ‘end of life’ care. He concluded that similar measures 
on assisted suicide should not be extended in the UK.675 He formed this opinion 
based on a case study which showed that people in Oregon who had attempted to 
end their life by taking a lethal drug, as prescribed by a doctor, did not die 
immediately. As a result, this was said to have often had an adverse effect on the 
family of the dying person. Similarly, it appears that some physicians talked some 
people, who were terminally ill, into ending their lives prematurely, in order to 
avoid the unpleasant death that could follow from allowing the illness to run its 
course. It has also been alleged that the law in the state of Oregon currently fails 
to protect those people whose choices are influenced by depression.676
 
                                                 
670 Wesley Smith (2009) ‘Right to die’ can become a ‘duty to die’, published in Telegraph.co.uk 
20th Feb. 
671 Who suffered from recurrent lung cancer. 
672 Who had prostate cancer. 
673 Wagner eventually received free medication from the drug manufacture and the denial of 
chemotherapy to Randy Stroup was reversed on appeal after his story hit the media. See ‘Death 
Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied Drugs for Life, But can Opt for Suicide’. 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=5517492&page=2
674 Smith Wesley J. (2008) ‘Another Assisted Suicide Abuse in Oregon: No Money to Help Live-
Will Pay to Make Dead’. 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2008/07/29/another-assisted-suicide-abuse-
in-oregon-no-money-to-help-live-will-pay-to-make-dead/) 
675 ‘Problems with Oregon Assisted Suicides are Real’ by Smith Wesley J. 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2007/11/06/problems-with-oregon-assisted-
suicides-are-real/
676 Alex Carlie (2009) ‘The Law as it stands could not be clearer’. BMJ, Vol.339, p.3169. 
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However, while refuting the allegations made, the spokesperson for the State 
argued that the Oregon Health Plan properly looks after the needs and the 
interests of patients in relation to potential treatments, no matter what the cost of 
the treatment is. He acknowledged there were some genuine issues of concern in 
the matter of Barbara Wagner677 and he stated that this case “was a public 
relations blunder and something the state is ‘working on’”678. Steinbrook Robert 
reports that a large number of people in Oregon die while under the care of a 
hospice program.679 A number of these patients had requested assistance.680 
Possible reasons for patients making such requests for assistance in suicide 
include the desire for control681 and to provide “a potential source of comfort for 
terminally ill patients, regardless of whether they ever choose to make use of 
it”.682  According to Ann Jackson of the Oregon Hospice Association, the rate of 
hospice death increased from 21 percentages to 39 percentages from 1993 to 
2000.683  Linda Gansini and others have stated that, based on the research data, it 
appears that only one in six requests are granted by physicians and only one in ten 
requests actually results in a case of suicide.684 Thus, Steinbrook Robert states 
that, according to Oregon Health Division, there is no evidence that the law has 
been abused.685 It has been noted: 
 
                                                 
677 The person who was denied treatment but instead was told that the State plan would pay for his 
assisted suicide. 
678 ‘Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied Drugs for Life, but can Opt for 
Suicide’. http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=5517492&page=2
679 Steinbrook Robert. (2002) ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon – An uncertain future’. The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 346, p. 461. 
680 Gansini L. and others (2002) ‘Experiences of Oregon Nurses and Social Workers with Hospice 
Patients who Requested assistance with suicide’. The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol.347, 
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“Oregon’s seven years of experience with this law686 have been, for the 
most part, reassuring: medical and legal safeguards established during 
implementation appear to have prevented abuse, and most patients have 
had expected outcome.”687  
 
Further to this, the recent report published under the ODWDA shows that in the 
year 2009, out of 95 patients who took prescriptions, only 59 took medications to 
end their life.688 According to the report, during the period from 1997-2009, only 
460 patients have died from ingesting medication prescribed to them under the 
ODWDA.689
 
 
3.3 The Law on Assisted Suicide in Switzerland  
The legal position of Switzerland with regard to assisted suicide is unique 
compared to that of the Netherlands and the State of Oregon. Assisted suicide is 
not a crime in Switzerland, provided that a person who aids or assists does it for 
humane reasons. In other words, any person may assist another in committing the 
act of suicide. It need not be a physician. Article 115 of the Swiss Penal Code 
(SPC) 1937, in force since 1942, defines assisted suicide as: 
 
“Art 115: Inciting and assisting someone to commit suicide (Verleitung 
undBeihilfe zum Selbstmord) 
A person who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or 
who assists that person in doing so will, if the suicide was carried out or 
attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment (Zuchthaus) of up to 5 
years or a term of imprisonment (Gefangnis).”690  
 
                                                 
686 That is from the year 1997 to 2000. 
687 Okie Susan. (2005) ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide – Oregon and Beyond’. The New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 352, pp. 1627-1628.  
688 ‘2009 Summary of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act’. 
http://oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/index.shtml.  
689 Ibid. 
690 Schwarzenegger Christian and Summers Sarah J. ‘Criminal Law and Assisted Suicide in 
Switzerland’. www.rwi.unizh.ch/schwarzenegger 
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Although it does not state in specific terms that assisted suicide is legal, neither 
does it prohibit it, except in conditions where the motive behind such an act or 
behaviour is self-interest. Hence as argued by Bosshard, “…the legality of 
assisting suicide, in the absence of self-interest, holds good for any person”.691 
Moreover, in 2001, the Swiss Parliament rejected a bill that would have banned 
the physicians from assisting suicide.692 Euthanasia, on the other hand, remains a 
crime which is punishable under Article 114 of the SPC as killing on the explicit 
request of the person concerned.693 Article 114 of the SPC defines euthanasia as 
murder upon request by the victim. The law does not recognise the concept of 
euthanasia.694 Apart from this provision, Article 11 of the Narcotics imposes a 
prerequisite on the doctors who prescribe the drug to the patient. A doctor must 
evaluate the competence of the person concerned.695 Another important point is 
that, as is the case in Holland, Switzerland allows assisted suicide in mental 
disorder cases. This position was recognised by the Federal Supreme Court in 
2006. The court stated: 
 
“[A]n incurable, permanent, serious mental disorder can be the cause of 
suffering comparable to that of a physical disorder. The court ruled that a 
doctor who prescribes a lethal dose of pentobarbital in a case like this does 
not necessarily violate the rules of medical practice. However, the Federal 
Supreme Court held, this requires a report by an expert in psychiatry 
providing evidence that the patient’s desire to die is not the expression of a 
curable, psychiatric disorder but a well-considered and permanent decision 
based on rational judgment.” 696
                                                 
691 Bosshard G. (2008) ‘Switzerland’, in Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (eds), 
Euthanasia and law in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 471. 
692 Available at: http://www.chninternational.com/switzerland_and_assisted_suicide.htm 
693 Bosshard G. (2008) ‘Switzerland’, in Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (eds), 
Euthanasia and law in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 468. 
694 Mauron Alex and Hurst Samia A. (2003) ‘Eudcation and Debate’. ‘Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians’. British Medical Journal, Vol. 326, 
p. 272.  
695 Bosshard G. (2008) ‘Switzerland’, in Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice (eds), 
Euthanasia and law in Europe. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 473. 
696 Ibid., at p. 473. 
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 Bosshard further explains that:  
 
“The court based its decision not only on the Swiss Penal Code and the 
Swiss Constitution, but also on the European Convention of human rights. 
The fundamental idea underlying Swiss law on suicide is that of the 
autonomous human individual who has the right to decide on the 
circumstances and the time of his own death. A right to die in this sense, 
however, is a negative right (liberty right): it protects the individual 
against legal prohibitions and interventions. Such negative rights can be 
restricted if other basic rights are at risk. No positive right (claim right) is 
involved. The court explicitly rejected the view of Ludwig Minelli, lawyer 
and founder of the right-to-die society Dignitas, that there is an individual 
right to a pain-free death (using pentobarbital).”697
 
The prime consideration that must be given in the case of the above practice is 
that the person who is being assisted must have the capacity to make such a 
decision. In addition, the person who wishes to die must perform the final act. 
Finally, the person helping with the performance of this act must lack a selfish 
motive. As long as the ‘right to die’ societies, as mentioned above, fulfil these 
requirements they can be assured that their acts will not come under criminal 
liability. Therefore, it is not surprising that a psychiatrist who allowed a media 
team i.e. TV cameras to be present when a patient was assisted in committing 
suicide, and who allowed the film to be broadcast thereafter, was found guilty of 
an offence against Article 115.698
 
In short, the legal structure of the regime applied in Switzerland is without 
ambiguity. It is controlled by the SPC and the Criminal Justice System (CJS). The 
police and the prosecutors play an active role in keeping the system abuse-free. 
                                                 
697 Ibid., at p. 473. 
698 Ibid., at p. 476. 
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The authorities get directly involved, on the spot in every case of assisted suicide. 
These cases are registered as unnatural deaths and are investigated like any other 
case of unnatural death. Similarly, the ‘right to die’ societies, who provide the 
service of assistance to autonomous individuals under special circumstances, 
remain in the constant focus of the authorities.  Although Article 115 of the SPC 
protects these societies, their conduct is closely observed by the concerned 
authorities. They are required to intimate the police of any cases of assisted 
suicide they deal with immediately upon death of the patient. In this way, these 
societies also help the regime to function effectively. In the following part of the 
chapter, the extra legal procedures adopted by these societies in conducting the 
practice of assisted suicide is set out.      
a) The Extra-Legal Procedure: Switzerland and ‘Right to Die’ 
Societies 
In Switzerland, the Criminal Law is liberal in relation to assisted suicide. There 
are no formal rules or guidelines to be adopted, except that the abettor should not 
act with a selfish motive, as explained above. Moreover, assisted suicide in 
Switzerland does not find a home in the medical context, unlike in the other two 
jurisdictions assessed above.699 Hence, one need not be a physician to assist in 
suicide. The unique feature of this practice, which occurs under the SPC, is that it 
can be performed by anybody, anywhere. The presence of independent 
organisations, which are known as right to die societies, makes the Swiss situation 
unique. These organisations are non-profit and non-governmental namely Exit 
Deutsche Schweiz (Exit), Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignite 
(Exit ADMD), Dignitas and Exit International. These organisations have framed 
their own guidelines, which must be complied with by any person who wishes to 
have assistance, and also by the member of their staff. Although each organisation 
has its own set of rules and requirements, they share one common requirement i.e. 
every person who wishes to have the services provided must be competent to 
make such a decision. The volunteers of these societies are comprised of 
                                                 
699 Bosshard G. and others (2008) ‘Suicide assisted by two Swiss right-to-die organisations’. J 
Med Ethics, Vol. 34, p. 810. 
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clergymen, social workers and nurses, all of whom are responsible for the 
effective service of the organisation. These are the people with whom the 
candidate comes into contact with first. In this way, the volunteers play an 
important role in the preliminary assessment of a candidate for assisted suicide. A 
request is first made to a volunteer, often by telephone, and not directly to the 
doctor.   
 
Following the preliminary assessment, the person concerned is then required to 
approach a doctor. He or she will usually be advised to ask for the cooperation of 
a family doctor who will prescribe a lethal dose of sodium pentobarbital. The 
doctor who prescribes the drug may either decide to remain present at the time of 
the final act, which is performed by the patient, or the doctor may decide to assist, 
without the aid of an organisation. It has been observed that only a few doctors 
have been willing to participate in the final act. Most doctors prefer to prescribe 
the drug and then let the organisation participate in the final act.700 The prescribed 
drug is stored at the organisation until the final act. This is different to the case of 
Oregon, where the drug is stored at the patient’s own home.  As it is clear that the 
final act is a self-administered act, whereby the candidate swallows the drug, this 
becomes a problem in cases of candidates who are unable to swallow the pill. In 
this case, the organisation moves a step forward in assisting such patients to 
commit suicide.  In these types of cases, the organisation provides assistance by 
using iv-drips or stomach tubes. This is the case mostly with those who are 
already being fed using artificial nutrition methods or have had tube feeding 
devices administered. Sometimes, in the absence of these devices, a nurse will put 
an intravenous drip in place. The volunteer will then add the lethal dose to the 
fluid in the drip container. This process is viewed as a preparatory activity. The 
last step is considered to be vital as far as the law is concerned. This final step is 
to open the tap of the drip or tube. This must be carried out by the dying person. 
Furthermore, this must be attested to by a witness. Lastly, the death must be 
                                                 
700 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 475. 
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reported to the criminal authorities. These authorities lay down procedural 
requirements. The requirement of competence of the candidate or patient is shared 
by all the organisations. However, as far as the substantive internal rules are 
concerned, each organisation has their own set of criteria.701  
 
Exit which caters for the German speaking part of Switzerland, and which has its 
headquarters in Zurich, requires that the person who wishes assistance must have 
a poor prognosis, and suffering that is ‘unbearable or be suffering from 
unreasonable disability.702
 
Exit ADMD which is the sister concern of Exit, operates in the other region i.e. 
the French speaking part. It provides a service only to those people who suffer 
from an incurable disease or those people that are terminally ill. Otherwise its 
conditions are the same i.e. it requires that “…the person wanting assistance be 
competent”703.  
 
Dignitas, which not only caters for the Swiss, but also for foreigners, requires that 
the person must suffer from a fatal disease or from an unacceptable disability.704  
 
Exit International is another organisation which also offers suicide assistance to 
people who do not live in Switzerland.  
 
Even under the Swiss law, the applicant must perform the final act. This usually 
occurs in the venue provided by the organisation i.e. the ‘right to die’ society. It is 
an action carried out “by the ingestion of a lethal dose of barbiturates prescribed 
by a physician with explicit intention of enabling the patient to end his or her 
life”705. As is the case in the Netherlands, it is not only people suffering from a 
physical disease that are considered to be fit candidates for assistance, but also 
                                                 
701 Ibid., at p. 471. 
702 Ibid. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid., at p. 472. 
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those who suffer from a mental illness. However, since in Switzerland anyone can 
assist in suicide of another, the question remains as to what extent the implied 
requirement of competence is fulfilled in cases where the third party is non-
physician.706 Arguably, since the ‘right to die’ societies are non-profit 
organisations, they would provide assistance in most of the cases that fulfils their 
eligibility requirements. Hence, the number of people (non-physicians) who help 
in suicide of another would be less and they should be subject to the same legal 
requirements as that of the ‘right to die’ societies. The same safeguards, as 
mentioned above, should apply to the case of a layperson as apply in the case of a 
‘right to die’ society.  
 
Although, as stated above, the law has not set any limits or restrictions on the 
practice of assisted suicide, the Swiss Academy of Medical Science, in their new 
Medical Ethics Guidelines for the Care of Patients at the End of Life, has 
introduced certain guidelines. “The Academy states that ‘a personal decision of a 
doctor in accordance with his or her conscience to assist a terminally ill patient in 
suicide has to be respected as such’”707. However, doctors should follow certain 
guidelines set by the Academy. Firstly, the only cases that should be considered 
are cases in which “the patient is approaching the end of life;”. Secondly, the 
doctor must discuss both the availability of alternative options and whether the 
candidate desires any alternative option. Thirdly, the patient must be competent to 
make a decision and the decision must be well thought through and it must be 
made without any external pressures being exerted on the patient.708 However, the 
Academy makes it clear that assistance in suicide does not form part of a doctor’s 
usual tasks – there is no duty to assist. In addition, the Academy requires that the 
first and the second points be fulfilled by analysis based on medical expertise. 
                                                 
706 Because even though the volunteers of the ‘right to die’ societies are non-physicians, the 
applicant are examined by their physicians. For example, those who travel to Switzerland to die 
with the assistance of Dignitas have to provide a medical certificate that discloses the competence 
and health history of the applicant. This is one of the requirements of ‘right to die’ societies that 
apply in all cases foreigners as well as their residents. 
707 Griffiths John, Weyers Heleen and Adams Maurice. (2008) Euthanasia and law in Europe. 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing. p. 473. 
708 Ibid., at p. 481. 
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Apart from the above set requirements, the academy also states that “...‘the final 
act in the process leading to death must always be undertaken by the patient him 
or herself’ and thereby clearly reject euthanasia in any circumstances”709. 
 
Presumably, in the cases where doctor is not willing to provide help i.e. the doctor 
is unwilling to write a prescription, other sources are used by the ‘right to die’ 
societies. As far as the place where such an action can be performed is concerned, 
it is open to the individual, unless it is organised through one of the societies. As 
long as such an action is not performed in a banned institution or hospital. Most of 
the hospitals in Switzerland do not permit assistance in suicide on their premises. 
Nevertheless, in 2000, “the Zurich City Council decided to lift an existing ban on 
assisted suicide in nursing homes”.710 At the same time the council reiterated that 
assistance in suicide is not allowed in the city hospitals.  
 
However, it has been noted: 
 
“In 2006, the Lausanne University Hospital decided to allow right-to-die 
societies on to their premises to help terminally ill, non-ambulatory 
patients who seek suicide assistance but are unable to leave the 
hospital”.711  
 
Furthermore, another hospital, the Zurich Cantonal University Hospital, which 
does not entertain this kind of activity on their premises, reaffirmed the ban in 
2007 and it adopted a policy of ‘studied neutrality’. According to this policy, no 
health care professional currently working at the Zurich University Hospital is 
allowed to directly engage in assistance. However, if a competent patient seeks 
assistance from a ‘right to die’ society from outside the hospital walls, he or she 
should not be prevented from seeking assistance. Such a patient has, as in any 
other circumstances, the right to a report. This report gives medical information 
                                                 
709 Ibid., at p. 474. 
710 Ibid.  
711 Ibid. 
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such as the diagnosis and prognosis and, if necessary, the patient can be 
transported by ambulance to a facility of his or her choosing, including a ‘right to 
die’ society.712  
 
Clearly, there is no uniform regime. Furthermore, there are no set guidelines or 
requirements stated by either the criminal law, or by any special provision of legal 
jurisprudence. The only relevant condition within the criminal law is under 
section 115. This condition is that the assistance ought to be for an altruistic 
purpose. The requirement of competence is implied from the nature of the act 
itself. The existence of the negative right to die is legally open to all, including 
foreigners as seen above.  
 
It is suggested that this approach is much more progressive in comparison to the 
approaches taken by the Netherlands and the State of Oregon. The Swiss model 
not only establishes the concept of a person’s right to die, which plays a major 
role in the non-prosecution of the person who assists,713 but it has also effectively 
‘de-medicalised’ death. Furthermore, it has made the whole process 
transparent.714  Under Swiss law, no medical precondition is required to assist 
another person in suicide.715 Similarly, a doctor’s participation is not 
necessary.716 However, a doctor is free, like any other citizen of the country, to 
                                                 
712 Ibid. 
713 Bossbard G. and others. (2002) ‘Open regulation and practice in assisted suicide’. Swiss 
medical weekly, Vol. 132, p. 527. It is relevant to note that in the Netherlands the basis for non-
prosecution lies in the conflict of the physician’s duties to respect life versus to relief of suffering 
and in Oregon it is like in Switzerland (right to die concept). 
714 Ziegler S.J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted 
Suicide for its Potential to enhance oversight and demedicalize the dying process’. Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p. 319. 
715 Fischer S. and others. (2009) ‘Reasons why people in Switzerland seek assisted suicide: the 
view of patients and physicians’. Swiss Medical Weekly, Vol. 139, p. 333. 
716 As already seen any person may assist in suicide in Switzerland which dates back to 1981 when 
attitudes of the people towards suicide was motivated by honour and romance. This is when the 
Swiss federal government declared suicide not to be a crime and assisted suicide would be a crime 
unless the author (assistant) is motivated by selfish reasons. At this time, motives related to health 
were not a concern and hence the involvement of the physician was not required. See Mauron 
Alex and Hurst Samia A. (2003) ‘Education and Debate’. Assisted Suicide and euthanasia in 
Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians’. BMJ, Vol. 326, p. 271. 
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assist in suicide if he or she so desires.717 Although ‘right to die’ societies 
generally prefer and rely in favour of a requirement for the assistance of a doctor 
in order to prescribe a lethal dose of barbiturates (sodium pentobarbital)718, it is 
arguable that the ‘right to die’ societies could rely on other sources or means to 
achieve this, as discussed in chapter 1 of the thesis. However, the possible reason 
why ‘right to die’ societies favour doctor’s assistance is that the provision of a 
controlled substance ensures a quick and painless death. As seen above in many 
scenarios, it is the family doctor of the patient who provides the lethal 
prescription. The person is then able to end his or her life, with the help of the 
‘right to die’ societies, at home, in an institution or in a nursing home.719
 
Any possible exploitation of the above right to die is safeguarded by the de-
medicalisation of death and the direct involvement of the authorities. Possible 
cases of abuse are also prevented by keeping the concepts of competence and 
motive at the heart of the practice of assisted suicide. For example, all of the 
organisations that are set up to provide assistance in suicide are non-profit 
organisations.720 Hence, there is little or no potential for commercial exploitation 
of the issue. Similarly, measures721 have been taken to ensure abuse-free practice 
of assisted suicide in the country. These measures have proven successful, except 
                                                 
717 Mauron Alex and Hurst Samia A. (2003) ‘Education and Debate’. Assisted Suicide and 
euthanasia in Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians’. BMJ, Vol. 326, p. 272.  
718 As it is, controlled substance and one can avail of it only with the prescription of a doctor. See 
Ziegler S.J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide 
for its Potential to enhance oversight and demedicalize the dying process’. Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p.333.  
719 Bosshard G. and others. (2008) ‘Suicide assisted by two Swiss right to die organisations’. J 
Med Ethics, Vol. 34, pp. 810-811. It is to be noted that all foreigners who are assisted by Dignitas 
for example die in a hotel room or a flat rented by Dignitas. 
720 ‘Organised assisted suicide to be regulated’. 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/dokumentation/mi/2009/2009-10-28.html ; Assisted 
Suicide statistics: the numbers Dignitas helps to die, by country. 25 Feb. 2010, Guardian.co.uk  
721 Such as follows: a) the barbiturate is obtainable only on a doctor’s prescription; b) it is never 
directly handed to the applicant or available for supplies, but only handed to doctor, right to die 
societies or the attendant; c) applicant can postpone or cancel time and date of planned assisted 
suicide; d) applicant is required to sign a declaration in front of the witnesses registered on file; d) 
the attendant calls the police on the site once death occurs to conduct investigation and required 
formalities as per the law on non-natural death; e) the attendant possess required knowledge to 
perform the task. See   Baezner-Sailer Elke. (2008) ‘Physician-assisted suicide in Switzerland: A 
personal report’ in Giving Death a helping hand: Physician-assisted suicide and public policy. An 
International Perspective, Vol. 38, pp. 141-148. 
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in the instances of development of ‘death tourism’. This ‘death tourism’ has 
created anger among the residents of Switzerland and its authorities.722 The main 
cause of this concern is the financial burden that Swiss taxpayers and its 
authorities are forced to incur. Elke has noted that the procedural cost to the state, 
is CHF 3,000 – 5,000 per assisted suicide.723 It has been stated: 
 
“According to the public prosecutor’s office, the accumulated costs for 
assisting foreigners in a suicide in the Canton of Zurich amount to CHF 
273,000 per annum!”724   
 
This financial problem, coupled with the concern that ‘right to die’ societies such 
as Dignitas are increasingly testing the boundaries of assisted suicide, has given 
reason for the Swiss authorities to reflect on the current laws governing assisted 
suicide. Although the Federal council is not in favour of ending the country’s 
liberal laws, it is currently in favour of limiting the practice of assisted suicide. 
For instance, it has proposed that the government should impose guidelines and 
restrictions as to when, and under what conditions, a person can be assisted in 
suicide.725
 
Hence, although the Swiss law on assisted suicide has not led to abuse in cases of 
vulnerable people, it has indirect implications on the residents of the country who 
are forced to bear the financial burden towards those who contribute nothing to 
the country’s economy except in paying compensation to Dignitas for providing 
them with the service.  
 
Furthermore, as far as the principle of sanctity of life is concerned, it has been 
stated that the Federal council “believes in the paramount importance of 
                                                 
722 Baezner-Sailer Elke. (2008) ‘Physician-assisted suicide in Switzerland: A personal report’ in 
Giving Death a helping hand: Physician-assisted suicide and public policy. An International 
Perspective, Vol. 38, pp. 141-148. 
723 Ibid., at p. 145. 
724 Ibid. 
725 Ibid. 
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protecting human life”726. However, as argued by Mauron and Hurst, in most 
cases “the permissibility of altruistic assisted suicide cannot be overridden by a 
duty to save life”727. 
 
Having examined the liberal foreign regimes in relation to assisted suicide and 
euthanasia, in the following part of the thesis an attempt is made to discover 
whether these foreign regimes provide any information that could potentially 
inform the debate surrounding the strict regime in England and Wales. In doing 
so, the concluding part of the thesis will try to answer the following questions. Is 
the fear of abuse groundless? Are there different ways to respond to fears of 
abuse? Have the above regimes experienced further problems resulting from 
liberalisation of the law? Do other countries have different views on the sanctity 
of life in comparison to the territories of England and Wales?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
726 ‘Organised assisted suicide to be regulated’. 
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/dokumentation/mi/2009/2009-10-28.html  
727 Mauron A. and Hurst Samia A. (2003) ‘Education and Debate’. Assisted Suicide and 
euthanasia in Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians’. BMJ, Vol. 326, p. 271. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
What can the Jusrisdiction of England and Wales learn from the Foreign 
Regimes discussed above?   
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis, the restrictive approach towards 
assisted suicide and euthanasia, taken under the law of England and Wales, is 
currently being relaxed to some extent. It is clear that the judges in recent cases 
have tried to balance the ethics of personal autonomy and human suffering with 
the sanctity of life. For instance, it is clear that the DPP’s guidelines have made it 
possible for people in England and Wales to take assistance in suicide without the 
fear of prosecution of the person who provides assistance.728 However, the person 
who assists must ensure that his or her conduct does not go beyond assisted 
suicide. Furthermore, his or her motive must be good, in order not to fall foul of 
the existing law covering assisted suicide.729 On the other hand, the courts have 
openly accepted voluntary passive euthanasia, non-voluntary passive euthanasia 
and the provision of care at the end of life i.e. making the dying process 
painless.730
 
However, unlike the situation in Switzerland, the conduct of the assistant in 
suicide cases in England and Wales typically attracts criminal liability, 
irrespective of his or her good motive. Furthermore, doctors whose action to 
                                                 
728 For detail analysis on this aspect, see chapter 1 of the thesis. 
729 It is relevant to note that the method adopted by the DPP via guidance to remove certain types 
of deeds or actions such as booking tickets, escorting the applicant to Switzerland to die with 
assistance, or helping in making other arrangements which could come under ‘trivial’ assistance, 
would include far more interventionist tactics that could be deemed ‘lawful’ by virtue of the 
DPP’s discretion. For example, on 24th May 2010, the DPP in the case of Mr Bateman, who 
assisted his wife to die by helping her put a plastic bag over her head and to put together the 
helium gas apparatus, decided not to bring prosecution against Mr Bateman in the public interest. 
The DPP said, although there was sufficient evidence to charge Mr Bateman with the offence of 
assisted suicide, his actions were purely motivated by compassion. It was found that his wife 
performed the last act that resulted in her death. Mrs Bateman tightened the strings of the bag and 
turned on the helium supply. See ‘No charges in West Yorkshire assisted death case’. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/8701173.stm?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium
=twitter
730 This practice has given way to statuses as seen in chapter 2 of the thesis. 
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relieve pain, results in the death of the patient, or a shortening of their life, still 
face risk of prosecution of murder or attempted murder or even assisted suicide. 
Conversely, the law remains incoherent. The guidance provided by the DPP 
addresses part of this problem, but it still leaves areas of ambiguity which could 
penalise bona fide assistance. Hence, there is a need under the current law of 
England and Wales to provide legal security to those who would assist in suicide 
of another as well as to doctors whose conduct may lead to foreseen, but 
unintended consequences. These consequences may include causing death while 
treating the pain and suffering of the patient. In the same way, it is necessary to 
address the issue of ‘act or omission distinction’ that is currently used as a shield 
to justify the conduct of doctors and to protect them from any kind of criminal 
responsibility.  
 
As seen above, doctors in the Netherlands have faced similar problems as doctors 
in England and Wales. Doctors in the Netherlands begun to assist their patients 
(on request) in dying by active means. However, the model adopted by the 
Netherlands is most liberal in the sense that it not only permits assisted suicide but 
also euthanasia. The impact of this model is far reaching in the sense that it sets 
no limit as to who can be assisted in suicide or in the termination of life as long as 
the patient consents and he or she suffers unbearably and hopelessly. As a result, 
old people tired of life731 and depressed people732 have been helped to die under 
the new law, as well as seriously ill people. Although the guidelines set by the 
DPP resemble the criteria set under the statutory Act 2001, the jurisdiction of 
England and Wales will probably not find the Dutch model suitable for the reason 
that it permits deliberate killing, the prohibition of which is said to form a corner 
stone of the criminal law of England and Wales.733 Similarly, setting no speed 
limit on who can be assisted in dying, except requiring that the suffering must be 
                                                 
731 Moller M. and Huxtable R. (2001) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands: the case of “life fatigue”’. 
New Law Journal, Vol. 151, pp. 1600-1601; Huxtable R. and Moller M. (2007) ‘Setting a 
Principled Boundary?’ Euthanasia as a Response to Life Fatigue. Bioethics, Vol.21, pp. 117-126.  
732 Ibid.  
733 See ‘Extracts from the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics’ in 
(eds) Keown J. (1995) Euthanasia Examined: ethical, clinical and legal perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 102. 
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unbearable and hopeless, makes it difficult to control the practices. As a result, 
allowing active killing under the Dutch eligibility criteria would probably mean a 
wide liberalisation of the law of assistance in ending life in England and Wales.  
 
As far as the State of Oregon is concerned, this model seems to deal with the 
issues surrounding the current debate on assisted suicide more carefully. The 
Oregon model has embraced the value of life from the perspective of quality of 
life. Furthermore, this model treats assisting in dying as a treatment, which is 
optional, and it is available to the terminally-ill only. Oregon has set safeguards to 
prevent abuse by limiting the level of degree of help provided i.e. only with 
prescription.  It has also limited the categories of patients who can avail of this 
option i.e. only those who suffer from terminal illness. As a result, less people are 
able to make use of it. Furthermore, some of these patients do not in fact make use 
of it and most of them die in a hospice under care. Hence, this model could prove 
to be more suitable and safe when compared with the Netherlands. However, this 
model also has drawbacks in relation to dealing with what exactly morally 
justifies cases of assisted suicide in the State of Oregon. Is it suffering or 
autonomy? If it is suffering, then all who suffer should be able to have this option 
available to them and if it is autonomy, then irrespective of whether one suffers or 
not the patient should have the option available to him or her. Hence, this model 
may give rise to discrimination if it is adopted as it is into the law of England and 
Wales.  
 
Finally, the Swiss model is the one that most clearly upholds the liberty and 
autonomy of the individual. This is a fairer system compared to the model chosen 
by the Netherlands and the State of Oregon. The Swiss model not only respects 
individual autonomy and humanity, but it also shows respect for human life by 
not allowing deliberate killing. In addition, it provides a clear and transparent 
system that effectively de-medicalises death.  In this way, the scope for potential 
abuse is reduced. However, death tourism is an increasing concern in Switzerland. 
The authorities of the country are currently preparing to deal with this concern. 
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Other than this, Switzerland appears to deal with the practice of assisted suicide 
more efficiently and openly than the other two jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
Swiss model has provided for this situation without implicating a third person in 
the death of the person, nor depriving people who can do very little to help 
themselves of availing of assistance.734  
 
Which Regime would best suit the current situation of England and Wales? 
Although the current position of England and Wales on assisted suicide and 
euthanasia substantially overlaps with the practice of the Netherlands prior to the 
enactment of the statutory Act 2001, it most resembles the Swiss model which 
prohibits euthanasia (like England and Wales), but allows assistance in suicide 
with altruistic motive, the condition which also forms part of the DPP’s guidelines 
on assisted suicide in England and Wales. Both the DPP’s guidelines and the 
SPC, make motive of the person who assists in suicide of another the most 
relevant aspect. In each case the motive establishes the criminal responsibility of 
the author. Although, motives does not correspond with autonomy, unless motive 
is defined as the desire to respect the wishes of the person making the request. 
The use of it (i.e. motive) in this context, in both jurisdictions could mean a desire 
not only to help, but a desire also to respect the wishes of the person who make 
the request. This is visible from the situation of Daniel James and also from other 
scenarios discussed in the chapter 1 of the thesis. As far as Switzerland is 
concerned, as stated earlier, the practice of providing assistance in suicide 
originated from the concept of honourable deed. Those who desired to end their 
life by way of suicide, their wishes were respected by providing them assistance 
in doing so.  
 
The Swiss regime addresses the concerns faced by England and Wales. It not only 
respects individual autonomy by providing assistance in suicide, but it also 
                                                 
734 This is done with the help of the modern technology and sometimes by lifting a glass to the 
mouth of the person who is assisted to die. See Ziegler S.J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An 
Exploration of the Swiss Model of Assisted Suicide for its Potential to enhance oversight and 
demedicalize the dying process’. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, p. 322. 
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ensures that the value of life is not undermined by limiting its freedom to patients 
approaching the end of life735 and by restricting a right to die as a negative right 
and not a positive right736. Similarly, it has addressed the fear of abuse by making 
its system transparent and ensuring that the CJS is directly involved in situations 
of assisted suicide. Furthermore, the involvement of the ‘right to die’ societies has 
made it possible to help even those patients who can do very little to help 
themselves commit suicide. The role played by the ‘right to die’ societies helps 
others to have control over place and time of their death.  This makes dying more 
humane and dignified.  
 
As a result, this model fulfils the needs of most of the people who desire to have 
control over time and place of their death. At the same time, it proves the need for 
euthanasia is unnecessary as long as a person who desires to die is able to either 
swallow the lethal drug or is able to turn on the button of intravenous tube. In this 
way, a person who is assisted in dying would not only be competent at the time of 
his death, but he or she would also be in a position to have control over his death. 
If this option is made available to the people in England and Wales, it will not 
only help people die a dignified death with assistance, but it would also do away 
with the scope for covert euthanasia as well as the need for euthanasia.  
 
Hence, this thesis ultimately proposes the adoption of the Swiss model into 
England and Wales. However, in order to adopt this model, the current guidelines 
as promulgated by the DPP, would require modification and codification. By 
maintaining the status quo of the existing law on assisted suicide and euthanasia, 
parliament should aim to enact a special law in relation to assisted suicide. This 
special law could be drafted by codifying the existing guidelines promulgated by 
the DPP. However, as said earlier, some necessary amendments and insertions 
would have to be undertaken in order to ensure adequate protection, safeguards 
and respect for human life. At the same time, the law could ensure that a person in 
                                                 
735 This limit is imposed by the Swiss Academy of Medical Science. See pp. 140-141 of the thesis. 
736 See p. 136 of the thesis. 
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the circumstances described above would die a ‘good death’ i.e. one that is easy 
and painless as well as humane and dignified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157
Appendix A 
Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging and 
Assisting Suicide 
Issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions on 25 February 2010. 
Introduction 
1. A person commits an offence under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 if he 
or she does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or 
attempted suicide of another person, and that act was intended to 
encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide. This offence is 
referred to in this policy as "encouraging or assisting suicide". The consent 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is required before an 
individual may be prosecuted. 
2. The offence of encouraging or assisting suicide carries a maximum 
penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. This reflects the seriousness of the 
offence. 
3. Committing or attempting to commit suicide is not, however, of itself, a 
criminal offence. 
4. This policy is issued as a result of the decision of the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords in R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of 
Public Prosecutions reported at [2009] UKHL45, which required the DPP 
"to clarify what his position is as to the factors that he regards as relevant 
for and against prosecution" (paragraph 55) in cases of encouraging and 
assisting suicide. 
5. The case of Purdy did not change the law: only Parliament can change the 
law on encouraging or assisting suicide. 
6. This policy does not in any way "decriminalise" the offence of 
encouraging or assisting suicide. Nothing in this policy can be taken to 
amount to an assurance that a person will be immune from prosecution if 
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he or she does an act that encourages or assists the suicide or the attempted 
suicide of another person. 
7. For the purposes of this policy, the term "victim" is used to describe the 
person who commits or attempts to commit suicide. Not everyone may 
agree that this is an appropriate description but, in the context of the 
criminal law, it is the most suitable term to use. 
8. This policy applies when the act that constitutes the encouragement or 
assistance is committed in England and Wales; any suicide or attempted 
suicide as a result of that encouragement or assistance may take place 
anywhere in the world, including in England and Wales.  
The investigation 
9. The police are responsible for investigating all cases of encouraging or 
assisting suicide. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
intends to provide all Police Forces with guidance on dealing with cases of 
encouraging or assisting suicide soon after the publication of this policy. 
Prosecutors who are involved in such cases should ensure that they 
familiarise themselves fully with the ACPO guidance when it is available. 
10. The ACPO guidance will specifically recommend that police officers 
liaise with the reviewing prosecutor to seek his or her advice at an early 
stage and throughout their enquiries so that all appropriate lines of 
investigation, in the context of the individual case, are discussed and 
agreed by the Prosecution Team. This is to ensure that all relevant 
evidence and information is obtained to allow a fully informed decision on 
prosecution to be taken. 
11. The reviewing prosecutor must ensure that he or she has sufficient 
evidence and information in order to reach a fully informed decision about 
the evidential and public interest stages of the Full Code Test (see 
paragraph 13 below). The reviewing prosecutor will need detailed 
information about the mental capacity of the person who committed or 
attempted to commit suicide and about any relevant public interest factor. 
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12. The reviewing prosecutor should only make a decision when he or she has 
all the relevant material that is reasonably capable of being obtained after 
a full and thorough investigation. The reviewing prosecutor should tell the 
police if any further evidence or information is required before a decision 
can be taken.  
The decision-making process 
13. Prosecutors must apply the Full Code Test as set out in the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors in cases of encouraging or assisting suicide. The Full 
Code Test has two stages: (i) the evidential stage; and (ii) the public 
interest stage. The evidential stage must be considered before the public 
interest stage. A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not 
proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be. Where there is 
sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, prosecutors must go on to 
consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. 
14. The DPP will only consent to a prosecution for an offence of encouraging 
or assisting suicide in a case where the Full Code Test is met.  
The evidential stage 
15. Section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 was amended with effect from 1 
February 2010. It is therefore essential that prosecutors identify the timing 
of any act of encouragement or assistance that it is alleged supports the 
bringing of a criminal charge relating to the suicide or attempted suicide of 
the victim. 
16. Where the act of encouragement or assistance occurred on or after 1 
February 2010, section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 as amended by section 
59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 applies. 
17. In these cases, for the evidential stage of the Full Code Test to be satisfied, 
the prosecution must prove that:  
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o the suspect did an act capable of encouraging or assisting the 
suicide or attempted suicide of another person; and 
o the suspect's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an 
attempt at suicide. 
18. "Another person" referred to in section 2 need not be a specific person and 
the suspect does not have to know or even be able to identify that other 
person. The offence of encouraging or assisting suicide can be committed 
even where a suicide or an attempt at suicide does not take place. 
19. It is no longer possible to bring a charge under the Criminal Attempts Act 
1981 in respect of a section 2 Suicide Act 1961 offence by virtue of 
paragraph 58 of Schedule 21 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
Attempts to encourage or assist suicide are now captured by the language 
of section 2, as amended. 
20. In the context of websites which promote suicide, the suspect may commit 
the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide if he or she intends that one 
or more of his or her readers will commit or attempt to commit suicide. 
21. Section 59(4) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 adds section 2A into 
the Suicide Act 1961. 
22. Section 2A provides that a person who arranges for someone else to do an 
act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of 
another person will also be liable alongside that second person for the 
encouragement or assistance. 
23. Section 2A also makes it clear that a person may encourage or assist 
another person even where it is impossible for the actual act undertaken by 
the suspect to provide encouragement or assistance - for example, where 
the suspect believes he or she is supplying the victim with a lethal drug 
which proves to be harmless. 
24. Finally, section 2A also makes it clear that a suspect who threatens or puts 
pressure on the victim comes within the scope of the offence under section 
2. 
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25. The amendments to section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 are designed to 
bring the language of the section up-to-date and to make it clear that 
section 2 applies to an act undertaken via a website in exactly the same 
way as it does to any other act. 
26. Prosecutors should consult the Ministry of Justice Circular 2010/03 which 
provides further detail about the changes made to section 2 of the Suicide 
Act. 
27. Where the act in question occurred on or before 31 January 2010, the 
former offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the suicide of 
another, or an attempt by another to commit suicide, contrary to the then 
section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, applies. 
28. In these cases, for the evidential stage to be satisfied, the prosecution must 
prove that:  
o the victim committed or attempted to commit suicide; and 
o the suspect aided, abetted, counselled or procured the suicide or the 
attempt. 
29. The prosecution also has to prove that the suspect intended to assist the 
victim to commit or attempt to commit suicide and that the suspect knew 
that those acts were capable of assisting the victim to commit suicide. 
30. In relation to an act done prior to 1 February 2010, it is possible in law to 
attempt to assist a suicide. Such an offence should be charged under the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981. 
31. This enables an individual to be prosecuted even where the victim does 
not go on to commit or attempt to commit suicide. Whether there is 
sufficient evidence of an attempt to assist suicide will depend on the 
factual circumstances of the case.  
Encouraging or assisting suicide and murder or manslaughter 
distinguished 
32. The act of suicide requires the victim to take his or her own life. 
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33. It is murder or manslaughter for a person to do an act that ends the life of 
another, even if he or she does so on the basis that he or she is simply 
complying with the wishes of the other person concerned. 
34. So, for example, if a victim attempts to commit suicide but succeeds only 
in making him or herself unconscious, a person commits murder or 
manslaughter if he or she then does an act that causes the death of the 
victim, even if he or she believes that he or she is simply carrying out the 
victim's express wish.  
Explaining the law 
35. For the avoidance of doubt, a person who does not do anything other than 
provide information to another which sets out or explains the legal 
position in respect of the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide under 
section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 does not commit an offence under that 
section.  
The public interest stage 
36. It has never been the rule that a prosecution will automatically follow 
where the evidential stage of the Full Code Test is satisfied. This was 
recognised by the House of Lords in the Purdy case where Lord Hope 
stated that: "[i]t has long been recognised that a prosecution does not 
follow automatically whenever an offence is believed to have been 
committed" (paragraph 44). He went on to endorse the approach adopted 
by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Attorney General in 1951, when he stated in 
the House of Commons that: "[i]t has never been the rule... that criminal 
offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution". 
37. Accordingly, where there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, 
prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in 
the public interest. 
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38. In cases of encouraging or assisting suicide, prosecutors must apply the 
public interest factors set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the 
factors set out in this policy in making their decisions. A prosecution will 
usually take place unless the prosecutor is sure that there are public 
interest factors tending against prosecution which outweigh those tending 
in favour. 
39. Assessing the public interest is not simply a matter of adding up the 
number of factors on each side and seeing which side has the greater 
number. Each case must be considered on its own facts and on its own 
merits. Prosecutors must decide the importance of each public interest 
factor in the circumstances of each case and go on to make an overall 
assessment. It is quite possible that one factor alone may outweigh a 
number of other factors which tend in the opposite direction. Although 
there may be public interest factors tending against prosecution in a 
particular case, prosecutors should consider whether nonetheless a 
prosecution should go ahead and for those factors to be put to the court for 
consideration when sentence is passed. 
40. The absence of a factor does not necessarily mean that it should be taken 
as a factor tending in the opposite direction. For example, just because the 
victim was not "under 18 years of age" does not transform the "factor 
tending in favour of prosecution" into a "factor tending against 
prosecution". 
41. It may sometimes be the case that the only source of information about the 
circumstances of the suicide and the state of mind of the victim is the 
suspect. Prosecutors and investigators should make sure that they pursue 
all reasonable lines of further enquiry in order to obtain, wherever 
possible, independent verification of the suspect's account. 
42. Once all reasonable enquiries are completed, if the reviewing prosecutor is 
doubtful about the suspect's account of the circumstances of the suicide or 
the state of mind of the victim which may be relevant to any factor set out 
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below, he or she should conclude that there is insufficient information to 
support that factor.  
Public interest factors tending in favour of prosecution 
43. A prosecution is more likely to be required if:  
1. the victim was under 18 years of age; 
2. the victim did not have the capacity (as defined by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005) to reach an informed decision to commit 
suicide; 
3. the victim had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed 
decision to commit suicide; 
4. the victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or 
her decision to commit suicide to the suspect; 
5. the victim did not seek the encouragement or assistance of the 
suspect personally or on his or her own initiative; 
6. the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; for example, 
the suspect was motivated by the prospect that he or she or a 
person closely connected to him or her stood to gain in some way 
from the death of the victim; 
7. the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide; 
8. the suspect did not take reasonable steps to ensure that any other 
person had not pressured the victim to commit suicide; 
9. the suspect had a history of violence or abuse against the victim; 
10. the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constituted 
the assistance him or herself; 
11. the suspect was unknown to the victim and encouraged or assisted 
the victim to commit or attempt to commit suicide by providing 
specific information via, for example, a website or publication; 
12. the suspect gave encouragement or assistance to more than one 
victim who were not known to each other; 
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13. the suspect was paid by the victim or those close to the victim for 
his or her encouragement or assistance; 
14. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, 
nurse, other healthcare professional, a professional carer [whether 
for payment or not], or as a person in authority, such as a prison 
officer, and the victim was in his or her care; 
15. the suspect was aware that the victim intended to commit suicide 
in a public place where it was reasonable to think that members of 
the public may be present; 
16. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a person involved 
in the management or as an employee (whether for payment or not) 
of an organisation or group, a purpose of which is to provide a 
physical environment (whether for payment or not) in which to 
allow another to commit suicide. 
44. On the question of whether a person stood to gain, (paragraph 43(6) see 
above), the police and the reviewing prosecutor should adopt a common 
sense approach. It is possible that the suspect may gain some benefit - 
financial or otherwise - from the resultant suicide of the victim after his or 
her act of encouragement or assistance. The critical element is the motive 
behind the suspect's act. If it is shown that compassion was the only 
driving force behind his or her actions, the fact that the suspect may have 
gained some benefit will not usually be treated as a factor tending in 
favour of prosecution. However, each case must be considered on its own 
merits and on its own facts.  
Public interest factors tending against prosecution 
45. A prosecution is less likely to be required if:  
a. the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed 
decision to commit suicide; 
b. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion; 
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c. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the 
definition of the offence, were of only minor encouragement or 
assistance; 
d. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking the 
course of action which resulted in his or her suicide; 
e. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on 
the part of the victim to commit suicide; 
f. the suspect reported the victim's suicide to the police and fully 
assisted them in their enquiries into the circumstances of the 
suicide or the attempt and his or her part in providing 
encouragement or assistance. 
46. The evidence to support these factors must be sufficiently close in time to 
the encouragement or assistance to allow the prosecutor reasonably to 
infer that the factors remained operative at that time. This is particularly 
important at the start of the specific chain of events that immediately led 
to the suicide or the attempt. 
47. These lists of public interest factors are not exhaustive and each case must 
be considered on its own facts and on its own merits. 
48. If the course of conduct goes beyond encouraging or assisting suicide, for 
example, because the suspect goes on to take or attempt to take the life of 
the victim, the public interest factors tending in favour of or against 
prosecution may have to be evaluated differently in the light of the overall 
criminal conduct.  
Handling arrangements 
49. Cases of encouraging or assisting suicide are dealt with in Special Crime 
Division in CPS Headquarters. The Head of that Division reports directly 
to the DPP. 
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50. Any prosecutor outside Special Crime Division of Headquarters who 
receives any enquiry or case involving an allegation of encouraging or 
assisting suicide should ensure that the Head of Special Crime Division is 
notified. 
51. This policy comes into effect on 25 February 2010 and supersedes the 
Interim Policy issued on 23 September 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 168
Bibliography 
 
Books and Journal articles  
Adams M. and Nys H. (2003) ‘Comparative Reflections on the Belgian  
Euthanasia Act 2002’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 11, pp. 353-376.   
 
Arlidge A. (2000) ‘The Trial of Dr David Moor’. Criminal Law Review, Jan, pp.  
31-40. 
 
Ashworth A. (2009) Principles of Criminal Law’. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 
 
Bar W., Ulrich Esther and Bosshard G. (2003) ‘748 cases of Suicide assisted by a  
Swiss right-to-die organisation’. Swiss Medical Weekly, Vol. 133, pp. 310-
317. 
 
Battin M.P. (2008) ‘Safe, Legal Rare? Physician-Assisted Suicide and Cultural  
Change in the Future’ in Birnbacher Dieter and Dahl Edgar (eds). Giving 
Death a Helping Hand: Physician-Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation 
and Public Policy. An International Perspective. The Netherlands: 
Springer, Vol. 36. 
 
________   (2005) Ending Life: Ethics and the way we die. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Bennion F. (2009) ‘Assisted Suicide: A Constitutional Change’. Criminal Law  
and Justice Weekly. Vol. 173, pp. 519-523. 
 
Bennett J. (1980) ‘Morality and Consequences’. The Turner Lectures on  
Human Values Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford University. May 
9th, 16th and 23rd. 
 169
________ (1966) ‘Whatever the Consequences’. Analysis, Vol. 26, No.3, pp.  
83-102. 
 
Biggs H. (2001) Euthanasia, Death with Dignity and the Law. Oxford; Portland  
and Oregon: Hart Publishing.  
 
Bossbard G., Ziegle S.J., Furter M., Imhof R.M., Imhof L., Huber C.A. and  
Fischer S. (2008) ‘Suicide assisted by two Swiss right-to-die 
organisations’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 34, pp. 810-814. 
 
Bossbard Georg, Fisher Susanne and Bar Walter. (2002) ‘Open regulation and  
practice in assisted suicide’. Swiss medical weekly, Vol. 132, pp. 527-534. 
 
Boyle J.M. (1980) ‘Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect’.  
Ethics, Vol. 90, No.4, pp. 527-538. 
 
Burgess J.A. (1993) ‘The great slippery-slope argument’. Journal of Medical  
Ethics, Vol. 19, pp. 169-174;  
 
Burns Seamus. (2008) ‘Public: Fettered Flexibility?’ New Law Journal, Vol. 158,  
p. 1708. 
 
Childress J.F. (1980) ‘Negative and Positive Rights’. The Hastings Center Report,  
Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 19. 
 
Chrispin E., English V., Harrison C., Sheather J. and Sommerville A. (2009)  
‘Ethics Briefings’. J. Med. Ethics, Vol. 35, pp. 335-336. 
 
Cohen-Almagor R. (2001) The Right to Die with Dignity: An argument in ethics,  
medicine, and law. New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London: Rutgers 
University Press. 
 
 170
Coggon John. (2006) ‘Could the Right to Die with Dignity represent a New Right  
to Die in English Law?’ Medical Law Review, Vol. 14, pp. 219-237. 
 
Cotterrell R. (1992) The Sociology of Law: An Introduction. London; Dublin;  
Edinburgh: Butterworths. 
 
Dahl E. and Levy N. (2006) ‘The Case for Physician assisted suicide: how ca it  
possibly be proven?’ J Med Ethics, Vol. 32, pp. 335-338. 
 
Dave Powell. (2009) ‘Assisting Suicide and the Discretion to Prosecute: Hard  
Cases and Good law?’ The Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 73, pp. 8-11. 
 
Devis M., Croall H. and Tyrer J. (2010) Criminal Justice. Harlow; England; etc.,:  
Pearson Educational Ltd. 
 
De Haan J. (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review,  
Vol. 10, pp. 57-75. 
 
Devettere R. (1995) Practical Decision Making in Health Care Ethics.  
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.  
 
Devlin Patrick. (1985) Easing the Passing: The Trial of Dr John Bodkin Adams.  
London: The Bodley Head. pp. 171-172. 
 
Dickenson D., Johnson M. and Katz J.S. (eds), (2000) Death, Dying and  
Bereavement. Second Edition. London; Thousand Oaks and New Delhi:  
SAGE Publications. 
 
Doyal Len. (2001) ‘Why should euthanasia and physician assisted suicide should  
be legalised’. British Medical Journal, Vol. 323, 1079-80. 
 
 171
Draper H. (1998) ‘Euthanasia’. In Chadwick R. (Ed.) Encyclopaedia of Applied  
Ethics, Vol. I. San Diego, Academic Press. 
 
Dworkin G., Frey R.G. and Bok S. (eds), (1998) Euthanasia and Physician- 
assisted Suicide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Dworkin R. (ed), (1977) The Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press.  
 
_____________ (1994) Life’s Dominion: An argument about Abortion,  
Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Dziewas R., Kellinghaus C. and Soros P. (2003) ‘The Principle of Double-Effect  
in a Clinical Context’. Poiesis Prax, Vol. 1, pp. 211-218.  
 
Easton Susan. (2008) ‘Constructing Citizenship: Making Room for Prisoners’  
Rights’. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 
127-146. 
 
FaFrance Arthur B. (2008) ‘Physician Assisted Death: The Oregon Experience’.  
Wyoming L. Rev, Vol. 8, pp. 333 – 346. 
 
Fenigsen Richard. (1989) ‘A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia’. The Hastings  
Center Report, Vol. 19, pp. 22-30. 
 
Finnis J.M. (1993) ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubicon? Law Quarterly Review, Vol.  
109, pp. 329-337. 
 
________ (1991) ‘Intention and Side-Effects’ in Frey R.G. and Morris C.W.  
(eds) Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 172
 Fischer S. Huber Carola A., Furter M., Imbof L., Imbof R. M., Schwarzenegger  
C., Ziegler S. and Bossbard G. (2009) ‘Reasons why people in 
Switzerland seek assisted suicide: the view of patients and physicians’. 
Swiss Medical Weekly, Vol. 139, pp. 333-338. 
 
Foot P. (1977) ‘Euthanasia’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 85- 
112. 
 
_____  (2008) ‘Safe, Legal Rare? Physician-Assisted Suicide and Cultural  
Change in the Future’ in Birnbacher Dieter and Dahl Edgar (eds). Giving 
Death a Helping Hand: Physician-Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation 
and Public Policy. The Netherlands: Springer, Vol. 36. 
 
Freeman, Michael. (2002). ‘Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Diane  
Pretty Case’. Medical Law Review. Vol. 10, pp. 245-270. 
 
Gansini L., Harvath T., Jackson Ann, Goy E.R., Miller L.L. and Delorit M.A.  
(2002) ‘Experiences of Oregon Nurses and Social Workers with Hospice 
Patients who requested assistance with Suicide’. The New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 347, pp. 557-563. 
 
Gansini L., Nelson H.D., Schmidt T.A., Kraemer D.F., Delorit M. A. and Lee  
M.A. (2000) ‘Physician’ Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act’. The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 342, pp. 557-563. 
 
George R. J. D., Finlay I.G. and Jeffrey D. (2005) ‘Legalised euthanasia will  
violate the rights of vulnerable patients’. British Medical Journal, Vol. 
331, pp. 684-685. 
 
Gillon Raanan. (1986) ‘Acts and Omission, Killing and Letting Die’. British  
 173
Medical Journal, Vol.292, pp. 211-218. 
 
Goff Robert. (1995) ‘A Matter of Life and Death’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 3,  
pp. 1-21 
 
Goss James. (2000) ‘A Postscript to the Trial of Dr. David Moor’. Criminal Law  
Review, July, pp. 568-570. 
 
Goy ER, Carlson B, Simopoulos N, Jackson A and Ganzini L. (2006)  
‘Determinants of Oregon hospice chaplains’ views on physician-assisted 
suicide’, Journal Palliate Care, Vol.22, No. 2, pp. 83-90. 
 
Griffiths, J., Weyers, H. and Adams, M. (2008) Euthanasia and Law in Europe.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Haan J.D. (2002) ‘The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review,  
Vol.10, pp. 57-75. 
 
Hale, D.B. (Lady Justice of Appeal) (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: when is there a right  
to die?’ Comm. L. World Rev. Vol. 32, pp. 1-14. 
 
Hall M., Trachtenberg F. and Dugan E. (2005) ‘The Impact on patient trust of  
legalising physician aid in dying’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 31, pp. 693-697. 
 
Harris N.M. (2001) ‘The Euthanasia Debate’. Journal of the Royal Army Medical  
Corps, Vol. 147, pp. 367-370.  
 
Heywood, R. (2010) ‘R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP: clarification on  
assisted suicide’. Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 125, pp. 393-396.  
 
Hirst M. (2009) ‘Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue’. Criminal  
 174
Law Review, p. 870. 
 
______ (2009) ‘Suicide in Switzerland: Complicity in England?’ Criminal Law  
Review, p. 335. 
 
Humphry, D. (2002) Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance and  
Assisted Suicide for the Dying. Third Edition. New York: Dell Publishing.  
 
Hurst S.A. and Mauron A. (2003) ‘Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in  
Switzerland: allowing a role for non-physicians’. Available at: 
http://www.chniternational.com/switzerland_and_assisted_suicide.htm
 
Huxtable R. and Moller M. (2007) ‘Setting a Principled Boundary?’ Euthanasia as  
a Response to Life Fatigue. Bioethics, Vol.21, pp. 117-126.  
 
________ (2007) Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise.  
New York: Routledge. Cavendish. 
 
___________ (2004) ‘Get out of jail free? The doctrine of double effect in  
English law’. Palliative Medicine, Vol. 18, pp. 62-65. 
 
Jackson Emily. (2010) Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Second edition.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
__________  (2008) ‘Secularism, Sanctity and the Wrongness of Killing’.  
BioSocieties, Vol. 3, pp. 125-145. 
 
Kennedy Ian. (1997) ‘Commentary 3: A Response to Lowe’. J. Med Ethics, Vol.  
23, pp. 161-163. 
 
Keown, J. (2009) ‘In Need of Assistance?’ New Law Journal, Vol. 159(7387)  
 175
1340-1341.  
 
________ (2003) ‘European Court of Human Rights: Death in Strasbourg –  
assisted suicide, the Pretty case, and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’. International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 1, pp. 722-730. 
 
_________ (2002) Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press.  
 
_________ (2000) ‘Beyond  Bland: a critique of the BMA guidance on  
withholding and withdrawing medical treatment’. Legal Studies, Vol. 20, 
No.1, pp. 66-84. 
 
_________ (1997) ‘Restoring moral and intellectual shape to the law after Bland’.  
Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 113, pp. 482-503. 
 
_________ (1995) Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, clinical and legal perspectives.  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
_________ (1992) ‘The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands’, Law  
Quarterly Review, Vol. 108, p. 78. 
 
Kugler I. (2003) ‘Two Concepts of Omission’. Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 14, pp.  
421-447. 
 
_______ (2002) Direct and Indirect Intention in the Criminal Law: And Inquiry  
into Degrees of Blameworthiness. England: Ashgate.  
 
Klein M. (2004) ‘Voluntary Active Euthanasia and the Double Effect Doctrine: A  
View from Germany’. Health Care Analysis, Vol. 12, No.3, pp. 225-240. 
Lady Hale Dame Brenda (2003) ‘A Pretty Pass: When is there a right to die?’  
 176
Comm. L. World Rev., Vol. 32, pp. 1-14. 
 
LaFrance A.B. (2008) ‘Physician Assisted Death: From Rhetoric to Reality in  
Oregon’. Wyoming Law Rev, Vol. 8, pp 333-346 
 
Leeuwen E.V. (2007) ‘The Role of Family in Euthanasia Decision Making’, HEC  
Forum, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 365-373. 
 
Lowe S.L. (1997) ‘The Right to Refuse Treatment is not a Right to be Killed’. J  
Med Ethics, Vol. 23, pp. 154-163. 
 
Marker R.L. (2006) ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Today’. Society, Vol. 43,  
pp. 59-67. 
 
McGee A. (2005) ‘Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze:  
Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia’. Medical Law Review, 
Vol. 13, pp. 357-385. 
 
McLean S. A. M. (1996) Death, Dying and the Law. Aldershot; Brookfield USA;  
Singapore; Sydney: Dartmouth.  
 
Meisel, Alan. (2003) ‘Quality of Life and End-of-Life Decisionmaking’. Quality  
of Life Research. Vol. 12, pp. 91-94. 
 
Mitchell J.B. (2007) Understanding Assisted Suicide. The University of Michigan  
Press. 
 
Moore M.S. (1997) Placing Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law. Oxford:  
Clarenden Press. 
 
__________ (1993) Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications  
 177
for Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarenden Press. 
 
Morris Dan. (2003) ‘Assisted Suicide under the European Convention on Human  
Rights: a critique’. European Human Rights Law Review, Vol.1, 65-91. 
 
Mullock Alexandra. (2009) ‘Prosecutors Making (bad) Law?’ Medical Law  
Review, Vol. 17, pp. 290 – 299. 
 
Narveson, J. (1999). Moral Matter. Canada: Broad View Press Ltd. 
 
Nys H. and Adams M. (2003) ‘Comparative Reflection on the Belgian Euthanasia  
Act 2002’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 11, pp 353-376 
 
Otlowski, M.F.A. (1997) Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law. Oxford:  
Clarendon Press. 
 
Palmer, Henry. (1975). ‘Dr. Adams’ Trial for Murder’ in (ed) Burke, J., and  
Allsop, P. The Criminal Law Review. London: Sweet and Maxwell 
Limited. 
 
Pedain Antje. (2003) ‘Intention and the Terrorist Example’. Criminal Law  
Review, Sept., pp. 579-593. 
 
Price David. (2009) ‘What Shape to Euthanasia after Bland? Historical,  
Contemporary and Futuristic Paradigms’. Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 
125, pp. 142-174. 
 
_________ (1997) ‘Euthanasia, Pain relief and Double effect’. Legal Studies, Vol.  
17, pp. 323-342. 
 
__________  (1996) ‘Assisted Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment:  
 178
Linguistics, Morals and Legal Contortions’. Medical Law Review, Vol. 4, 
pp. 270-299. 
 
Quill E.T., Dresser R. and Brock W.D. (1997) ‘The Rule of Double Effect – A  
Critique of its Rule in End-of-Life Decision Making’. The New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 337, pp. 1768-1771. 
 
Richard Nobles and David Schiff. (2010) ‘Disobedience to Law – Debbie Purdy’s  
Case’. Modern Law Review, Vol. 73, pp. 282-304.   
 
Sanderson, M.A. (2002) ‘ Pretty v United Kingdom. App. No. 2346/02’. The  
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 96, pp. 943-949. 
 
Saini Pushpinder (1999) ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Law of Murder’.  
Medico-legal Journal, Vol. 67, part 3, pp. 106-120. 
 
Scorer Richard. (2008) ‘Time for Change’. New Law Journal, Vol. 158, p. 193. 
 
___________   (2008) ‘Assisting Death’. New Law Journal, Vol. 158, p. 960. 
 
Shaw D.M. (2009) ‘Euthanasia and Eudaimonia’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, pp. 530- 
533. 
 
Simillis Constantinos. (2008) ‘Euthanasia: A Summary of the Law in England and  
Wales’. Medicine Science and the Law, Vol. 48, pp. 191-198. 
 
Simon C. (1998) ‘Last Rights: Euthanasia, the Sanctity of Life, and the Law in the  
Netherlands and the Northern Territory of Australia’. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, p. 392. 
 
Skegg (1978) ‘The Termination of Life-Support Measures and the Law of  
 179
Murder’. Modern Law Review, Vol. 41, pp. 423-436. 
 
Smith J.C. (2000) ‘A Comment on Moor’s Case’. Criminal Law Review, p. 41. 
 
Smith P. (1987) Criminal Law Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith. London:  
Butterworths. Somerville M. (2006) ‘Against Euthanasia’ Arts and 
Opinion Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 4. 
 
Somerville M. (2001) ‘Death Talk’: The Case against Euthanasia and Physician- 
assisted Suicide. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
 
Steinbock B. (2005) ‘The case for physician assisted suicide: not (yet) proven’. J  
Med Ehics, Vol. 31, pp. 235-241.  
 
Steinbock B. and Norcross A., (eds), (1994) Killing and Letting Die. New York:  
Fordham University Press. 
 
Steinbrook R. (2002) ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon – An Uncertain  
Future’. The New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 346, pp. 460-464. 
 
Stephens G.C. (2008) ‘From Pretty to Purdy: Suicide and Assistance from across  
the border – R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions’. Scots Law Times, Vol. 39, pp. 267-270. 
 
Suzanne Uniacke. (1994) Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification of  
Homicide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Torda A. (2005) ‘How far does a doctor’s “duty of care” go?’ Internal Medicine  
Journal, Vol.35, pp. 295-296. 
 
Tripp J.H. (1997) ‘Commentary.1: The Right to Refuse Treatment’. J. Med  
 180
Ethics, Vol. 23, pp. 159. 
 
Tur R.H.S. (2003) ‘Legislative Technique and Human Rights: the Sad Case of  
Assisted Suicide’. Criminal Law Review, Jan, pp. 3-12. 
 
Wal G. V.D and Dillmann R.J.M. (1994) ‘Euthanasia in the Netherlands’, BMJ,  
Vol.308, pp. 1346-1349. 
 
Wellman C. (1999) Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric?  
US: Westview Press. 
 
Williams Glanville (1977) ‘Letters to the Editor: Switching off life support  
machines’. Criminal Law Review, p.635. 
 
____________ (1973) ‘Euthanasia’. The Medico Legal Society, Vol.41, pp. 14- 
34. 
 
____________ (1958) The Sanctity of life and the Criminal Law. London: Faber  
and Faber Ltd. 
 
Williams Glenys. (2007) Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The  
Impact of Criminal Law Concepts on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. 
London; New York: Routledge. Cavendis. 
 
____________ (2001) ‘The Principle of Double Effect and Terminal Sedation’.  
Medical Law Review, Vol. 9, pp. 41-53. 
 
Wilson William. (2008) Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory. Third Edition.  
England; New York etc: Pearson Longman. 
 
____________ (2002) Central Issues in Criminal Theory. Oxford-Portland: Hart  
 181
Publishing. 
 
____________ (1995) ‘Is life sacred?’ Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law,  
Vol. 17, No.2, pp. 131-148. 
 
Wilson W and Smith K.J.M (1995) ‘The Doctors’ Dilemma: Necessity and the  
Legality of Medical Intervention’. Medical Law International, Vol. 1, pp. 
387-410.  
 
Young R. (2007) Medically Assisted Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Ziegler S.J. (2009) ‘Collaborated Death: An Exploration of the Swiss Model of  
Assisted Suicide for its potential to enhance oversight and demedicalize 
the dying process’. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, Vol. 37, pp. 318-
330. 
 
List of Cases 
A v United Kingdom [1984] 6 E.H.R.R. CD 140. 
 
Airedale Hospital Trustees v Bland [1992] UKHL 5. 
 
Attorney-General v Abel and others [1984] 1 QB 795. 
 
B v An NHS Trust [2002] 2 All ER 449. 
 
Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 E.H.R.R. 1. 
 
R v Hough [1984] 6 Cr App R (S) 406. 
 
 182
R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home  
Department intervening) [2002] 1. A.C. 800. 
 
R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutors (Society for the Protection of  
Unborn Children Intervention) [2009] 3. W.L.R. 403. 
 
R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 1 Cr. App. R. 32. 
 
R. (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2008] EWHC 2565 (Admin) 
 
R v Wallis [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 342. 
 
R v Woollin [1998] 3 WLR 382. 
 
Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam. 147. 
 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) (1994) 1 WLR 290. 
 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 Cr App. WLR, at 782. 
 
R Z (Local Authority: Duty) [2005] 1. W.L.R. 959. 
 
Case Comments 
Allen N. (2009) ‘Saving Life and Respecting Death: A Savage Dilemma’.  
Medical Law Review, 17, pp. 262-273. 
 
Buxton Richard. (2010) ‘R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP: Complicity in  
Suicide abroad’. Law Review, Vol. 126, pp. 1-5. 
 
Cartwright N. (2009) ’48 Years on: Is the Suicide Act fit for purpose?’  
Commentary. Medical Law Review, Vol. 17, pp. 467-476. 
 183
Chrispin E., English V., Harrison C., Sheather J. and Sommerville A. (2009)  
‘Ethics briefings’. J Med Ethics, Vol. 35, pp. 335-336.  
 
Cruz de Peter. (2005) ‘The Terminally Ill adult seeking assisted suicide abroad:  
the extent of the duty owed be a local authority.’ Commentary. Medical 
Law Review, Vol. 13, pp. 257-267. 
 
‘Health Care: Refusal of DPP to undertake not to prosecute applicant’s husband if  
he assisted applicant’s suicide’. (2002) European Human Rights Law 
Review, Vol. 5, 686-688. 
 
‘Manslaughter-ingredients of offence where death caused by gross negligence’.  
Criminal Law  Review, 1998, Nov. p. 833. 
 
Mason J.K. (2009) ‘Unalike as two peas? R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP’.  
Edinburgh Law Review, Vol. 13, pp. 298-302. 
 
Reports and Bills  
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill. Available at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk.pa/ld200405/ldasdy/86/5012004.ht
m
 
HC Deb 14 July 1961 vol 644 cc833-45. ‘Suicide Bill [Lords]’ at  
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1961/jul/14/suicide-bill-lords  
 
Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics HL Paper 21-I HMSO, 1994 at  
para 242. 
 
Select Committee on Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (First Report).  
 184
Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/86
07.htm
 
List of Statues 
The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
European Convention of Human Rights 1950 
Homicide Act 1957 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985  
Suicide Act 1961 
 
Websites and Newspaper articles   
Alexander Larry. (2000-2001) ‘Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of  
Issues’. Working Paper 22, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=270451. 
 
Assisted Suicide statistics: the numbers Dignitas helps to die, by country’. (25  
Feb. 2010) Available at: Guardian.co.uk 
 
‘Corrections and Clarifications’. (6 March 2010). Available at:  
http://www.guardian.ac.uk/theguardian/2010/mar/06/corrections-clarifications  
 
‘Crime File-Famous Criminal: Dr John Bodkin Adams’. Available at,  
http://www.crimeandinvestigation.co.uk/crime-files/dr-john-bodkin-
adams/biography.html
 
David Brown (3 April 2009) Dignitas founder condemned over plans to help  
healthy woman commit suicide. The Times Friday. 
 
 185
‘Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied Drugs for Life, But  
can Opt for Suicide’. Available at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Story?id=5517492&page=2
 
Decision on Prosecution - ‘The Death by Suicide of Daniel James’. (9 December  
2008). Available at: 
www.cps.gov.uk/news/nationalnews/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james.h
tml. 
 
‘Decision to charge loving mother Kay Gilderdale with attempted murder of ME  
daughter was right, says DPP’.  (26 Jan. 2010). Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.ac.uk/news/article-1246222/Keir-Starmer-says-decision-charge-
Kay-Gilderdale-attempted-murder-daughter-Lynn-public-interest.html#ixzz0zrNK
 
‘Dr Moor: Landmark Verdict’. (28 November 2000). Available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/background_ 
briefings/euthanasia/331263.stm
 
‘Guardian Daily: Assisted suicide and the law’. Available at:  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/audio/2010/jan/29/guardian-daily-
podcast
 
Finn G. (21 August 1999) ‘Graduate in Mercy killing bid freed’. Available at: The  
Independent. 
 
‘Harold Shipman: Timeline’ Available at, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2136444.stm  
 
Hirsch Afua. (25 Jan. 2010) ‘Kay Gilderdale Case: A Clear verdict on the Law’s  
Confusion on Assisted Suicide’ Available at: Guardian.co.uk  
 
 186
‘I helped my daughter die’. (1 Feb. 2010) Available at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00qs930/b00qs8mk/panorama_I_Helped_My_Da
ughter_Die/
 
‘Interim Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Assisted Suicide’.  
Available at:  
www.cps.gov.uk
 
‘InternationalTaskForce.org Available at:  
http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/assisted_suicide_laws.htm 
 
Mother ‘injected brain-damaged son with fatal dose of heroin to end misery’. (5  
Jan. 2010). Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime  
 
Ninemsn staff. (15 Jan. 2010). Available at:   
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/world/1000181/mother-explains-why-she-
killed-son-with-heroin  
 
‘Organised assisted suicide to be regulated’. Available at  
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/ejpd/en/home/dokumentation/mi/2009/2009-
10-28.html  
 
Polly Toynbee. (31 July 2009) ‘The 1961 Suicide Act instrument of State torture’.  
Available at: The Guardian. 
 
‘Prosecution of Offences Act 1985’. Available at: http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk
 
‘Respecting Patient Choices- What is a Doctors duty of care regarding end-of-life  
care?’ Available at, http://www.respectingpatientchoices.org.au/medico-
legal-general-faqs/what-is-a-doctors-duty-of-care-re
 
Schwarzenegger C. and Summers S. J. (2005) ‘Criminal Law and Assisted  
 187
Suicide in Switzerland’. Available at: www.rwi.unizh.ch/schwarzenegger  
 
Should law be changed on ‘Mercy Killing’? (26 Jan. 2010). Available at: BBC  
News Online. 
 
Smith Wesley (20 Feb. 2009) ‘Right to die’ can become a ‘duty to die’. Available  
at: Telegraph.co.uk. 
 
Smith Wesley (2008) ‘Another Assisted Suicide Abuse in Oregon: No Money to  
Help Live-Will Pay to Make Dead’. Available at: 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2008/07/29/another-
assisted-suicide-abuse-in-oregon-no-money-to-help-live-will-pay-to-
make-dead/
 
Smith Wesley. ‘Problems with Oregon Assisted Suicides are Real’. Available at:  
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2007/11/06/problems
-with-oregon-assisted-suicides-are-real/
 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Oregon Revised Statutes. Available at:  
http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/index.shtml 
 
‘The Suicide Act 1961’. Available at: http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk  
 
‘UK Statute Law Database’. Available at: http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk
 
Walsh Fergus (2009). How Julie brought back memories f a brave woman whose  
story I told. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/jan/25/assisted-suicide-short-
stay-switzerland  
 
 188
